Still other states favor intermediate steps in the form of confidence-building measures believing that such measures would constitute a constructive move towards the prevention of an arms race in outer space. The process of building confidence between states involves step-by-step reductions in perceptions of threat or conditions of uncertainty. In connection with military operations in space, the purpose of confidence-building measures is to obtain greater transparency and predictability through activities such as notification, verification, and monitoring, in order to reduce suspicion and tension between nations while enhancing international peace and stability. ( More ... )

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Billick, Thomas W. Arms Control Implications for Military Operations in Space. Maxwell AFB, AL: USAF Air University, May 2001. [ 6 quotes ] [ page 47 ]

 

At present, there are very few rules of the road relating to space. The Bush administration has adopted a muscular national space policy, and Air Force doctrine now calls for the ability to project power in, through and from space. At the same time, the administration has refused to talk about rules that could impinge upon the military uses of space, claiming that this constitutes a slippery slope to limiting U.S. freedom of action. Administration officials also have asserted that there is no military space problem that needs to be discussed.

This last argument seems particularly unsound after the Chinese test. Diplomacy certainly has its limits, and is no substitute for military preparedness, but complete freedom of action can turn space into a shooting gallery to every nation's detriment. Avoiding diplomatic engagement usually makes tough problems much worse, and puts Washington, not Beijing, in the doghouse. Increasing the safety of vital satellites is a topic worthy of discussion. Space, like military activities here on Earth, needs a code of conduct to promote responsible activities and to clarify irresponsible ones ( More ... )

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Katz-Hyman, Michael and Michael Krepon. "Irresponsible in Space." Defense News. February 5, 2007.

 

Finally, the United States and China need to recognize that they must make an effort to manage their emerging competition in military space in a manner that does not undercut their own national security, as well as the security of others. Breaking off nascent discussions about space cooperation in favor of launching a kind of Cold War in space is bound to backfire on both Washington and Beijing in the long run. Instead, a frank and open dialogue about each side's national security concerns in space is called for -- along with serious consideration of how a new code of conduct for behavior in space might be drafted to clearly demark the boundaries of acceptable and unacceptable behavior in space. ... Failure to act to restrain unfettered military competition in space is bound to result in a "Wild West" environment that raises the risks not only to Chinese and U.S. uses of space, but to the peace and prosperity of the entire world. ( More ... )

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Hitchens, Theresa. "U.S.-Sino Relations in Space: From "War of Words" to Cold War in Space." China Security. (Winter 2007): 12-30. [ 6 quotes ] [ page 27 ]

 

As the January Chinese A-Sat test demonstrates, the vulnerability problem in space is a global concern: All spacefaring nations stand to lose if a few operate irresponsibly. The most effective rejoinder to irresponsible behavior is not to mimic it, but to take the lead in laying out rules of the road that responsible spacefaring nations follow.

Irresponsible spacefaring nations interfere with another nation's space objects, use lasers in a harmful manner against space objects, and conduct activities, experiments or tests that result in the deliberate generation of persistent space debris. ( More ... )

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Katz-Hyman, Michael and Michael Krepon. "An Arms Race in Space Isn't the Problem." Space News. February 12, 2007.

 

BERNHARD BRASACK (Germany) speaking on behalf of the European Union, recalled that the European Union had unanimously voted in favour of General Assembly resolutions on transparency and confidence-building measures in outer space activities and on prevention of an arms race in outer space in the sixty-first General Assembly. The risk represented by space debris for the operability of space activities was an additional source for concern. From that point of view, some form of interaction between the work in the Conference and that of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space was desirable, and the European Union suggested the Conference consider the possibility of inviting the Chairman of the Committee to brief them on questions relevant to their work. The European Union stood ready to explore in a substantial manner the possibilities of preventing an arms race in outer space. The recent test of an anti-satellite weapons should serve as a wake up call in that regard and remind them of the urgency of the matter and their responsibility to act. More than ever a sense of proportion and a sense of responsibility were called for. A gradual and progressive approach was possible. The adoption of measures of transparency and confidence-building, as conducive towards the prevention of an arms race in outer space, could be discussed. Confidence-building measures could, among others, be based on the principle of non-interference with non-aggressive activities in space and drawing up a "code of conduct" and "rules of behaviour" or "rules of the road" in space.

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United Nations - Conference on Disarmament. "Conference on Disarmament Hears Statements from 17 States on Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space." . February 13, 2007.

 

The small satellite, which was called DART­ -- Demonstration of Autonomous Rendezvous Technology -- bumped into an experimental communication satellite known as MUBLCOM. Initially ground controllers just thought the satellite ran out of fuel as it approached MUBLCOM and bailed from the mission early so as to avoid a disaster. But shortly thereafter engineers at Orbital, the company which built both the $95 million DART and the MUBLCOM satellite, noticed that MUBLCOM was in a higher orbit than it was before the encounter. Four days later US Air Force Space Command, which maintains surveillance on over 10,000 objects in space, confirmed this observation. DART hit MUBLCOM and pushed it into a higher orbit. Luckily, for both craft, no damage was detected. The accident demonstrates the dangers of close quarters operations of satellites. Due to extremely high launch costs, still currently around $10,000 per kilogram, designers and engineers design satellites with the lightest materials possible, which means they are also very fragile. Combine this with the fact that satellites in low earth orbit are traveling at speeds exceeding seven kilometers per second, a collision in space can be catastrophic.

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Katz-Hyman, Michael. "Proximity Operations in Outer Space: The Case for a Code of Conduct." INESAP Information Bulletin. No. 26 (June 2006): 64-67. [ 4 quotes ]

 

Dangerous maneuvers can be misinterpreted as attacks or preparation for attacks. In addition, they can lead to debris generation if a collision occurs. Minimizing and notifying other states of planned maneuvers which may come close to other satellites is key. Under the Model Code, space-faring nations agree to avoid such dangerous maneuvers. If a mission requires a satellite to approach or to dock with another nation's spacecraft, nations agree to prenotify each other of such maneuvers. In the case of autonomous satellites and proximity operations, having clear guidelines on the proper behavior of satellites along with an improved space surveillance network will enhance the security of on-orbit satellites. One way to implement this would be with special caution areas around satellites. This would not prohibit close proximity operations but states maneuvering a satellite within the special caution zones would need to pre-notify and explain their actions. On the sea, this has meant that not only do naval ships not enter such areas without notification, but when they are near such areas they keep an open channel of communication. While the technical implementation of such areas in space would be challenging, they would provide an extra buffer in between very fragile satellites.

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Katz-Hyman, Michael. "Proximity Operations in Outer Space: The Case for a Code of Conduct." INESAP Information Bulletin. No. 26 (June 2006): 64-67. [ 4 quotes ] [ page 65 ]

 

Established and agree-upon rules in space will increase security for all nations. If there are understood acceptable behaviors of satellites it will be easier to identify when nations break such rules. It will also be politically easier to form coalitions to respond to such breaches. It will encourage nations to invest in the peaceful uses of space and to develop spacecraft that are potentially transformational, such as autonomous satellites, but not strategically provocative since they will adhere to responsible behaviors. Rules of the road which prevent dangerous actions will increase space assurance and therefore a nation's ability to operate in space. In short, rules of the road increase the freedom of action of nations as opposed to limit it.

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Katz-Hyman, Michael. "Proximity Operations in Outer Space: The Case for a Code of Conduct." INESAP Information Bulletin. No. 26 (June 2006): 64-67. [ 4 quotes ] [ page 66 ]

 

Many feel that these definitional problems are impossible to overcome if international agreement is to be reached. In answer to this, the Henry L. Stimson Center , in collaboration with a number of other nongovernmental organizations, has proposed a Code of Conduct for Space-Faring Nations. This code is still evolving, but its key feature is a pledge to avoid creating persistent space debris by following the guidelines of the Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordination Committee (IADC). Such a pledge would go a long way in protecting the world's economic interests in outer space by creating an international taboo against creating dangerous space junk. ...

Another important aspect of the proposed code is the call for nations of the world to share space surveillance data. Through a series of radars, ground-based optical telescopes, and even a camera onboard a satellite, the United States observes and tracks almost all the objects in space with diameters greater than 10 centimeters. The parameters necessary to calculate the orbits for most of these are provided on a website open to the public. Other countries also maintain such observations but do not share them. It would be an important confidence-building measure for all countries to share this information. ( More ... )

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Forden, Geoffrey. "After China's Test: Time For a Limited Ban on Anti-Satellite Weapons." Arms Control Today. Vol. 37, No. 3 (April 2007). [ 7 quotes ]

 

The United States should implement these satellite safeguards, and should also take the lead on developing “rules of the road” for space operations, and increasing transparency on space security issues. Rules of the road could include rules that establish a keep-out zone around satellites, and a method for notifying the owner of a satellite should another satellite need to violate this zone. In a similar manner as the Law of the Sea, such rules can defuse unnecessary tensions, and are especially useful during times of crisis. Diplomacy may not be perfect or solve all of the outstanding security requirements or tensions, but neither are military options perfect.

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Grego, Laura. "Statement of Dr. Laura Grego." Testimony before the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs. Ed. . Washington, D.C.: , May 23, 2007. [ 6 quotes ]

 

Adopt an international code of conduct on space behavior. Establishing a code of conduct or rules of the road would reinforce international norms about the right of countries to use space for peaceful purposes. This could limit China's ability to conduct future ASAT tests and to develop more effective systems. Both arms control and code of conduct approaches would impose limits on U.S. freedom of action in space. In addition, a ban against actions that produce space debris would not address strategic issues associated with ASAT weapons or prevent the development of capabilities that could deny or disrupt satellite services. However, the space debris issue could be helpful in mobilizing commercial interests to actively oppose ASAT weapons or actions that interfere with the operations of satellites.

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Lutes, Charles D. and Phillip C. Saunders. China's ASAT Test: Motivations and Implications. Washington, D.C.: Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, June 2007. [ 10 quotes ] [ page 4 ]

 

Instead of the elusive, legally binding treaty, violation of which might draw U.N. sanctions, the Stimson Center promotes the idea of a less formal "code of conduct," a halfway step by which governments pledge to avoid "harmful interference" with satellites, and not to test space weapons. The European Union and Canada are among those endorsing such a code.

"There's a growing consensus among nations, including space-faring and missile-possessing nations, that there should be some rules of the road, some standard for responsible behavior in space," said Daryl Kimball, of the Arms Control Association in Washington.

"A key is going to be what the next U.S. administration decides to do."

In a survey of presidential candidates by Washington's Council for a Livable World, Sen. Barack Obama backed a space code of conduct. Sen. Hillary Rodham Clinton said she would constrain space weaponization "as much as possible." Republican candidates did not respond.

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"U.S. Satellite Strike Sets Back Space Weapons Ban." Global Security Newswire. February 25, 2008.

 

Nonetheless, holding out for perfect agreements in space security talks—such as the complete bans on all possible means of space interference sought after by arms control purists and the doubt-proof verification required by hard-line skeptics—will continue to be the enemy of many good (and useful) space security agreements, unless national leaders show increased pragmatism. As in past periods, real-life agreements will never provide perfect security against all possible technologies of interference, and verification mechanisms will never be able to "prove" the complete absence of weapons-related capabilities (although they will get better and better at detecting and limiting them). However, partial or incremental solutions—such as rules of the road or specific bans against destructive ASAT testing—might work well enough to prevent near-term space conflict, if the relevant actors are willing. Steady engagement among key players over time may then have the chance to limit hostility and mistrust, leading to even better mechanisms. This type of step-by-step approach is not ideal, but, as both past and recent events have shown, it will likely serve the interests of all parties in space more effectively than taking no steps at all.

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Moltz, James Clay. "The Past, Present, and Future of Space Security." Brown Journal of World Affairs. Vol. 14, No. 1 (Fall / Winter 2007): 187-195. [ 3 quotes ] [ page 194 ]

 

While this article does not predict the future success of international efforts to prevent space conflicts, it does suggest that there are strong incentives for states to cooperate in space. Historical experience, however, shows that creative and sustained national leadership will be required if states are to overcome their mistrust and restrain natural tendencies toward active defenses in space. Critical among these factors will be the development and institutionalization of international space security talks toward a reconceptualized framework. Such a framework should downplay the current state- versus-state focus of many countries, and instead emphasize the notion of common security against shared threats in space—threats such as traffic control, conflicting broadcast frequencies, increasingly scarce geo-stationary orbital slots, and debris-producing space weapons. Perhaps greater awareness of the range of multilateral technical problems in space will encourage states to rethink some of their political assumptions about space competition, thus stimulating leaders to seek out new mechanisms for restraint-based cooperation.

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Moltz, James Clay. "The Past, Present, and Future of Space Security." Brown Journal of World Affairs. Vol. 14, No. 1 (Fall / Winter 2007): 187-195. [ 3 quotes ] [ page 194 ]

 

A good starting point would be the same Moral Code of Conduct for space that Forden highlights. The world community also needs to move forward toward a more complete space security effort, an acceptable and reciprocal mechanism involving such factors as international space situational awareness and the coordination of space traffic. The goal is to not only increase the safety of space operations, but also to provide a degree of transparency and cooperation with the aim of reducing tensions in space. These measures could have the same stabilizing effect on space security as National Technical Means had on arms control verification during the Cold War. It would also be advisable to implement such a solution in stages with a staggered process of engagement building upon shared goals. The key element in the process is that no nation should be forced to resort to the threat of or the use of counterspace as a primary piece of its national policy. There needs to be greater coordination and engagement on key issues which reflect the desire for all actors to preserve the free use of space, motivated by fundamental self-interest.

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Weeden, Brian. "How China "Wins" a Potential Space War." China Security. Vol. 4, No. 1 (Winter 2008): 134-147. [ 7 quotes ] [ page 144-145 ]