The American officials presume that Mr. Hu was generally aware of the missile testing program, but speculate that he may not have known the timing of the test. China's continuing silence would appear to suggest, at a minimum, that Mr. Hu did not anticipate a strong international reaction, either because he had not fully prepared for the possibility that the test would succeed, or because he did not foresee that American intelligence on it would be shared with allies, or leaked.

In an interview late Friday, Stephen J. Hadley, President Bush’s national security adviser, raised the possibility that China’s leaders might not have fully known what their military was doing. ( More ... )

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Sanger, David E. and Joseph Kahn. "U.S. Tries to Interpret China's Silence Over Test." New York Times. January 22, 2007.

 

China's prolonged silence about its destruction of the Feng Yun 1-C satellite, which it launched in 1999, has been almost as unnerving to its potential enemies (America, Japan and Taiwan especially) as the experiment itself. It was only this week—12 days after the event—that China grudgingly admitted that it had tested something in space. This has led to speculation that, as with an outbreak of severe acute respiratory syndrome, or SARS, in military hospitals in 2002-03, the army has not kept all arms of government informed. With the satellite, China still will not describe openly what actually happened.

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"Stormy weather." Economist. January 25, 2007.

 

This weapons test does not change the basic facts of the situation, and certainly not the balance of power in East Asia. While the US intelligence community was at last report still gathering data on the test, no new technology really seems to have been required. It can therefore be read not as a matter of pushing the envelope, but of China (in most respects) catching up to where the US and the Soviet Union were forty years ago—just as is the case with its manned space program. Nor is a single test the same thing as the organization of a militarily effective combat unit. Indeed, as the restraint of both superpowers during the Cold War demonstrated, it is not even a sign that the creation of such a unit is imminent. ( More ... )

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Elhefnawy, Nader. "Making Sense of China's Weapons Test." The Space Review. February 5, 2007.

 

If the Cold War space competition did not rise to the level of an arms race in some respects, there are strong reasons why the Chinese-U.S. competition can be even less intense. The Chinese leadership is smarter than the Soviet leadership. Beijing will not bankrupt itself in a military competition. Instead, the Chinese military will compete asymmetrically and cost-effectively. The People's Liberation Army (PLA) could employ temporary and reversible effects against U.S. satellites – the Pentagon's preference – or it could fight dirty, with kinetic energy weapons. Presumably one message of its crude A-Sat test was to clarify that, if push comes to shove, China will contest the Pentagon's objective of space control using weapons of its choosing.

Beijing's ambitions in space go well beyond this objective. China's space program is also intimately connected to its economic goals and status consciousness. Beijing's status has been damaged by creating an enduring hazard to space operations in low Earth orbit. Its economic ambitions also will be jeopardized if the Cold War taboo against destroying another nation's satellites is broken. The interconnectedness of the economic and military aspects of space power – another key difference from the Cold War – constitutes another reason why an arms race in space is unlikely.

The Pentagon also has learned important lessons from the Cold War. Back then, the United States had insufficient appreciation of the dangers of space debris. Now all stakeholders in space are keenly aware that debris constitutes an indiscriminate, lethal hazard. This is why the Chinese test was so irresponsible – and why Congress would further damage America's standing and security by emulating Chinese misbehavior.

Perhaps the most important reason why an arms race in space between the United States and China is unlikely is because a race is not required to mess up essential satellites. A single nuclear detonation can do extraordinary harm, as can a modest arsenal of old-fashioned kinetic energy weapons. Neither China nor the United States needs to race to mess up space.

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Katz-Hyman, Michael and Michael Krepon. "An Arms Race in Space Isn't the Problem." Space News. February 12, 2007.

 

Despite the need for an effective deterrent to meet security challenges that China may confront in space, it will not initiate a space weapons race with the United States or any other country. First, China does not have the ambition to enter a space weapons race. During the Cold War period, faced with a threat of nuclear war, China did not join in the nuclear weapons race between the United States and the Soviet Union. Today, China's space program is pointed in the direction of peaceful development. The new political and diplomatic doctrines – a harmonious society and world – also curb China's entrance to a space weapons race. Second, China does not have the ability to enter a space weapons race. Although China has ambitious plans in space, the technical gap, especially in the military area vis-à-vis the United States, is difficult if not impossible to fill. China will not and cannot expend significant budgetary resources pursuing space weapons, but will instead focus on civilian and commercial space assets. So, if China owns space weapons, their number and quality will be limited in their capacity to act as an effective defense mechanism and will not be a threat to other countries.

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Shixiu, Bao. "Deterrence Revisited: Outer Space." China Security. (Winter 2007): 2-11. [ 4 quotes ] [ page 10 ]

 

Officials concluded that China was unlikely to cancel the test and that there were few good options to punish China if they ignored an American warning to hold off. American intelligence agencies were loath to let the Chinese know they were aware of the state of their preparations.

Meeting Chinese demands for a negotiation on space-based weapons was not considered an option for the administration. The United States last tested an antisatellite weapon — a missile that was fired into space from an F-15 warplane — in 1985, and has no current program to develop a new antisatellite system.

With an eye on missile defense, however, the administration has sought to maintain maximum flexibility for American military operations in space. So the administration’s decision was to monitor China’s preparations and draft a protest that could be delivered after the test.

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"U.S. Knew of China's Missile Test, but Kept Silent." New York Times. April 23, 2007.

 

Gregory Kulacki and Jeffrey Lewis argued in a joint presentation that the common arguments about China's anti-satellite test—that the test was a shot across the bow of American space superiority or an attempt to force the U.S. into negotiations to restrict the development of space weaponry—are based on limited information and unreliable sources. Further, such explanations view China as a unified, rational decision maker, rather than a complicated bureaucracy in which conflicting interests compete for attention and resources, and mistakes can be made. Commentators and officials should be cautious in assessing Chinese intentions with limited information, Kulacki and Lewis advised at the Carnegie Endowment on November 13, 2007.

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Kulacki, Gregory and Jeffrey Lewis. "A Different View of China's ASAT Test -- Presentation at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace." Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, November 13, 2007 [ 1 reference ]