China's recent test (January 11, 2007) of a direct-ascent anti-satellite weapon is an aggressive and provocative act by China and should be viewed as a national security threat by the United States.
Keywords: Anti-Satellite Weapon (ASAT), China, Testing of Space Weapons.
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Chinese military officials have extensively studied how the United States has used satellite imagery in the Persian Gulf war, the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and in tracking North Korea's nuclear weapons program -- an area in which there has been some limited intelligence-sharing between Chinese and American officials. Several senior administration officials said such studies had included extensive analysis of how satellite surveillance could be used by the United States in case of a crisis over Taiwan. "This is a wake-up call," said Robert Joseph, the under secretary of state for arms control and international security. "A small number of states are pursuing capabilities to exploit our vulnerabilities." As a result, officials said, the Chinese test is likely to prompt an urgent new effort inside the Bush administration to find ways to counter China’s antisatellite technology. Among the options are efforts to “harden” vulnerable satellites, improve their maneuverability so that they can evade crude kinetic weapons like the one that destroyed the Chinese satellite and develop a backup system of replacement satellites that could be launched immediately if one in orbit is destroyed. Sanger, David E. and Joseph Kahn. "U.S. Tries to Interpret China's Silence Over Test." New York Times. January 22, 2007.
But Theresa Hitchens, a critic of the administration’s space arms research who is director of the Center for Defense Information, a private group in Washington that tracks military programs, said that China’s antisatellite test might be “a shot across the bow” meant to prod the Bush administration into serious negotiations. In the test, a Chinese missile pulverized an aging Chinese weather satellite more than 500 miles above Earth on Jan. 11. Ms. Hitchens warned that an arms race in space could easily spin out of control, noting that India has been “rattling its sword” and some experts in that country are openly calling for antisatellite arms. A global competition that produced armadas of space weapons, she added, could raise the risk of accidental nuclear war if, for instance, a whirling piece of space junk knocked out a spy satellite. Broad, William J. "Look Up! Is It a Threat? Or a Plea for a Ban?." New York Times. January 21, 2007.
China's successful anti-satellite missile test has sparked a political firestorm, as analysts have tried to ascertain who in China knew what when and to what end. Were China's diplomats in the dark about the missile strike? Was it all a gambit to force a reluctant United States to the negotiating table for a ban on space-based weapons? While interesting to China watchers and nonproliferation experts, this discussion risks obscuring the real message of the test: Chinese rhetoric notwithstanding, China's rise will be as disruptive and difficult as that of any other global power. ( More ... ) Economy, Elizabeth. "China's Missile Message." Washington Post. January 25, 2007. [ page A25 ]
Chinese authorities acknowledge their country is a newcomer in space, and insist they aren't challenging the leading position of the Americans, or of the Russians, for that matter. However, China’s recent ASAT tests may have been a deterrent signal, planting seeds of doubt about the assumption of U.S. supremacy in space. A decade ago, the Chinese regime showed its displeasure with pro-independence politicians on Taiwan by conducting live missile tests near the island. (Beijing considers Taiwan a renegade province that must be reunited with the mainland—by force, if necessary.) In a warning to Beijng to lay off, Washington moved two aircraft carrier groups near the Taiwan Strait. Now, although it's far from operational, Beijing appears to be seeking the capability to cripple the satellites on which U.S. military operations depend—which could change the calculation in any future Taiwan crisis. "The U.S. relies heavily on specialized satellites, so this test might make the U.S. think over whether they would want to get involved in the Taiwan Strait," says Arthur Ding, a security analyst at Taipei's National Chengchi University. "Can U.S. and China Avoid Space Arms Race?." Newsweek. January 27, 2007.
Lacking an official explanation from the Chinese government, analysts are forced to divine Beijing’s motives. China’s actions do not appear to be aimed at coercing the United States to negotiate a space weapons treaty. If this were the case, it would seem that the Foreign Ministry would have issued a statement immediately following the test’s revelation. In fact, despite private consultations in Washington and Beijing prior to the U.S. announcement, the Foreign Ministry initially appeared ignorant of the matter. In contrast, when China detonated its first nuclear weapon in October 1964, its official statement read: "The Chinese Government hereby solemnly proposes to the governments of the world that a summit conference of all the countries of the world be convened to discuss the questions of the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons, and that as the first step, the summit conference conclude an agreement to the effect that the nuclear powers and those countries which may soon become nuclear powers undertake not to use nuclear weapons either against non-nuclear countries and nuclear-free zones or against each other". Pollpeter, Kevin L. "Motives and Implications Behind China's ASAT Test." . January 25, 2007.
China’s ASAT test raises unsettling questions about China’s commitment to arms control, the ramifications of its rise as a major power, its military posture and foreign policy toward the United States and Chinese civil-military relations. Its secretive nature and hesitancy to admit to the test raises questions regarding whether China was ever serious about banning space weapons and whether it was actually engaging in “lawfare”—a strategy aimed at ensnaring the United States in legal commitments to which China never had the intention of abiding. Moreover, its official statements regarding the test only seem to add confusion to China’s stance on space weaponization. A Foreign Ministry spokesman stated that China “opposes weaponization and an arms race in outer space. Our position has not changed” (The Washington Post, January 23). Such actions also raise suspicions about China’s adherence to other arms control measures, such as its adherence to a similarly principled moratorium on nuclear testing. Pollpeter, Kevin L. "Motives and Implications Behind China's ASAT Test." . January 25, 2007.
China’s test could also undermine its campaign to assuage concerns about its potential rise. Its space diplomacy has heretofore been exemplary and has managed to accentuate civil and commercial applications and international cooperation rather than national security issues. Moreover, world opinion has been overwhelming against U.S. policy toward space (China Brief, January 10). China has tried to reassure the international community that it “will not engage in any arms race or pose a threat to any other country,” but the ASAT test could send a signal that its outward diplomacy belies an inner aggressiveness, especially since the majority of countries oppose the weaponization of space [7]. China’s test could also trigger the United States into developing space weapons and lead to an arms race in space. Pollpeter, Kevin L. "Motives and Implications Behind China's ASAT Test." . January 25, 2007.
Finally, the test defies explanation in terms of the bilateral relationship. U.S.-China relations are at a high point and cross-Strait relations remain relatively stable. Yet, the ASAT test is just one of several provocative actions taken by China recently. In August 2006, National Reconnaissance Office Director Donald M. Kerr confirmed that a U.S. satellite had been painted by a Chinese laser, and in October 2006 Pacific Command Commander Admiral William J. Fallon confirmed that a Chinese Song-class submarine had surfaced within five miles of the carrier USS Kitty Hawk (The Washington Post, January 19; BBC, November 16, 2006). All incidents seem to send the message that the PLA has adopted a more aggressive posture toward the United States. While military issues are just one aspect of the overall relationship with China, its importance can have important spillover effects to the entire relationship. China’s ASAT test, coupled with other provocative actions, may play into the hands of those in the United States who believe security issues should play a stronger role in tempering U.S.-China relations—a consequence which China hopes to avoid. The test can be used to argue against greater positive-sum engagement with China and to counter claims that China is a more responsible stakeholder in the international arena. Unfortunately, it remains unclear whether the Chinese leadership even understands how poorly it has miscalculated. Pollpeter, Kevin L. "Motives and Implications Behind China's ASAT Test." . January 25, 2007.
The lack of coordinated action by the Chinese government suggests that the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) either is acting alone in this matter or has such influence or acts with such little supervision that it can take significant actions without notifying other government organizations or even the top Chinese leadership. Interviews in Beijing by U.S. scholars strongly suggest, for example, that the PLA Navy did not tell the Foreign Ministry that it was planning to transit a Han-class nuclear submarine through Japanese waters in November 2004. The ASAT program may be too highly classified to have informed the Foreign Ministry about the test, and in the culture of extreme secrecy that permeates the Chinese government, it may be unwilling to even acknowledge the test. Indeed, U.S. officials have expressed concern that the delayed response from the Chinese government may indicate that even President Hu Jintao, who also serves as the head of the Central Military Commission, did not know about the test, or at the least did not know the specifics (The New York Times, January 19). Such a scenario presents troubling questions concerning civilian oversight of the PLA and the extent to which the PLA is its own powerbase. Pollpeter, Kevin L. "Motives and Implications Behind China's ASAT Test." . January 25, 2007.
In the last decade or so, as scientists came to agree that the number of objects in orbit had surpassed a critical mass — or, in their terms, the critical spatial density, the point at which a chain reaction becomes inevitable — they grew more anxious. Now, experts say, China’s test on Jan. 11 of an antisatellite rocket that shattered an old satellite into hundreds of large fragments means the chain reaction will most likely start sooner. If their predictions are right, the cascade could put billions of dollars’ worth of advanced satellites at risk and eventually threaten to limit humanity’s reach for the stars. ( More ... ) Broad, William J. "Orbiting Junk, Once a Nuisance, Is Now a Threat." New York Times. February 6, 2007.
The potential proliferation of technologies demonstrated in Beijing's Jan. 11 ASAT test underscores the need for Israel to protect its growing space arsenal, said Defense Minister Amir Peretz and Maj. Gen. Elyezer Shkedy, commander of Israel's Air and Space Force. "We are well aware of attempts by hostile states, especially by Iran, to acquire an independent space-launch capability," Peretz said of Tehran's plans to convert its Shahab-3 ballistic missile into a satellite launch vehicle. "We're also aware that … only recently a nation like China proved its ability to physically strike orbiting satellites. This capability compels us to prepare for the most difficult scenarios, in the event that, in the future, enemy states will be able to harm Israeli space assets." ( More ... ) Opall-Rome, Barbara. "Israel Wary of China ASAT Test." Defense News. February 6, 2007.
BRIAN TODD, CNN CORRESPONDENT: Well, Wolf, the Chinese already blinded one U.S. satellite temporarily when they illuminated it last year. And experts say this latest missile test exposes at least two major weaknesses of America's military in space. TODD (voice-over): The first weakness, the U.S. military's dependence on satellites. If hostilities broke out, experts say China could take out dozens of America reconnaissance or communication satellites within hours. Then... JOHN TKACIK, HERITAGE FOUNDATION: We simply couldn't function. You couldn't get data through. You couldn't get voice communications. You couldn't get any kind of telecommunications. You couldn't see the battle space. TODD: The second weakness, vulnerability. Experts say many American GPS satellites which guide smart weapons and troop movements are more than a thousand miles into space, mostly out of range of China's ballistic missiles. But the reconnaissance satellites, which take pictures of the targets for those bombs, missiles and soldiers, are sitting ducks. JOHN PIKE, GLOBALSECURITY.ORG.: Our imagery and intelligence satellites are in orbit only a few hundred miles up, the same altitude as the target satellite the Chinese shot down. TODD: And experts tell us the reconnaissance satellites the U.S. military does have are too big, about the size of a city bus, easy targets. Tkacik, John J. and John Pike. "Situation Room: January 19, 2007." CNN : , January 19, 2007 - 19:00 ET [ 1 reference ]
BRIAN TODD, CNN CORRESPONDENT: Well, Wolf, the Chinese already blinded one U.S. satellite temporarily when they illuminated it last year. And experts say this latest missile test exposes at least two major weaknesses of America's military in space. TODD (voice-over): The first weakness, the U.S. military's dependence on satellites. If hostilities broke out, experts say China could take out dozens of America reconnaissance or communication satellites within hours. Then... JOHN TKACIK, HERITAGE FOUNDATION: We simply couldn't function. You couldn't get data through. You couldn't get voice communications. You couldn't get any kind of telecommunications. You couldn't see the battle space. TODD: The second weakness, vulnerability. Experts say many American GPS satellites which guide smart weapons and troop movements are more than a thousand miles into space, mostly out of range of China's ballistic missiles. But the reconnaissance satellites, which take pictures of the targets for those bombs, missiles and soldiers, are sitting ducks. JOHN PIKE, GLOBALSECURITY.ORG.: Our imagery and intelligence satellites are in orbit only a few hundred miles up, the same altitude as the target satellite the Chinese shot down. TODD: And experts tell us the reconnaissance satellites the U.S. military does have are too big, about the size of a city bus, easy targets.
Further, if the ASAT test was part of an effort to drive the United States into space-related negotiations with China, again it may backfire – at least in the near term. It is true that there has been a chorus of calls for the United States to now undertake efforts to ban ASATs, or at a minimum, ASATs that create debris. For example, Rep. Ed Markey, D-Mass., stated: "American satellites are the soft underbelly of our national security, and it is urgent that President Bush move to guarantee their protection by initiating an international agreement to ban the development, testing, and deployment of space weapons and anti-satellite systems." Industry weekly Space News also urged the Bush administration to change course and consider "whether new and verifiable accords – such as a ban on the testing of anti-satellite weapons in space," noting that it "only makes sense to ban an activity that increases debris that threatens the satellites of multiple countries." However, there are no signs that the administration intends to heed such advice. Rather, quite the opposite. ( More ... ) Hitchens, Theresa. "U.S.-Sino Relations in Space: From "War of Words" to Cold War in Space." China Security. (Winter 2007): 12-30. [ 6 quotes ] [ page 22 ]
Even more puzzling, and perhaps more worrisome, is the possibility – as has been speculated by some U.S. officials – that perhaps the Chinese leadership didn't really understand what risks the test might entail, and that the People's Liberation Army (PLA) may have been less than forthcoming in briefing the leadership about those risks. U.S. National Security Adviser Stephen Hadley suggested in an interview with The New York Times that it was possible that Chinese President Hu Jintao and other senior leaders may not have been fully aware of the military's plans regarding the test. "The question on something like this is, at what level in the Chinese government are people witting, and have they approved?" Hadley said. 11 U.S. analysts are divided on that question; and it may be that the initial response from the Bush administration was designed to give Hu some wiggle room to "save face." Nonetheless, there is a fairly strong consensus that, at a minimum, the Chinese Foreign Ministry was neither informed nor ready to respond to the outcry that ensued. Hitchens, Theresa. "U.S.-Sino Relations in Space: From "War of Words" to Cold War in Space." China Security. (Winter 2007): 12-30. [ 6 quotes ] [ page 21 ]
Likewise, the Chinese action may spur Japan not only to speed its efforts at developing missile defenses but possibly to develop military space capabilities. "It may fuel the argument that Japan should develop space technology for national defense, especially as it came in the midst of the North Korean nuclear crisis," said Yasunori Matogawa, a professor of space engineering at the Institute of Space and Astronautical Science, part of the Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency. Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe said Tokyo had demanded an explanation from the Chinese government; while Foreign Minister Taro Aso criticized Beijing for failing to give advance notice of the test which he doubted was for "peaceful use" of space. Japanese officials have continued to charge that the Chinese government has yet to give a full and credible account of the test and future plans. Hitchens, Theresa. "U.S.-Sino Relations in Space: From "War of Words" to Cold War in Space." China Security. (Winter 2007): 12-30. [ 6 quotes ] [ page 25 ]
Even if we are facing the worst case scenario and China is bent on space weaponization (entirely inconsistent with its past behavior), the reality remains that China can be brought to the negotiating table with appropriate measures and international pressure. After all, China clearly remains the far weaker space power vis-à-vis the United States and a space race would be proportionately far more costly to China than the United States. But in order for progress to be made, the United States also needs to come to terms with a new reality. China's ASAT test was a voice of opposition both to the structure of security in space and the U.S. pursuit of military dominance in space at the exclusion of others. And thus, it is actually America's response to the ASAT test that may be even more important in how the future of space security plays out. China probably has both the technological and financial means to compete with the United States in space over the long term. If the United States concludes it must meet a threat with more threat, it may invite a military race in outer space and China may just give it to them. If the United States can muster the political will and leadership to restrain its reaction, there is still hope. But flexibility and sacrifice will be essential. Hagt, Eric. "China's ASAT Test: Strategic Response." China Security. (Winter 2007): 31-51. [ 5 quotes ] [ page 43 ]
The official debris count from China’s anti-satellite missile test has reached 957 pieces big enough to be tracked and NASA's Orbital Debris Program Office is estimating more than 35,000 pieces larger than 1 cm. This makes the January 11 test the largest debris-generating event in history, surpassing the previous record set in 1996, according to Dr. T.S. Kelso. Dr. Kelso serves as Senior Research Astrodynamicist in the Center for Space Standards & Innovation (CSSI) and webmaster of CelesTrak, a site dedicated to tracking space objects and monitoring them for in-orbit collisions. STK-generated videos courtesy of CSSI (www.centerforspace.com) "Chinese ASAT Test." . March 5, 2007.
The official debris count from China’s anti-satellite missile test has reached 957 pieces big enough to be tracked and NASA's Orbital Debris Program Office is estimating more than 35,000 pieces larger than 1 cm. This makes the January 11 test the largest debris-generating event in history, surpassing the previous record set in 1996, according to Dr. T.S. Kelso. Dr. Kelso serves as Senior Research Astrodynamicist in the Center for Space Standards & Innovation (CSSI) and webmaster of CelesTrak, a site dedicated to tracking space objects and monitoring them for in-orbit collisions. STK-generated videos courtesy of CSSI (www.centerforspace.com)
STK-generated videos courtesy of CSSI (www.centerforspace.com)
Even today, information remains a highly prized and seldom-shared commodity in Chinas Leninist system. The Chinese government is stovepiped: the most critical linkages across agencies take place at the very top, with little horizontal communication or information sharing at the lower, working levels of government. In fact, Chinese bureaucrats tend to hoard information to ensure that rivals cannot manipulate it to their advantage. Although this dynamic is found in all bureaucracies, the current Chinese system takes it to an extreme. The PLA, which has long had considerable leeway to carry out its business as it saw fit, remains a particularly compartmentalized and secretive structure. Does this mean that the PLA operates as a rogue organization? No. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) still controls the gun. Hu Jintao--who simultaneously heads the PLA (as chair of the Central Military Commission), the CCP (as its general secretary), and the state (as the country's president)--straddles the main parts of the political hierarchy. As the only civilian on the Central Military Commission, the country's most important civil-military communication node, Hu plays a singularly critical role. He was undoubtedly aware of and supportive of the ASAT testing program. But after obtaining explanations from Chinese diplomats about the ASAT test in January, officials from the United States and around the world concluded that the leaders of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs had not been informed of--much less consulted about--it in advance. It took the ministry nearly two weeks to come out with a terse acknowledgment and explanation. Even as late as ten days after the incident, Chinese Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing said that he had "not received any confirmed information" about it. Chinese diplomats called in to explain themselves to governments around the world were often at a loss; they, too, were in the dark. Gill, Bates and Martin Kleiber. "China's Space Odyssey: What the Antisatellite Test Reveals About Decision-Making in Beijing." Foreign Policy. Vol. 86, No. 3 (May/June 2007). [ 1 reference ]
This stunning demonstration was remarkable for several technical reasons. To begin with, there is no evidence that Chinese space managers manipulated the flight parameters of the target satellite before the mission to make it easier to hit; rather, the attack was executed on a spacecraft that was flying as fast-7.42 kilometers a second-as an intercontinental ballistic missile would be when entering the earth's atmosphere. Further, the satellite was destroyed by a unitary hit-to-kill payload--a bullet hitting a bullet. China has, therefore, surpassed the erstwhile Soviet Union, which in its heyday could do little beyond attempting to kill space targets by spraying them with shrapnel from a conventional fragmenting warhead. Finally, the interceptor missile was still rising when it hit the target, a technically more difficult task than destroying it on its descent. ( More ... ) Tellis, Ashley J. Punching the U.S. Military's "Soft Ribs": China's Anti-Satellite Weapon Test in Strategic Perspective. Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, June 2007. [ 15 quotes ] [ page 1 ]
Yet the 12 days of silence after the test argues against a premeditated desire on Beijing's part to force negotiations of an international treaty banning space weapons. If arms control had been the goal, then the test should have been accompanied by a clear government statement to that effect, not denials and thin rhetoric. By contrast, the Beijing authorities had a presumably coordinated public statement ready on the day of China's first nuclear test in 1964: "The Chinese Government hereby solemnly proposes to the governments of the world that a summit conference of all the countries of the world be convened to discuss the questions of the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons, and that as the first step, the summit conference conclude an agreement to the effect that the nuclear powers and those countries which may soon become nuclear powers undertake not to use nuclear weapons either against non-nuclear countries and nuclear-free zones or against each other." A calculated, coordinated effort to coerce the United States to the negotiating table would have likely have included a similar statement of principles about opposition to weaponization of space. Mulvenon, James. "Rogue Warriors?—A Puzzled Look at the Chinese ASAT Test." China Leadership Monitor. No. 20 (Winter 2007): 1-7. [ 2 quotes ] [ page 12 ]