While China is expanding its military space program, they are not currently pursuing the technology and programs they would need to mount an effective challenge to U.S. conventional dominance.
Keywords: China, U.S. Navy.
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If the goal is to gain asymmetric advantage, China should invest primarily in those systems that pose a greater risk to the US or offer greater potential for asymmetric advantage. These include satellite reconnaissance, SIGINT, ASAT and microsatellites. Satellite navigation and communications increase the capabilities of Chinese forces; satellite reconnaissance and anti-satellite programs degrade the capabilities of U.S. forces. China over-invests in navigation and communications satellites. These programs pose less of a challenge to the U.S. and will create less of an advantage for Chinese forces than satellite reconnaissance and anti-satellite capabilities. ( More ... ) Lewis, James A. "China as a Military Space Competitor." Perspectives on Space Security. Ed. Audrey M. Schaffer. Washington, D.C.: Space Policy Institute, December 2005. [ 8 quotes ] [ page 95 ]
China has sought to extend its surveillance capabilities, which have been limited to date by the need to use either ground or aerial platforms, and will probably use any new space-based assets to watch the sea areas around Taiwan. U.S naval forces could still retain an element of surprise the further away they are from the Island. This may require positioning ships further out and launching aircraft at a greater range, which will increase aerial refueling requirements and complicate aircraft recovery. Stealth is not an option for aircraft carriers, so the U.S. may also have to rely more on the use of submarine forces. Spoofing capabilities for ships or for battle groups may also be necessary. ( More ... ) Lewis, James A. "China as a Military Space Competitor." Perspectives on Space Security. Ed. Audrey M. Schaffer. Washington, D.C.: Space Policy Institute, December 2005. [ 8 quotes ] [ page 110 ]
If China does not invest in space surveillance, the effect is to limit the effectiveness of their new purchases. Despite upgrades to their naval forces and weaponry, the Chinese do not seem to be in any rush to deploy supporting ELINT satellites. This may be only a temporary delay, it could reflect either satisfaction with current levels of collection or a conscious decision not to expend resources on ELINT, or it might be a failure to fully understand the interconnection between space assets and terrestrial force. The best way for foreign analysts to determine if China has increased its SIGINT capabilities in a naval context would be to look for new kinds of antennae on Chinese naval vessels or new kinds data relays coordinated with missile-firing exercises. ( More ... ) Lewis, James A. "China as a Military Space Competitor." Perspectives on Space Security. Ed. Audrey M. Schaffer. Washington, D.C.: Space Policy Institute, December 2005. [ 8 quotes ] [ page 102 ]
The answers to these questions should influence how the US responds to the threats China’s ASAT represents. There is at least one way to answer these questions: "war-gaming" a massive Chinese attack on US satellites, where China is only limited by the laws of physics and the known properties of their ASAT, and see how much damage could be done. Such an exercise also reveals what the US could do, and what it could not do, to minimize the consequences. The results of my calculations are reported here. They assume that China launches a massive attack and that everything works exactly as planned: every ASAT launches, the US does not respond until after the attacks are launched even though it will have overwhelming evidence ahead of time, and every ASAT hits its target. Thus, this is a worst case scenario for the United States. In the end, we'll show, the US would still has sufficient space assets to fight a major conventional war with China, even after such an attack. America's military capabilities would be reduced, for a few hours at a time. But they would not be crippled. Back in 2001, a commission lead by Donald Rumsfeld warned of a "space Pearl Harbor," a single strike that could cripple America's satellite network. It turns out, there is no such thing. Forden, Geoffrey. "How China Loses the Coming Space War." Wired Magazine. January 10, 2008.