Iran does not have the capabilities or motivation to pose a serious threats to U.S. interests in outer space. Despite its rhetoric to the contrary, it relied on Russia for its partially successful satellite launch and its efforts to develop an indigenous launch capability have been plagued by bureaucratic and structural barriers for decades.
Keywords: Iran.
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After examining almost thirty years of Iran's handling of the project [to launch a communications satellite], the question also arises whether the project will ever materialize. Many times over the years Iran has concluded contracts that have repeatedly come to naught. Iran's difficulties in obtaining its own communications satellite are even more conspicuous against the background of other Middle East states' success in this domain. ( More ... ) Shapir, Yiftah S. "Iran's Efforts to Conquer Space." Strategic Assessment (JCSS). Vol. 8, No. 3 (November 2005). [ 2 quotes ]
Nevertheless, a close examination of the projects that Iran has been engaged in indicates its great difficulty in attaining these capabilities. Iran has failed to reach even the basic stages in these grandiose projects after many years of effort, stages that other states attained a long time ago. The reasons for this failure are not clear but they seem to be linked to the government's inherent inability to coordinate government agencies, resolve conflicting demands, and mobilize the required resources for the projects. In other words, Iran is motivated to achieve far-reaching goals. Iran also has a significant technological infrastructure. Nevertheless, the engine is stalled and important projects are being delayed. If this assessment is correct and the Iranian failure is a deep systemic failure, this could point to questions on Iran's capability to materialize other ambitious programs, such as in the realms of ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons. ( More ... ) Shapir, Yiftah S. "Iran's Efforts to Conquer Space." Strategic Assessment (JCSS). Vol. 8, No. 3 (November 2005). [ 2 quotes ]
The dictates of asymmetric warfare suggest that while rudimentary forms of space related initiatives by Tehran and Pyongyang cannot be ruled out in the future, it is more likely that they would seek to produce casualties on the ground rather than to try to damage inanimate objects in space. The proximity of forward-deployed U.S. forces, as well as America's allies and friends, provides a ''target-rich''environment for asymmetric attacks. Covert attacks against the U.S. homeland by various means would also seem to be more likely than easily attributable attacks against U.S. satellites. ( More ... ) Katz-Hyman, Michael and Michael Krepon. "Viewpoint: Space Weapons and Proliferation." Non Proliferation Review. Vol. 12, No. 2 (July 2005): 323-341. [ 15 quotes ] [ page 331-2 ]
One UK missile expert, however, says the test has "very little military significance". Doug Richardson, editor of the defence industry publication Jane's Missiles and Rockets, told New Scientist that the rocket would have a horizontal range of roughly 300 kilometres (185 miles), or 200 km (125 miles) with a heavy warhead – about the same as a Scud missile. "No breakthrough" "The performance is similar to that of existing solid-propellant Iranian tactical missiles," Richardson adds. "It's no big breakthrough." Knight, Will. "Iranian Rocket Test has 'Little Military Significance'." New Scientist. February 26, 2007.