Iran does not have the capabilities or motivation to pose a serious threats to U.S. interests in outer space. Despite its rhetoric to the contrary, it relied on Russia for its partially successful satellite launch and its efforts to develop an indigenous launch capability have been plagued by bureaucratic and structural barriers for decades.
Keywords: Iran.
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After examining almost thirty years of Iran's handling of the project [to launch a communications satellite], the question also arises whether the project will ever materialize. Many times over the years Iran has concluded contracts that have repeatedly come to naught. Iran's difficulties in obtaining its own communications satellite are even more conspicuous against the background of other Middle East states' success in this domain. ( More ... ) Shapir, Yiftah S. "Iran's Efforts to Conquer Space." Strategic Assessment (JCSS). Vol. 8, No. 3 (November 2005). [ 2 quotes ]
Nevertheless, a close examination of the projects that Iran has been engaged in indicates its great difficulty in attaining these capabilities. Iran has failed to reach even the basic stages in these grandiose projects after many years of effort, stages that other states attained a long time ago. The reasons for this failure are not clear but they seem to be linked to the government's inherent inability to coordinate government agencies, resolve conflicting demands, and mobilize the required resources for the projects. In other words, Iran is motivated to achieve far-reaching goals. Iran also has a significant technological infrastructure. Nevertheless, the engine is stalled and important projects are being delayed. If this assessment is correct and the Iranian failure is a deep systemic failure, this could point to questions on Iran's capability to materialize other ambitious programs, such as in the realms of ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons. ( More ... ) Shapir, Yiftah S. "Iran's Efforts to Conquer Space." Strategic Assessment (JCSS). Vol. 8, No. 3 (November 2005). [ 2 quotes ]
The dictates of asymmetric warfare suggest that while rudimentary forms of space related initiatives by Tehran and Pyongyang cannot be ruled out in the future, it is more likely that they would seek to produce casualties on the ground rather than to try to damage inanimate objects in space. The proximity of forward-deployed U.S. forces, as well as America's allies and friends, provides a ''target-rich''environment for asymmetric attacks. Covert attacks against the U.S. homeland by various means would also seem to be more likely than easily attributable attacks against U.S. satellites. ( More ... ) Katz-Hyman, Michael and Michael Krepon. "Viewpoint: Space Weapons and Proliferation." Non Proliferation Review. Vol. 12, No. 2 (July 2005): 323-341. [ 15 quotes ] [ page 331-2 ]
One UK missile expert, however, says the test has "very little military significance". Doug Richardson, editor of the defence industry publication Jane's Missiles and Rockets, told New Scientist that the rocket would have a horizontal range of roughly 300 kilometres (185 miles), or 200 km (125 miles) with a heavy warhead – about the same as a Scud missile. "No breakthrough" "The performance is similar to that of existing solid-propellant Iranian tactical missiles," Richardson adds. "It's no big breakthrough." Knight, Will. "Iranian Rocket Test has 'Little Military Significance'." New Scientist. February 26, 2007.
According to Tarikhi, satellite-based remote sensing is one of ISA's top priorities. "Although the Mahdasht Receiving Station in northwest of Tehran was one of the first receiving stations around the world to receive [data and imagery] from Landsat, it failed to continue its activity properly and favorably due to the advent of the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1978," said Tarikhi. "This raised the idea of having self-owned satellites to secure the needs of the country for remote sensing data in addition to other demands [including] communications and broadcasting, for instance." [1] Omid is described by Tarikhi as an experimental satellite that is taking orbital measurements while opening the door to "more sophisticated systems carrying the remote sensing tools as well". There is a definite link between what the ISA is pursuing in space via Omid, and what APSCO sees as one of its top priorities. "APSCO plans to develop remote sensing assets as one of its primary activities and programs. It would be beneficial for its members and would bring to them lots of economic and social benefits," said Tarikhi. Brown, Peter J. "Iran's New Satellite Challenges China." Asia Times. February 9, 2009.
Iran's Omid project clearly supports the objectives of APSCO, and shares elements with another Chinese space initiative known as the Multilateral Cooperation on Space Technology Applications initiative in the Asia-Pacific region (AP-MCSTA). Iran has participated in this project along with China and Thailand, to name a few. These three countries are contributing as well to a joint mission to design and manufacture the Small Multi-Mission Satellite (SMMS) which will function as an Earth observation and disaster monitoring platform. Tarikhi never mentioned the Asia-Pacific Regional Space Agency Forum (APRSAF) which was established in 1993 under the oversight of what is now known as the Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA). This happened in response to the declaration adopted by the Asia-Pacific International Space Year Conference (APIC) in 1992. While one encounters a few Asian nations that belong to both APSCO and APRSAF simultaneously, there are distinctly political overtones to the split between APSCO and APRSAF. India, Japan and South Korea, for example, are members of APRSAF but not APSCO, while Iran belongs to APSCO, but not APRSAF. Regional space politics in Asia are complex indeed. Brown, Peter J. "Iran's New Satellite Challenges China." Asia Times. February 9, 2009.
Still, the record is clear. The ISA [Iranian Space Agency] has been involved in various peaceful United Nations-sponsored joint space activities for decades, and Iran is a participant in another forum, the Asia-Pacific Space Cooperation Organization (APSCO). China organized ASPCO in 2005, and it now includes Iran along with Bangladesh, Indonesia, Mongolia, Pakistan, Peru, Thailand and Turkey. While there will be no attempt made here to somehow assert that China exerts any real influence over Iran's activities in space via APSCO, China stands to benefit enormously from anything that calls attention to, or otherwise underscores, China's efforts to foster the civilian and peaceful side of the global dual-use space technology agenda. As an established regional space forum in Asia, APSCO has served this purpose well. Besides having much to say about APSCO, [Parviz] Tarikhi's broader track record to date cannot be dismissed or overlooked. He has contributed years of service to the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (UN-COPUOS). Among other things, he co-chaired the Action Team of UNISPACE-III which has tried to develop a comprehensive worldwide environmental monitoring strategy. He and other ISA personnel have worked closely with senior officials from countries like Nigeria and Indonesia, something that US President Barack Obama might ponder. In fact, as a senior member of the ISA team, Tarikhi's record embodies the ISA's commitment to developing assets in space both for peaceful purposes and for use as part of various multinational space projects. In an article published in "Position" magazine last June entitled, "Iran's Ambitions in Space" Tarikhi emphasized that "Iran has pursued a space program for many years. It first embraced the idea of using space and its technologies for peaceful purposes in 1958, when it joined 17 other countries to establish the UN ad hoc Committee for International Cooperation on Space (which later became UN-COPUOS)." Brown, Peter J. "Iran's New Satellite Challenges China." Asia Times. February 9, 2009.
Finally, any scenario involving conflict with Iran includes the possibility that that country would use its ballistic missiles to attack US space assets. Because attacking a specific satellite would involve tracking and targeting resources that Iran does not possess, such an attempt would amount to a blind strike against the orbital environment. By scattering debris at altitudes used by the United States' ISR satellites, Iran could hope to degrade or disable as many such satellites as possible. Although this threat is real, many reasons argue against carrying it out. First, debris clouds are indiscriminate and would potentially damage satellites from every nation that uses those specific altitudes. The guaranteed international condemnation would only serve to strengthen the US political position globally with respect to the conflict. Second, the United States' ability to model and track debris clouds to a certain extent would enable it to mitigate some postattack risk from debris. Finally, the use of Iranian ballistic missiles in this manner would make them unavailable for attacks against US forces on the ground. Weston, Scott A. "Examining Space Warfare: Scenarios, Risks, and US Policy Implications." Air & Space Power Journal. XXIII, No. 1 (Spring 2009): 73-82. [ 7 quotes ] [ page 79 ]