Contrary to the views of space sanctuary and space arms control advocates, fear of an emerging US capability to destroy Chinese satellites is not the primary catalyst behind Beijing's counterspace moves. Chinese interests in space weapons do not hinge on winning a potential US-Chinese ASAT battle or participating in a space arms race. Two other motivations play a much greater role in cultivating China's desire for counterspace weapons: to counter the space-enabled advantage of US conventional forces; and to guarantee the viability of Chinese nuclear forces in the face of emerging American missile defenses. ( More ... )

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France, Martin E.B. and Richard J. Adams. "The Chinese Threat to US Superiority." High Frontier Journal. Vol. 1, No. 3 (Winter 2005): 17-22. [ 12 quotes ] [ page 18 ]

 

Already the United States is pursuing a number of military systems that could be used to attack targets in space from Earth or targets on Earth from space. To China, current U.S. deployment of a Ground-Based Midcourse Missile Defense system represents an intentional first step toward space weaponization. China experts argue that the interceptors of the system based in Alaska and California could be used to attack satellites.After all, such systems could be easily adapted to target satellites, which are more fragile and more predictable than ballistic missile warheads. If the United States is determined to ensure �space dominance,� it would first want to use such weapons to negate an adversary�s satellites. ( More ... )

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Zhang, Hui. "Action/Reaction: U.S. Space Weaponization and China." Arms Control Today. Vol. 35, No. 10 (December 2005). [ 10 quotes ]

 

Beijing is even more concerned about U.S. plans for a robust, layered missile defense system. Such a system would provide the capability to engage ballistic missiles in all phases of flight: soon after they are launched, at the height of their trajectory, and as they descend. These are known as the boost, midcourse, and terminal phases, respectively. In particular, China is concerned about interceptors and other defenses that the United States would like to position in space. ( More ... )

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Zhang, Hui. "Action/Reaction: U.S. Space Weaponization and China." Arms Control Today. Vol. 35, No. 10 (December 2005). [ 10 quotes ]

 

Chinese experts are concerned that even a limited missile defense system could neutralize China�s fewer than two dozen single-warhead ICBMs that are capable of reaching the United States. �It is evident that the U.S. [national missile defense] will seriously undermine the effectiveness of China�s limited nuclear capability from the first day of its deployment,� said Ambassador Sha Zukang, the former director-general of the Department of Arms Control and Disarmament at the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs. �This cannot but cause grave concerns to China,� he said.Some Chinese fear that, whether or not the U.S. missile defenses are as effective as planned, U.S. decision-makers could act rashly and risk a disarming first strike once the system is operational. ( More ... )

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Zhang, Hui. "Action/Reaction: U.S. Space Weaponization and China." Arms Control Today. Vol. 35, No. 10 (December 2005). [ 10 quotes ]

 

China is particularly concerned that space weaponization could limit its civilian and commercial space activities and negatively affect its economic development. Today, China has various operational civilian satellites in space, a family of launchers, a modern space-launch complex, and a growing list of customers in the international satellite-launch market. ... The U.S. pursuit of space control would threaten China�s civilian and commercial space activities and perhaps even deny China access to space. ( More ... )

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Zhang, Hui. "Action/Reaction: U.S. Space Weaponization and China." Arms Control Today. Vol. 35, No. 10 (December 2005). [ 10 quotes ]

 

A U.S. move into space could also lead China to reconsider its support for the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). China signed the CTBT in 1996 and has not yet ratified it, partly because it was rejected by the U.S. Senate in 1999. However, U.S. missile defense and space weaponization plans would make Chinese ratification even more difficult. China may feel the need for additional nuclear tests if the need to counter a missile defense drives Beijing to develop new warheads that include decoys or maneuverable warheads. Already, China faces concerns from some experts who think that the CTBT will put more direct constraints on China�s nuclear weapons program than on the weapons programs of other states. ( More ... )

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Zhang, Hui. "Action/Reaction: U.S. Space Weaponization and China." Arms Control Today. Vol. 35, No. 10 (December 2005). [ 10 quotes ]

 

On October 15, 2003, China became only the third nation to send a man into space. Astronaut Lieutenant Colonel Lang Liwei�s 21-hour orbit made him an instant hero in China and reaffirmed Beijing�s commitment to modernize the PLA. Observant during the Cold War, Desert Storm, Allied Force, Enduring Freedom, and Iraqi Freedom, Chinese leaders saw the effect of space support to air, land, and sea operations. They witnessed the value of space enhancement across everything from basic command and control to intelligence gathering to weapon accuracy. In a few instances, they have even begun to capitalize on this recognition. ( More ... )

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Meteyer, David O. The Art of Peace: Dissuading China from Developing Counter-Space Weapons. USAF Academy, CO: USAF Institute for National Security Studies, August 2005. [ 20 quotes ] [ page 34-5 ]

 

Although the U.S. government claims ‘rogue states’ such as North Korea and Iran as putative targets for such programs, China increasingly perceives itself as an intended loser -- as a robust U.S. missile defense network and an arsenal of space-based weapons could effectively negate China’s nuclear deterrent and thus trigger a destabilizing arms race. The rationale for China’s angst comes from a number of places. ( More ... )

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Hagt, Eric. "Mutually Assured Vulnerabilities." China Security. Vol. 1, No. 2 (2006): 84-106. [ 6 quotes ] [ page 85 ]

 

While it does not currently appear to be the case, China could seek an asymmetrical advantage in space as well, since parity is technically and economically out of the question for some time, and perhaps not even needed to be a space power. Currently, however, Beijing does not have a coherent military space architecture, but rather it appears to be actively pursuing a wide-range of capabilities. China watched the United States establish space dominance in the first Gulf War, Kosovo, Afghanistan and Operation Iraqi Freedom. It realized how far behind it was. “We are so dominant in space that I pity a country that would come up against us,” said Maj. Gen. Franklin Blaisdell, director of space operations for the Air Force, eight days before Operation Iraqi Freedom began. Nevertheless -- or perhaps at least partly pushed by that pronouncement -- China clearly feels compelled to develop military space capabilities. ( More ... )

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Johnson-Freese, Joan. "Strategic Communication with China: What message about space?." China Security. Vol. 1, No. 2 (2006): 37-57. [ 2 quotes ] [ page 51 ]

 

China’s Foreign Ministry spokesman Liu Jianchao insisted, “This test was not directed at any country, and does not constitute a threat to any country.” But that sounded a tad disingenuous. Chinese officials have made no secret of their anxiety—and impatience—over the U.S. refusal to ban weapons in space, despite Chinese and Russian pressure on Washington to do so. The U.S. National Space Policy unveiled last October asserts the right to deny anyone deemed “hostile to U.S. interests” access to space—a declaration that one Chinese official described as reeking of “the overpowering smell of gunpowder.” Teng Jianqun, deputy director of the China Arms Control and Disarmament Association, wrote that the “hegemonic flavor” of the new policy “betrays an intense determination to exercise control over space.”

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"Can U.S. and China Avoid Space Arms Race?." Newsweek. January 27, 2007.

 

The similarity of the Chinese and U.S. visions of the military use of space suggests that at the same time that the U.S. Defense Department makes very public statements about threats to the U.S. space infrastructure, the need to control space, and the inevitability of space weaponization, these statements are then used by the Chinese to justify the militarization and weaponization of their own space program. In a 7 February 2001 Liberation Army Daily article, one author writes that the United States "maintains that a space war is inevitable" and that through the use of space the "United States can occupy a commanding height in issuing a threatening signal to opponents to make them stop their threat of armed force, and thus reach its goal of 'forcing the enemy to surrender without a fight.'" The author concludes: Space fighting is not far off. National security has already exceeded territory and territorial waters and airspace and territorial space should also be added. The modes of defense will no longer be to fight on our own territory and fight for marine rights and interests. We must also engage in space defense as well as air defense. Consequently, the U.S. Defense Department may unwittingly be producing a security dilemma where its own efforts to protect its systems may be driving others to develop systems to counter U.S. space efforts. This may suggest, at the least, that Defense Department pronouncements about its vision for the use of space should not be made so public and, at the most, may require the U.S. Defense Department to examine how its actions may affect U.S. security.

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Pollpeter, Kevin L. "The Chinese Vision of Space Military Operations." China's Revolution in Doctrinal Affairs: Emerging Trends in the Operational Art of the Chinese People's Liberation Army. Ed. David M. Finkelstein. Alexandria, VA: CNA Corporation, December 2005. [ 9 quotes ] [ page 351 ]

 

The NSP presents a number of challenges to China's security environment. First, it grants the United States with exclusive rights to space: the right to use any and all necessary means to ensure American security while at the same time denying adversaries access to space for "hostile purposes." This sets up an inequitable environment of "haves" and "have-nots" in space, raising suspicion amongst nations. For instance, the NSP declares that U.S. space systems should be guaranteed safe passage over all countries without exception (such as "interference" by other countries, even when done for the purpose of safeguarding their sovereignty and their space integrity). With its significant space assets and military space capabilities, this situation gives the United States an obvious and unfair strategic advantage in space. Second, it refutes international restrictions and undercuts potential international agreements that seek to constrain America's use of space. This effectively undermines any potential initiatives put forth by the international community to control space weaponization– initiatives that China supports. This U.S. position leads the global community to suspect U.S. unilateralist intentions in space. Lastly, while the policy may not state it explicitly, a critical examination of its contents suggest its intention to "dissuade and deter" other countries, including China, from possessing space capabilities that can challenge the United States in any way– a parameter that would effectively disallow China to possess even a minimum means of national defense in space. The resultant security environment in space is one with one set of rules for the United States and another set of rules for other nations. In such a context, only U.S. security concerns are taken into account with a result of the reinforcement of a zero-sum dynamic to which space is already prone and threatens to pressure others into a military space race.

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Shixiu, Bao. "Deterrence Revisited: Outer Space." China Security. (Winter 2007): 2-11. [ 4 quotes ] [ page 2-3 ]

 

Open source Chinese publications reflect Beijing's increased interest in spaceborne targets. In a 1995 meeting, members of China's Central Military Commission (CMC) listed an adversary's "nervous system and brain" as essential objectives in modern warfare. In a 1998 article, Captain Shen Zhongchang, Director of Research and Development at the Navy Research Institute in Beijing, described "mastery of outer space" as a precondition for victory in future battles. In 1999, the Vice Minister of COSTIND stated, "Since GPS is playing an ever-increasing role in long-range precision attacks, precision bombing, accurate deployment of troops, requests for reinforcements and unified actions for command and control, anti-satellite systems centered on satellite navigation will be developed..." It is apparent Chinese strategists have identified American space systems as a Center of Gravity and seek to degrade this asymmetric advantage through development of counterspace means.

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France, Martin E.B. and Richard J. Adams. "The Chinese Threat to US Superiority." High Frontier Journal. Vol. 1, No. 3 (Winter 2005): 17-22. [ 12 quotes ] [ page 18 ]