Opponents of the U.S. will not have to match U.S. space weapons technology to compete in outer space. They can counter U.S. space superiority assymetrically or by developing cheaper and less technical versions of U.S. space weapons.
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The rub, of course, is that potential adversaries may not elect to emulate American approaches to the military use of orbital space. A regional opponent primarily concerned with preventing the United States from projecting its military power into its region of the world could choose to exploit space assets in very different ways than mirroring American capabilities. Some focused capabilities in orbit along with a willingness to combat or negate US advantages derived from space using terrestrial means could very well go far to level the playing field between the United States and a future regional opponent. ( More ... ) Watts, Barry D. The Military Use of Space: A Diagnostic Assessment. Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, February 2001. [ 8 quotes ] [ page 95 ]
Moreover, America's technical lead could be rendered less important even where it does not shrink. America's advantage over Iraq and Yugoslavia was that it was an information-age power fighting an industrial-age power, and the disparity between two information-age powers is likely to be less significant than that. The theft or import of technology may be no substitute for homegrown research and development, but a cheap knock-off may in some cases be good enough to get the job done. This is especially so if the knock-off can be produced in large numbers. The dual-use character of so much space technology and the fact that others are likely to be able to imaginatively combine various technologies, improvise, adapt, and even innovate mean it can not be assumed that other states will always field inferior systems. ( More ... ) Elhefnawy, Nader. "Four Myths About Space Power." Parameters. (Spring 2003): 124-32. [ 6 quotes ] [ page 125 ]
Finally, it has been widely acknowledged that a power disadvantaged in satellites and space-based weapons could use a variety of cheaper weapons and tactics to reduce American space superiority. High-flying drones can provide a partial substitute for a shortage of adequate satellites, at least regionally. Such a capability may be less extensive, secure, or reliable in particular respects than what the United States possesses, but it will be there nonetheless. At the same time, low-budget powers can use a variety of techniques to attack American satellites, including hacker warfare or earth-based laser weapons which will have advantages over the space-based variety. ( More ... ) Elhefnawy, Nader. "Four Myths About Space Power." Parameters. (Spring 2003): 124-32. [ 6 quotes ] [ page 126 ]
The second lesson to remember from the development of air power is that countermeasures to any new technology are actively pursued by those nations threatened by the new technology. “Throughout the ages, it has been an iron law of weapons development for new concepts to be negated eventually by offsetting countermeasures.”11 The invention of radar by Great Britain to detect incoming German aircraft during WWII provides just one example. If space assets used for war are seen as threatening to a nation, that nation, or a coalition of similarly threatened nations, will seek to counter it. ( More ... ) Liller, Dwayne. "America Needs Space." High Frontier Journal. Vol. 2, No. 1 (September 2005): 34-37. [ 3 quotes ] [ page 35 ]
Similarly, a number of measures could be developed to counter a space-based interceptor. One countermeasure would be to develop technology to boost rockets faster, rendering important boost-phase defenses impotent. China has already made steps in this direction by developing solid-fuel ICBMs that burn faster than its previous liquid-fueled missiles. If the spaced-based laser were to be revived, specific countermeasures could be developed. The countermeasures could include rotating the missile to distribute the laser energy over a wide area, thus preventing the missile from being damaged, or protecting the vulnerable parts of the ICBM with reflective or ablative coatings. Moreover, the attacker could simultaneously launch several ICBMs or an ICBM with some theater or tactical ballistic missiles used as decoys from a compact area to overwhelm space-based weapon systems. ( More ... ) Zhang, Hui. "Action/Reaction: U.S. Space Weaponization and China." Arms Control Today. Vol. 35, No. 10 (December 2005). [ 10 quotes ]