U.S. national security depends upon the military's ability to deny adversaries the means to achieve their objectives. The proliferation of satellite communication and intelligence capabilities means the U.S. may need to disable an adversaries space assets in future conflicts. In the long-term, the U.S. may also need anti-satellite weapons to defeat an adversaries' force projection space weapons.
Keywords: Anti-Satellite Weapon (ASAT).
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The arguments in favor of weaponizing space center around the fact that the United States relies heavily on space-based assets for both military and commercial needs. Protecting these assets will become increasingly important as access to space becomes cheaper and the technology needed for this access becomes more available. ( More ... ) Spacy, William L. Does the United States Need Space-Based Weapons?. Maxwell AFB, AL: USAF Air University, September 1999. [ 11 quotes ] [ page 3-4 ]
We can see how these tools might lead to effective denial of an adversary's access to commercial or other space-based service. ... As the targeted corporation sees increasing percentages of its revenue-producing assets turned off, it becomes ever more likely that the corporation would voluntarily deny service to the targeted party. After an initial few demonstrations of US capability and commitment, the mere presence of a few microsats escorting commercial satellites could be sufficient to establish and maintain embargoes in future crises. ( More ... ) Shaw, John E. and Simon P. Worden. Whither Space Power?: Forging a Strategy for the New Century. Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama: Air University, 2002. [ 8 quotes ] [ page 108 ]
While working to develop offensive capabilities for applying force from space, the Air Force must not neglect a defensive capability against similar weapons. While it is broadly assumed that the United States will not face a peer competitor for the next twenty years, some of these technologies that could threaten the United States will not mature for at least that long. There will be a convergence between the rise of a peer competitor and the maturing of technologies that could threaten U.S. military dominance. ( More ... ) Bell, Thomas D. Weaponization of Space: Understanding Strategic and Technological Inevitabilities.. Maxwell AFB, AL: USAF Air University, January 1999. [ 2 quotes ]
It also suggested to thoughtful observers that the United States should not count on an indefinite monopoly in this field--particularly as spaced-based products and services became increasingly available in the commercial market. The consequences of facing an enemy with the same or similar capabilities of observing the battlefield from space or providing precise navigation data to its forces would be profound. ... Thus, in future conflicts, the United States would no doubt want to deny the use of space capabilities to its enemies, lest they achieve the same advantages in space. The central dilemma is how to accomplish both ends-protecting one's own use of space, while at the same denying it to an adversary. ( More ... ) Klotz, Frank G. Space, Commerce, and National Security. Washington, D.C.: Council on Foreign Relations, January 1999. [ 12 quotes ] [ page 15 ]
Failure to fully develop and test such capabilities and such weapons could make the United States vulnerable to surprises from other nations in the future. Gen. John L. Piotrowski, former commander of the U.S. Space Command said, on many occasions, that when it came to space weapons the one thing the United States couldn’t afford to be was second. A robust program developing capabilities for space control should be laid out to explore new technologies, integrate them into new weapons systems, and fully test them both in laboratory and field demonstrations. Since the goal would be not to deploy such weapons until absolutely required (and when that time would come is unknown), an urgent "crash" program is not needed. However, unless aggressive programs (in terms of funding and schedules) are developed, little progress will be made. In this time of strategic pause, programs can be implemented that are aggressive, but take the necessary time–time to fully explore different technologies and thoroughly test and check out systems when developed. If the systems actually reach maturity, and there is still no pressing need for deployment, they can be set aside until such a situation arises. ( More ... ) Hyten, John E. A Sea of Peace or a Theater of War: Dealing with the Inevitable Conflict in Space. Urbana-Champaign, IL: Program in Arms Control, Disarmament and International Security, April 2000. [ 8 quotes ]
Given that doing nothing in the face of enemy aggression in space is not an attractive option, and diplomatic demarches and economic sanctions may not achieve the desired results, national security planners must be prepared in advance with a range of options for the impending contingency of responding to hostile interference with US interests in space. The tailoring of responses involving military activities must take into account the possibility that the adversary may not own or operate spacecraft or find a tat-for-tat response sufficiently compelling to change its behavior. Deterring additional strikes and disarming the enemy's ability to inflict further damage on critical US space assets should take priority. Countering the enemy's space control weapons, C2, and targeting, as noted above, will be important approaches to achieving such a counterforce mission objective. ( More ... ) Berkowitz, Marc J. "Protecting America's Freedom of Action in Space." High Frontier Journal. Vol. 3, No. 2 (March 2007): 13-18. [ 11 quotes ] [ page 17 ]
The ideal way, if possible, to protect our space assets is to dissuade others from developing and deploying ways to threaten them, but given the many ways available and the difficulty of identifying potential threats, this does not provide sufficient confidence. Besides, the United States has not been successful in dissuading at least a small number of countries from developing and acquiring means to attack its space systems. These capabilities exist, and are growing and spreading. Next, we need to be able to deter attacks on our systems, but what attacks and how? To rely on deterrence requires that we clearly define our interests and what we will regard as threats to them. It requires that all states and non-state actors be convinced that the United States will not tolerate attacks on or deliberate interference with our vital space systems, and that the United States has effective means to deal with such threats. This requires that the United States possess highly credible and potentially highly damaging responses, such that we can place confidence in reliance on deterrence. The ISAB is worried that deterrence against attacks confined to U.S. space assets, even though vital, lacks the high confidence necessary. At this time, the United States relies on dissuasion and deterrence, because it lacks the means to defend our space assets and to deny successful attacks on them. This is so despite the requirement in the 1996 and 2006 space policy directives that the United States be able to "deny, if necessary, adversaries the use of space capabilities hostile to U.S. national interests." U.S. State Department. Study on Space Policy: Report of the International Security Advisory Board. Washington, D.C.: U.S. State Department, April 27, 2007. [ 9 quotes ] [ page 6 ]