Attacking ground-based components of adversaries' space assets is not a viable long-term space control strategy.
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A number of points demonstrate how limited, and prone to failure, such a space control strategy [targeting ground stations] could be. First, in order for a target list to be useful, it must be updated and expanded regularly. To do that, the United States would need good to near-perfect intelligence. Assume U.S. intelligence agencies had the luxury of needing to watch only one potential enemy. To understand how difficult obtaining the required intelligence would be on just one country under a spotlight, remember that the United States was unaware of the true extent of Iraq's nuclear production facilities in peacetime prior to the Persian Gulf war, and that coalition air forces experienced agonizing difficulties in locating mobile Scud missiles during the war. Defense planners and policy makers who rely heavily on satellites for intelligence need to adopt a bit of humility, appreciating how much we do not and cannot know. ( More ... ) Lambakis, Steven. "Space Control in Desert Storm and Beyond." Orbis. Vol. 39, No. 3 (Summer 1995). [ 6 quotes ]
ASAT weapons, however unpleasant to some sensibilities, promise a distinct capability to strike at the enemy's center of gravity. Imagine a proliferation of ground-based transmitting installations and mobile communications facilities spread over a vast area on enemy soil. The task of locating and launching air strikes against every space station, node, and terminal relevant to enemy military operations, perhaps during the night or under enemy fire, may be impossible. Given recent technological advances, the number of space data receivers and transmitters can be increased without bounds, especially as new technologies allow for further miniaturization. When the redundancy of an enemy's ground-based telecommunications and C3I targets can be increased two-, five-, or even ten-fold, the only effective way to paralyze his C3I is by hitting the space links. Military space policy must therefore legitimize and enable a diversity of offensive as well as defensive tactics. Lambakis, Steven. "Space Control in Desert Storm and Beyond." Orbis. Vol. 39, No. 3 (Summer 1995). [ 6 quotes ]
Fourthly, tremendous logistical burdens may be involved in an intense, ground-oriented space control strategy. During Desert Storm, air combat fighters and bombers found convenient basing in-theater. Absent such basing our forces will have to rely more on long-range bombers to accomplish their missions. That will mean fewer sorties flown and fierce competition among targeters for the allocation of precious bombing runs. The course of the war may demand attacks on armored columns rather than on ground nodes and terminals. And lastly, one must consider the question of time. In a long war, an intense air campaign to destroy hundreds or thousands of targets is plausible. In a short, high-tempo war, such a space-control strategy may be only partially executed and fall short of its goal. Lambakis, Steven. "Space Control in Desert Storm and Beyond." Orbis. Vol. 39, No. 3 (Summer 1995). [ 6 quotes ]