Strategically, though not quite geographically, space is just another environment for conflict. The caveat with respect to geographical parallels is the evident difference in scale--the "quantity that becomes quality"--between the Earth and its atmosphere and the remainder of the universe ( i.e., space). Notwithstanding the vast asymmetry between the terrestrial geographical environments and space, it is not entirely obvious that "the stars" or "the heavens" have strategic significance for contemporary defense planners. Threats originating from far beyond the Earth-Moon system may appear from beyond our solar system or even from beyond our galaxy. If they do, we will be fortunate if we are able even to note the approach of such threats, let alone be equipped to see them at launch. In the long run, the very long run indeed, the security of the human race most likely will depend upon its space power. ( More ... )

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Gray, Colin S. "Space Power and the Revolution in Military Affairs: A Glass Half Full?." Air & Space Power Journal. XIII, No. 3 (Fall 1999). [ 2 quotes ]

 

Space power and space warfare are coming. The only issues are how and when. This uncompromising prediction could be upset only in the unlikely circumstance that a truly political peace broke out and was sustained, on Earth. Even in that improbable event, still one might be anxious about the kind of futures signaled in the scenarios of the movies Independence Day and Starship Troopers. Far-fetched, even comic such movies may well be, but they can act as a reminder that we may be at peace with ourselves. But would the universe be at peace with us? ( More ... )

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Gray, Colin S. "Space Power and the Revolution in Military Affairs: A Glass Half Full?." Air & Space Power Journal. XIII, No. 3 (Fall 1999). [ 2 quotes ]

 

Clementine 2 was originally scheduled for launch in 1998. It would have been the first mission specifically intended to study asteroids from an impact mitigation perspective. As pointed out earlier, targeting an asteroid involves many of the same technical issues as targeting a satellite. The space probe was to be built by the Air Force, and at one point was provided $120 million toward achieving its goals, and fit with instrument-packed three-foot-long missiles. Those missiles were to be released into the path of two asteroids selected by NASA: 1986JK, a halfmile wide chunk of rock to be encountered in May 2000; and Toutatis, an asteroid about two miles across, to be intercepted about five months later. The instrumented missiles would first take close-up pictures and make scientific measurements before slamming into their targets. The idea was to provide scientists with information about strength and make-up of the objects, specifically vital to understanding how to counter a potential Earth-impact, as well as to gain information on targeting space objects generally. ( More ... )

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Johnson-Freese, Joan. The Viability Of U.S. Antisatellite Policy: Moving Toward Space Control. USAF Academy, CO: USAF Institute for National Security Studies, January 2000. [ 1 reference ] [ page 21 ]

 

In the event of a massive strike from space, the resultant apocalyptic disasters would render such efforts as fruitless as rearranging the deck chairs while the Titanic sinks. The only meaningful response to a massive strike is some form of direct intervention. Direct intervention may entail deflection or destruction of the approaching space object to prevent or mitigate any impact with Earth. The means for achieving this fall partially within the realm of existing military capabilities, and partially within the ambit of technologies superficially similar to some proposed/experimental aspects of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). ( More ... )

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Kunich, John C. "Planetary Defense: The Legality of Global Survival." Air Force Law Review. Vol. 41 (1997): 119-160. [ 1 reference ] [ page 128 ]

 

The means to create effective NEO defense systems are partially within the realm of existing military capabilities but efforts need to continue along the lines of the now politically incorrect Strategic Defense Initiative. The Strategic Defense Initiative was an extremely sensitive program, which initiated a great deal of heated debate well before the end of the Cold War. However, those efforts toward developing modern and more capable satellite (or NEO) detection systems, could be reinvigorated on a global basis, making it a system directed outward and, consequently, more palatable to the international community. As regards mitigation/detection, intercontinental ballistic missiles or submarine launched counterparts could provide for destruction of any NEO's until newer and better (maybe non-nuclear) means of defense are developed. However, the mere existence of such a nuclear arsenal could constitute a danger to human life that may be much greater than the threat it is intended to mitigate. This issue also needs to be researched and repeatedly reassessed.

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Sweet, Kenneth. "Planetary Preservation: The Need for Legal Provision." Space Policy. Vol. 15 (1999): 223-231. [ 1 reference ] [ page 224 ]

 

On 7 February 2000, Worden ignited a minor firestorm within the NEO community when he submitted an essay proposing DoD leadership of international efforts to detect, study and (if necessary) defend against NEOs to the Cambridge-Conference Network electronic newsgroup.v Not meant as an official policy statement of the U.S government or the Department of the Air Force, Worden’s personal view was that while identification of 1 km asteroids seemed to be progressing at a sufficiently rapid (indeed, accelerating) pace, governments and astronomers were neglecting the 100 meter or "Tunguska Class" objects that strike up to several times per century. Worden couched the challenge in terms of space situational awareness, noting that the U.S. space community, particularly the DoD and NASA, are beginning to understand the importance of identifying and tracking virtually everything in Earth orbit in order to protect peaceful operations there, now and in the future. The ground and space-based tools used to achieve this close-range awareness would also serve to greatly improve detection of NEOs much smaller than mentioned by either Spaceguard or Shoemaker, but still capable of causing considerable death and destruction on Earth.

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France, Martin E.B. "Planetary Defense: Eliminating the Giggle Factor." Air & Space Power Journal. (August 2000). [ 1 reference ]

 

Since detection efforts began in the mid-1990s, NASA and supporting teams (using only ground-based telescopes and a meager budget of $5 million/year) have catalogued over 4,000 near-Earth asteroids (NEA). The discovery rate has increased each year during the past decade (fig. 4). We predict that a subset of the total NEAs shown in figure 4—potentially hazardous asteroids (PHA)—will come within 750,000 km of our home, less than two times the distance between Earth and the moon. PHAs are too massive to burn up in Earth’s atmosphere. As of November 2006, we have detected 843 of them, 700 larger than 1 km and capable of regional destruction.

No known asteroids target Earth now or for the next several years. However, this information can change rapidly. Nobody knows how long Earth will be spared. Our planet has not been so fortunate in the past. With 843 PHAs and counting, we must seriously consider mitigation options. Rather than debate whether we need planetary defense, we must determine when we will need it. From a policy perspective, we know that at least 843 asteroids prowling our neighborhood could cause local, regional, or global destruction, so we have just begun to understand the total threat. We won’t comprehend its full extent until we overcome the “giggle factor” and stop erroneously ascribing such thinking to science fiction. We need to create contingency plans and establish guidelines as an insurance policy—a far less expensive proposition than the consequences of suffering a direct hit.

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Kaupa, Douglas and Peter Garretson. "Planetary Defense: Potential Mitigation Roles for the Department of Defense." Air & Space Power Journal. XXII, No. 3 (Fall 2008): 34-41. [ 3 quotes ]

 

Both NASA and the DOD have expertise in space matters and operate space assets, but NASA’s core mission is space exploration. The DOD’s core missions are maintaining US security, protecting American lives, and ensuring the security of our allies. Expertise aside, planetary defense is clearly a defense mission. Further, since the DOD maintains a robust space mission, the proposed mission appears more closely aligned with the strengths and scope of the DOD than with those of the DHS.

Within the DOD, possible options might include AFSPC, the National Security Space Office, the Missile Defense Agency, and STRATCOM. Several reasons make STRATCOM the best option. For one, STRATCOM’s mission calls for “provid[ing] the nation with global deterrence capabilities and synchronized DOD effects to combat adversary weapons of mass destruction worldwide.”18 The command coordinates DOD capabilities to thwart weapons of mass destruction. We can consider an inbound Earth-impacting rock a weapon, despite the absence of an adversary. A combatant command, STRATCOM has the established lines of communication and the authority to react to strategic-level threats. It already maintains global vigilance and space situational awareness. The former US Space Command has been dissolved and subsumed by STRATCOM. Through AFSPC, the command already maintains daily space surveillance for detecting launches of ballistic missiles and tracking artificial satellites and Earth-orbital debris. Although AFSPC maintains space assets, operational control falls under STRATCOM’s authority. It also controls all military nuclear capability, perhaps the only option in certain minimum-warning scenarios. Moreover, STRATCOM is well practiced and competent with respect to disseminating rapid warnings to civilian leadership and civil defense networks. Finally, the command has years of experience in negotiating and executing collective security arrangements, such as that of the North American Aerospace Defense Command with Canada and those involving the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

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Kaupa, Douglas and Peter Garretson. "Planetary Defense: Potential Mitigation Roles for the Department of Defense." Air & Space Power Journal. XXII, No. 3 (Fall 2008): 34-41. [ 3 quotes ]

 

Some detractors have stated that a planetary-defense program is too expensive for the United States to bear alone and that it belongs in the international arena. Although they make a reasonable point, several considerations remain. First, for such a critical survival issue, the United States should not find itself at the mercy of an internationally delayed or incomplete plan. Second, international cooperation would still imply using US resources but with less US control. Third, significant national security reasons exist for having the United States pursue this capability for the defense of others. America has an interest in preserving its democratic civilization and maintaining international security.

The United States reaps significant economic benefits by providing international security. We have the most to gain by maintaining security and the most to lose if it fails. By visibly pursuing the capability to defend the planet, we make ourselves increasingly essential to international security. Furthermore, we will likely have to pay the bill anyway. The humanitarian crisis that could ensue from an impact with a 300-meter asteroid could easily dwarf the Asian tsunami of 2004. The humanitarian supply, airlift, sealift, and rebuilding costs would be staggering. Economic losses to US investors, huge costs to US insurers, and a possible recession or depression resulting from the loss of a city or nation would likely occur.

Despite concerns about the expense of developing such a planetary-defense system, it would translate into a competitive advantage for the United States. Solving difficult problems would create US intellectual capital, industrial capacity, and new technical areas of leadership critical to maintaining our lead in space.

The technology needed to protect the planet offers other advantages besides a contingency plan. Technologies that appear promising for planetary defense are also attractive for civil and defense applications, which include rapid and responsive high-capacity launchers, high-thrust rockets, long-duration power supply, and autonomous docking.

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Kaupa, Douglas and Peter Garretson. "Planetary Defense: Potential Mitigation Roles for the Department of Defense." Air & Space Power Journal. XXII, No. 3 (Fall 2008): 34-41. [ 3 quotes ]