Efforts to develop an arms control regime have been stifled by the rapid advances in space technology that can quickly make any international agreement irrelevant.
Keywords: Arms Control, International Law.
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Enthusiasm for today's, or even tomorrow's, solutions must be tempered with the knowledge that tomorrow's wrong choice was the one that seemed so obviously correct yesterday. Yet decisions cannot be avoided, and a slow, cautious approach may be as wrong a policy of space activity as may be a headlong rush. Like the language and policies of space treaties, prescriptions for action are likely to soon become so outmoded as to be of little other than historical value in just a decade or so. ( More ... ) Oberg, James. Space Power Theory. Maxwell AFB, AL: USAF Air University, 2001. [ 5 quotes ] [ page 159 ]
As is familiar to any serious student of previous international treaties dealing with technological questions, treaties usually persist long after the technological assumptions or specific crises behind them have become obsolete. Thus the reinterpretation of ambiguous wording based on unanticipated technical developments can lead to the existence of a set of "shadow treaties" which diverge from the original in different directions depending on the interpretations and intentions of the different parties involved. Because of the rapidity of revolutionary change in space activities, treaties can age extremely quickly and can become ambiguous and asymmetrically restrictive within only a decade or two. ( More ... ) Oberg, James. Space Power Theory. Maxwell AFB, AL: USAF Air University, 2001. [ 5 quotes ] [ page 78-9 ]
In the absence of an extant threat, an agreement aimed at weapons that could pose a threat to satellites can only speculate as to the types of systems, capabilities, or activities that should be subject to restriction. Space technology is developing so rapidly that entirely unforeseen threats could emerge within the life of a formal arms control treaty. Thus, limiting a particular kind of capability-such as the rocket-mounted satellite interceptors developed by the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War-would provide little protection against systems based on entirely new or different technology and could engender a false sense of security. ( More ... ) Klotz, Frank G. Space, Commerce, and National Security. Washington, D.C.: Council on Foreign Relations, January 1999. [ 12 quotes ] [ page 16-17 ]
The spread of dual-use technology is another reason to go slow on comprehensive bans. For example, Germany, in concert with Russia, has a program called TECSAS that is designed to rendezvous with an uncooperative satellite and repair it. It's a simple task to "unrepair" such target satellites as well. If, treaty-bound, the United States was prevented from fielding similar technology, it may face a future where it loses space superiority not because of enemy space weapons, but simply because it didn't deploy the necessary basic space capabilities that others have. ( More ... ) Worden, Simon P. "High Anxiety." Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. Vol. 62, No. 2 (March/April 2006): 21-23. [ 2 quotes ]
So, the problem of identifying space weaponization in terms of just exactly where and under what conditions it exists is highly complex, particularly as to how space weaponization can be defined in terms of international/space law. In this regard, Robert A. Ramey, who has been chief of space and international law at the U.S. Air Force Space Command, writes: (The) basic term space weapon lacks definition in international law. As a result, the concept it represents, which broadly speaking includes any implements of warfare in space, is difficult to isolate. Without this foundational definition, one cannot define phrases on which it might rely. The difficulty comes into particular focus by observing that any comprehensive definition of space weapons will include space systems equally used for nonmilitary, nondestructive, and nonaggressive purposes. Though space weapons may seem to include only a discrete class of armaments with easily definable characteristics, a closer examination "reveals a less obvious and more inclusive set of systems." Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis. Independent Working Group on Missile Defense, the Space Relationship, and the Twenty-First Century, 2007 Report. Washington, D.C.: Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, August 28, 2006. [ 13 quotes ] [ page 73 ]
Finally, any agreement that limits the United States' ballistic missile defense options must account for the possibility that the missile technology of the true target states of its BMD, such as Iran and North Korea, might one day improve to the point of outstripping the negotiated limits on BMD. To avoid a future US abandonment of the agreement, as in the case of the US withdrawal from the ABM Treaty, any agreement on space weapons should incorporate some flexibility by recognizing the potential need for future negotiations and requiring ongoing dialogue on missile threats. If it becomes necessary for the United States to deploy a more robust BMD system, it might seek to defuse Chinese concerns by pursuing BMD as a more open and transparent initiative with dis- crete and limited opportunities for Chinese participation. Such an initiative may lay the groundwork for deeper forms of collaboration in the future. Blazejewski, Kenneth S. "Space Weaponization and US-China Relations." Strategic Studies Quarterly. Vol. 2, No. 1 (Spring 2008): 33-55. [ 12 quotes ] [ page 51 ]