Previous multilateral efforts at creating a space arms control regime have failed because just about any space system can function as an anti-satellite weapon. For example, the Shuttle's extendable robotic arm has been used for in-orbit repair of satellites but it could just as easily be used to remove them from orbit. This is sometimes referred to as the 'residual ASAT' problem.
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Additionally, some of the systems that might be used to attack satellites, which would therefore be subject to limitation, might also have other, entirely legitimate civilian or military purposes. Reductio ad adsurdum, any satellite that can be maneuvered in such a way as to collide with another satellite could theoretically be used for "antisatellite" purposes. While one might counter that the functions of individual satellites are generally widely known, not everyone will agree. The Soviet Union, for example, objected to the U.S. space shuttle as a potential antisatellite platform since it had the capability to "snatch" satellites in orbit. ( More ... ) Klotz, Frank G. Space, Commerce, and National Security. Washington, D.C.: Council on Foreign Relations, January 1999. [ 12 quotes ] [ page 17 ]
In an effort to diffuse the perceived threat space weapons pose to the international community, the U.S. could make several new points in statements issued to the CD. First, practically any active satellite has the potential to be used as a weapon to destroy or disrupt other satellites. Satellites are typically built with a limited capacity to maneuver in order to maintain attitude and position throughout their useful life. It would be a relatively simple proposition to maneuver a given satellite into striking or blocking another, especially one already in close proximity. The point is that a ban on space systems designed as weapons will not necessarily prevent the use of weapons in space. ( More ... ) Billick, Thomas W. Arms Control Implications for Military Operations in Space. Maxwell AFB, AL: USAF Air University, May 2001. [ 6 quotes ] [ page 52 ]
At the United Nations last year, 160 countries called for negotiations on a proposal to ban weapons from space, and the United States was the only nation to vote against it. An administration led by John Kerry might have acted differently: Kerry has called space weapons "very disturbing" and has indicated that he favors a ban on them.This would be devastating to American interests. For one thing, ICBMs are space weapons. As they travel from their launch pads to their destinations, they leave the earth's atmosphere. Likewise, anti-ballistic missiles, such as those currently deployed in Alaska and California, are meant to intercept ICBMs in space -- they don't merely travel through space, but actually engage their targets up there. Eliminating these would hobble the United States in its effort to protect itself from the likes of North Korea, which of course would pay no attention to what any treaty said. ( More ... ) "Spacing Out." National Review. October 24, 2006.
I have worked arms control issues for a good number of years -- going back to the time when Professor Harrison and I worked together in the days of the Cold War. During that entire period, no one has been able to formulate an agreed definition of what is meant by a "space weapon." What is often meant - at least in international arms control fora - is whatever the U.S. may be exploring in terms of ballistic missile defenses in space, but not weapons on the ground that would attack our satellites in space. Acceptance of such an approach would not, in my assessment, constitute sound or productive arms control. While some may disagree, I believe this is a case where no arms control is better than bad arms control. ( More ... ) Joseph, Robert G. "Remarks on the President’s National Space Policy – Assuring America’s Vital Interests." . January 11, 2007.
Some believe a space weapon is purely a weapons system based in space that collides with another space object or intercepts a missile traveling through space. However, I would argue, the damage caused by a ground-based highenergy laser is just as severe for a target satellite as the damage caused by a physical on-orbit collision. The key difference is the latter may create an unacceptable debris field, posing further risks to other orbiting satellites. It is the ambiguity in definition that makes arms-control measures which ban space weapons difficult to implement and nearly impossible to enforce. This is compounded by the fact that satellites have tremendous dual-use value, making it very difficult to distinguish a nonweapon space system from a weapon space system. Any satellite could be maneuvered in such a way as to collide with a target satellite. Any ballistic missile, with sufficient orbital ephemeris data and software changes, could be used to target a satellite. Everett, Terry. "Arguing for a Comprehensive Space Protection Strategy." Strategic Studies Quarterly. Vol. 1, No. 1 (Fall 2007): 20-35. [ 6 quotes ] [ page 32-3 ]
* When is an object to be considered to be a covered – and prohibited – outer space weapon? One possible definition would include only space-based devices that were produced or converted specifically to damage or destroy other space-based objects. Such a definition, however, immediately raises the question of intent. How could one determine that an object was specially produced or converted? Also, how could one verify, in the event of damage or destruction to a space object, that the cause of the damage or destruction was the result of genuine error or malfunction, and not deliberate? Another approach could be to define “outer space weapon” to mean any object in, or transiting through, space that could destroy or damage another object in space. The problem with this approach is that it would need to include all objects in or transiting space, since any such object could, at least theoretically, have the inherent capability to strike another object and cause damage to it or destroy it. Moreover, would it be permissible to attack a ground tracking station, which performs a critical role in providing access to space and in the use of space, but which is not itself located in space? Such an approach obviously would be unworkable. It would constrain – if not force the end of – legitimate uses, such as defense, civil, commercial, intelligence, and non-weapon military satellite functions that are critical not only to the United States, but also to global security, commerce, science, and research. In this regard, it easily could capture and prohibit the deployment of ground-launched, non-weapon systems such as, for example, an unmanned replacement for the U.S. Space Shuttle, which is the workhorse of the International Space Station. Furthermore, it would capture important systems designed for other, non-counterspace missions, due to their inherent anti-satellite capabilities. These would include missile defense systems whose purpose is to destroy ballistic missiles launched from the ground at other objects on the ground, and terrestrial-based ballistic missiles. DeSutter, Paula A. Is An Outer Space Arms Control Treaty Verifiable?. Washington, D.C.: U.S. State Department, March 4, 2008. [ 6 quotes ]