The introduction of space weapons will not uniquely increase the risks of miscalculation and accidental war.
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Those who believe we run extraordinary risks stemming from clouded perceptions and misunderstandings in an age of computerized space warfare might want to take a look at some real-world situations of high volatility in which potentially provocative actions took place. Take, for example, the tragedies involving the USS Stark and USS Vincennes. ... ( More ... ) Lambakis, Steven. "Space Weapons: Refuting the Critics." Policy Review. (February 2001). [ 11 quotes ] [ page 5-6 ]
Even if a spacecraft were shot down by accident, the implications would not be so grave when compared, for example, to an accidental launch of a nuclear tipped missile. So, asked Walter McDougall, "why is it more important to protect pristine space, where nothing lives, than the crowded earth?" ( More ... ) Lambakis, Steven. On the Edge of Earth: The Future of American Space Power. Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky, 2001. [ 5 quotes ] [ page 259 ]
To these examples we may add a long list of tactical blunders growing out of ambiguous circumstances and faulty intelligence, including the U.S. bombing in 1999 of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade during Kosovo operations. Yet though these tragic actions occurred in near-war or tinderbox situations, they did not escalate or exacerbate local instability. The world also survived U.S.-Soviet "near encounters" during the 1948 Berlin crisis, the 1961 Cuban missile crisis, and the 1967 and 1973 Arab-Israeli wars. Guarded diplomacy won the day in all cases. Why would disputes affecting space be any different? ( More ... ) Lambakis, Steven. "Space Weapons: Refuting the Critics." Policy Review. (February 2001). [ 11 quotes ]
The oranges are different. They would be space-based interceptors, defensive weapons, designed to save lives and property. They would be small and compact defensive weapons, in this case Brilliant Pebbles (BP), that would use not explosives but their own body weight to provide kinetic energy. This would occur when the device (pebble) first “sees” the hostile nuclear weapon as it is launched, and locks on to the ascending missile. The device, powered by a mini-rocket, then would streak down or out or up to strike the missile (like a large pebble) and knock it out of commission. Obviously, seconds count, because once the pebble “sees” the missile firing, it must respond instantly or it is too late and the hostile missile is well on its way to its target. The problem of accidental activation, however, would be virtually eliminated, because the autonomous system – like cruise control on an automobile – would be designed to be switched off as the BPs pass over friendly or non-hostile territory and turned on again over potentially hostile territory and programmed to do so automatically.38 A reasonable comparison is the average home security system, which must be real-time automated, to activate its alarms the second an unwanted intruder shows up, so that law enforcement can respond effectively. Obviously, a prudent owner will turn off the alarm when moving about the premises or when expecting guests, but otherwise the owner wants the system armed to be able to respond quickly when needed. Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis. Missile Defense, the Space Relationship and the Twenty-First Century. Washington, D.C.: Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, 2009. [ 10 quotes ] [ page 91 ]
Further, even if a [Brilliant Pebble] “got away” to “run wild,” it would quickly burn up in the atmosphere. And in the case of an accidental shoot-down involving the mistaken identity of someone’s “innocent” missile (such as one carrying a communications satellite), Brilliant Pebbles and other SBIs would fall under the same protocols and international notification procedures that have long governed an unwarranted response by offensive nuclear weapons against another nation: when a country plans to launch a nonthreatening rocket – such as for a weather or communications satellite or to ferry astronauts and supplies to the international space station or the moon or to send robots to Mars or to orbit telescopes – those powers possessing offensive nuclear weapons are notified well in advance, so as to avoid a terrible misunderstanding that could trigger a massive retaliatory nuclear strike against the country of origin. Brilliant Pebbles and other SBIs would fall under the same protocol of advance notification and, of course, their automated systems would be switched off, even as offensive nuclear weapons would be taken off hair-trigger alert and ordered to “stand down.” Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis. Missile Defense, the Space Relationship and the Twenty-First Century. Washington, D.C.: Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, 2009. [ 10 quotes ] [ page 91 ]