The first nation to deploy space weapons will set off an arms race in space as other states race to counter any perceived strategic gain or take advantage of the leading state's technological research and development.
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The realisation of the increasing vulnerability of the United States to attacks against space assets has caused some to encourage Washington to begin to deploy defensive weapon systems to protect those assets from new weapons. While this could appear to make sense on a visceral or superficial level, a thoughtful analysis of the history of military development reveals basic flaws with this notion. Most importantly, history categorically demonstrates that effective defensive weapon systems will inevitably be countered by effective offensive systems, sparking an ever-spiralling arms race that ultimately leaves all sides less secure. ( More ... ) Graham, Thomas. "International Law and the Military Uses of Space." Disarmament Diplomacy. No. 63 (March-April 2002). [ 1 reference ]
Another factor that has thus far worked against promoters of space-based defenses and other types of orbital weapons has been the threat of hostile international reactions. This point is related to the issue raised above, but has different implications. Specifically, given that space currently has no weapons, supporters of space sanctuary arguments have the power of precedent on their side in observing that the start of a space arms race by any country (based on the ample experience of such contests in other fields, from machine guns to nuclear weapons) is going to be met eventually by adversaries. The result is likely to be reduced (not enhanced) security for all countries. During the Cold War, critics of space weapons could very credibly argue that whatever the USA did in space would eventually be matched by the USSR, if not directly then by other means. Indeed, this important concept became embodied in the so-called "Nitze criteria" for evaluating the costs of the SDI program. Former senior Reagan administration official Paul Nitze argued that it only made sense to continue with the highly expensive effort to field space-based defenses if it could be done more cheaply than the Soviets could deploy countermeasures. The failure of SDI to come even close to meeting this costefficiency metric--according to the administration's own criteria--proved to be an important nail in its coffin in the late 1980s. Moltz, James Clay. "Protecting Safe Access to Space: Lessons from the First 50 Years of Space Security." Space Policy. Vol. 23 (November 2007): 199-205. [ 12 quotes ] [ page 203 ]