Space-based weapons, like all space systems, are predictable and fragile, but they represent significant combat power if used before they are destroyed -- leading to a strong incentive to use these weapons preemptively, to "use them or lose them." ( More ... )

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Hardesty, David C. "Space-Based Weapons: Long-Term Strategic Implications and Alternatives." Naval War College Review. Vol. 58, No. 2 (Spring 2005): 45-68. [ 2 quotes ]

 

Whatever the reaction of the international community, the introduction of weapons into space would be strategically destabilizing. ... The US Congress Office of Technology Assessment echoed similar thoughts years later: "Pre-emptive attack would be an attractive countermeasure to space-based ASAT weapons. If each side feared that only a pre-emptive attack could counter the risk of being defeated by enemy pre-emption, then a crisis situation could be extremely unstable." This particular congressional assessment, and that of Jervis and Schelling, invite American caution with space weapons. The United States may weaponize space only to fight a war that otherwise need not have occurred. ( More ... )

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Ziegler, David W. Safe Heavens: Military Strategy and Space Sanctuary Thought. Maxwell AFB, AL: USAF Air University, June 1997. [ 9 quotes ]

 

Not surprisingly, the Pentagon is extremely worried about possible Chinese ASATs, and the threat that such weapons would pose to U.S. military superiority. The most recent Pentagon report on Chinese military power warns that "China is said to be acquiring a variety of foreign technologies which could be used to develop an active Chinese ASAT capability." The report also warns that, at the outset of a conflict, "the PLA would attempt to weaken U.S. or other third party's resolve by demonstrating the capability to hold at risk -- or actually striking -- high-value assets. The PLA would seek to leverage emerging asymmetric capabilities to counter or negate an adversary's superiorities." ( More ... )

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Lewis, Jeffrey. What if Space Were Weaponized? Possible Consequences for Crisis Scenarios. Washington, D.C.: Center for Defense Information, July 2004. [ 16 quotes ] [ page 19 ]

 

During the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union maintained nuclear forces on hair trigger alert, ready to be fired within minutes of an order to launch. One of the likely consequences of seeking a space dominance posture would be to elevate this hair trigger posture into space. ( More ... )

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Katz-Hyman, Michael and Michael Krepon. Assurance or Space Dominance? The Case Against Weaponizing Space. Washington, D.C.: Henry L. Stimson Center, April 2003. [ 16 quotes ] [ page 126 ]

 

In space, as with terrestrial missile defenses, it is far more challenging to mount a successful defense than to penetrate a soft target. Because of their threatening nature and their vulnerability, weapons designed for space warfare, whether on the ground or in orbit, would become extremely high-value targets. To prevent a precarious and dangerous mix of satellites interspersed with ASATs, the United States would seek to prevent space mines and other attacking devices either from being launched or from being parked in orbit. ( More ... )

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Katz-Hyman, Michael and Michael Krepon. Assurance or Space Dominance? The Case Against Weaponizing Space. Washington, D.C.: Henry L. Stimson Center, April 2003. [ 16 quotes ] [ page 77 ]

 

Other characteristics of the space environment reinforce space weapon?s destabilizing tendencies. The first is anonymity. Especially with respect to ASAT weapons, space may provide a degree of plausible deniability that would encourage attacks on space assets. The vastness of space and its isolation from population centers may also contribute to a perceived lack of collateral damage. An adversary could launch an attack on space assets with little or no risk of directly harming any human population. A related consideration for the US is that it may be hard pressed to justify responding to such a non-lethal attack, in terms of human lives, even if it vaporized billions of dollars in assets and undermined valuable earth services. These considerations could all reinforce an adversary's inclination to preemptively attack in space. ( More ... )

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Ruhm, Brian C. Finding the Middle Ground: The U.S. Air Force, Space Weaponization, and Arms Control. Maxwell AFB, AL: USAF Air University, April 2003. [ 2 quotes ] [ page 31-2 ]

 

Exacerbating the threat posed by space weapons is the Cold War-era deterrence logic that continues to dominate U.S. military planning. This logic emphasizes deterrence of threats through overwhelming force, carried out during the Cold War through the confrontational posturing of large, opposing forces on hair-trigger alert. The extension of this deterrence logic to space, as envisioned in current U.S. space plans, will turn space into a domain of overwhelming threat, against which most states have little protection. The new "pre-emptive" logic of the Bush administration's first National Security Strategy, released in September 2002, will make this situation even worse. The launching into space of an armada of space "battle stations," 1500 "Brilliant Pebbles" antimissile satellites, or "several thousand interceptors," would certainly seem to violate the important norm prohibiting the "threat of force" in relations between states. ( More ... )

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Tannenwald, Nina. Law Versus Power on the High Frontier: The Case for a Rule-Based Regime for Outer Space. : , Summer 2004. [ 7 quotes ] [ page 35 ]

 

In terms of their geostrategic impact, space-based weapons do not simply enhance existing threats but introduce a new and greater danger because of the threat they pose to strategic stability. The vulnerability of space-based weapons will likely create incentives for preemptive attack to protect them during a crisis, greatly increasing the likelihood of war. Further, although supporters of space weapons claim that, consistent with the United States' defensive orientation to the world, such weapons would be for defensive purposes, the reality is that, given their characteristics, many of them are inherently offensive weapons. It is widely recognized that space-based ballistic missile defense systems could carry out surprise attacks against terrestrial targets or satellites. ( More ... )

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Tannenwald, Nina. Law Versus Power on the High Frontier: The Case for a Rule-Based Regime for Outer Space. : , Summer 2004. [ 7 quotes ] [ page 34-5 ]

 

The third consequence of U.S. space weaponization would be the heightened probability of strategic conflict. Anyone familiar with the destabilizing impact of MIRVs will understand that weapons in space will bring a new meaning to the expression "hair trigger." Lasers can engage targets in seconds. Munitions fired from satellites in low-earth orbit can reach the earth's surface in minutes. As in the MIRV scenario, the side to strike first would be able to destroy much of its opponent's space weaponry before the opponent had a chance to respond. The temptation to strike first during a crisis would be overwhelming; much of the decisionmaking would have to be automated. ( More ... )

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Robb, Charles S. "Star Wars II." Washington Quarterly. Vol. 22, No. 13 (Winter 1999): 81-86. [ 3 quotes ]

 

The United States cannot expect that the entire world will sit idly by as it deploys weapons in space which, effectively, border every state on the planet. If the united states had unlimited armies, navies, and air forces, would it surround every border and coastline with them, ready to put down potential aggression or implement united states policy objectives at a moments notice? Adversaries and allies alike would certainly find such action offensive, possibly spurring them to respond. Putting weapons in space will elicit a similar reaction and/or countermeasures which decrease or negate the intended security benefits. ( More ... )

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Coffelt, Christopher A. The Best Defense: Charting the Future of US Space Strategy and Policy. Maxwell AFB, AL: USAF Air University, June 2005. [ 11 quotes ] [ page 79-80 ]