The threat of non-state actors or rogue states attacking space assets by detonating a low-yield nuclear weapon in low earth orbit is negligible.
Keywords: High Altitude Nuclear Detonation (HAND), Satellite Hardening.
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Moreover, the ASAT threat that is postulated is a nuclear threat. According to noted defense analyst James Kitfield, “The U.S. military has long worried that an adversary might detonate a crude nuclear weaponin space, frying the delicate electronics of all satellites, and disproportionately hamstringing U.S. troops who rely on satellites for missile and bomb guidance and for communications.” If such a detonation were to occur, even though not directed at a terrestrial target, the nuclear threshold would have been crossed. Even a so called “irrational” adversary would have to think twice before using a nuclear weapon. ( More ... ) Pena, Charles V. and Edward Hudgins. Should the United States 'Weaponize' Space? Military and Commercial Implications. Washington, D.C.: CATO Institute, March 18, 2002. [ 5 quotes ] [ page 8 ]
Finally, it is far from clear that a country planning on or engaged in fighting the United States would appreciably reduce the amount of military power the United States could ultimately bring to bear by attacking LEO satellite constellations with a nuclear burst above the sensible atmosphere. ... The costs of such a wantonly destructive act would be high and the likely benefits for the perpetrator, at best, fleeting and short term. ( More ... ) Watts, Barry D. The Military Use of Space: A Diagnostic Assessment. Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, February 2001. [ 8 quotes ] [ page 28 ]
The GPS constellation consists of 24 satellites, which are spread over different orbital planes at an altitude of 20,000 kilometers. To substantially degrade the GPS, the satellites have to be attacked individually, which is difficult to do. The satellites are also hardened against nuclear effects and have on-orbit spares. The robustness of the GPS constellation has been analyzed by Geoffrey Forden and is reported in Appendix D. The analysis shows that the GPS constellation is robust to the extent that it can lose up to four satellites and yet only suffer from periodic loss of function at any place. As stated earlier, this robustness makes the vulnerability of the GPS constellation to ASAT-type attacks rather small. ( More ... ) Lewis, Leo and Phillip E. Coyle. Ensuring America's Space Security. Washington, D.C.: Federation of American Scientists, September 2004. [ 7 quotes ] [ page 28 ]
However, the simple fact that most satellites have weathered the vagaries of natural space radiation so well over time indicates their normal design hardening is better than assumed. Military satellites in LEO are much more hardened, whereas the hardness of commercial platforms may vary. It is noteworthy that natural background radiation does vary significantly over time and yet not many satellites are known to have failed due to this variability. For example, under natural background radiation conditions in LEO, the peak flux for electrons with energy greater than 1 MeV ranges from 10^4 for the outer radiation belt to 10^6 for the inner. Enhanced solar flux is said to have resulted in >1 MeV electron flux to reach 10^8 particles/sq cm sec. Coincidentally, this is the same magnitude that is computed by the model due to a high-altitude nuclear explosion one day after the burst over Korea. ( More ... ) Lewis, Leo and Phillip E. Coyle. Ensuring America's Space Security. Washington, D.C.: Federation of American Scientists, September 2004. [ 7 quotes ] [ page 26-7 ]