A nation does not need to be a space-faring nation to have anti-space capabilities. Space assets include the ground segment, the space segment, and most importantly the link segment. A state-actor or a non-state actor (such as demonstrated by Falun Gong's hijacking of a PRC communicatons satellite) can attack a nation's space assets by attacking any or all of these segments. In Iran's case, they possess missiles. They possess warheads. And they may soon possess a nuclear device. Together these can be used in a SCUD-derived launch vehicle or a more sophisticated launch vehicle to attack satellites in low earth orbit. These attacks can be directed at specific satellites or all satellites depending on whether high-explosives or nuclear devices are used - the satellite can be taken down by a direct hit or by the explosion and debris from the explosion; a satellite can be taken down by a nuclear device either through the direct explosion or through total dose and dose-rate radiation effects; debris and radiation effects will affect not only the targeted satellite but satellites in a whole band of orbits - radiation effects could also affect satellites in higher orbits and disrupt space and terrestrial communications through scintilation and distortion of the ionosphere. Iran, any other terrorist-sponsoring nation, or terrorist group could also attack ground-based space assets and disrupt command and control of our space assets; jam communications links, or take command and control of satellites. Iran has demonstrated the ability to jam satellite communications. Iran has the growing capability to and the demonstrated intention of disrupting US utlization of space, hence they are a threat.
Keywords: Iraq.
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Iran continued to jam satellite reception in Tehran in 2005. While satellite dishes are technically banned in Iran, the government has reportedly taken additional steps to prevent reception of international opposition television stations, including Voice of America's Persianlanguage programming. The jammers did not affect the uplink, but instead broadcast microwave signals across Tehran to prevent reception over the local area, a procedure that is not banned by international law. The US Broadcasting Board of Governors responded on 17 June 2005 in support of Voice of America and other affected stations by providing access to a third satellite to broadcast their signals simultaneously with the current two (Telstar 12 and EutelSat's Hotbird), thus making it more difficult for Iranian authorities to jam the signals. This local jamming technique would be applicable to counter-intelligence or battlefield situations as well, providing the ability to temporarily block satellite reception over specific areas without damaging space assets or disrupting services outside of the area. Collard-Wexler, Simon, Thomas Graham et al. Space Security 2006. Waterloo, Ontario: Space Security Index, July 2006. [ 26 quotes ] [ page 138 ]
On 27 October 2005, Iran became the 45th country in the world to own a satellite, the Sina-1, which was launched by a Russian Kosmos-3 launcher. Designed by the Russian firm Polyot, Sina-1 has a resolution precision of about 45 meters and the Iranian government claims that the satellite will be used to collect data on ground and water resources, as well as meteorological conditions. However, less than a month after its launch, the head of Iran's space program said the Sina-1 is capable of spying on Israel and some suggest it is a response to Israel's Ofeq-5 reconnaissance satellite. However, the resolution precision of the Sina-1 clearly limits the effectiveness of any military reconnaissance functions. In cooperation with Italy's Carlo Gavazzi Space, Iran plans to launch a remote sensing Mesbah satellite in the near future and is still pursuing its own Space Launch Vehicle (SLV) – the Shehab-4 missile. Collard-Wexler, Simon, Thomas Graham et al. Space Security 2006. Waterloo, Ontario: Space Security Index, July 2006. [ 26 quotes ] [ page 138 ]
Iran has converted one of its most powerful ballistic missiles into a satellite launch vehicle. The 30-ton rocket could also be a wolf in sheep's clothing for testing longer-range missile strike technologies, Aviation Week & Space Technology magazine reports in its Jan. 29 issue. The Iranian space launcher has recently been assembled and "will liftoff soon" with an Iranian satellite, according to Alaoddin Boroujerdi, the chairman of the Iranian parliament's National Security and Foreign Policy Commission. The move toward an independent space launch capacity is likely to ratchet up concern in the U.S. and Europe about Iran's strategic capabilities and intents. Orbiting its own satellite would send a powerful message throughout the Muslim world about the Shiite regime in Tehran. Couvalt, Craig. "Iran Set to Try Space Launch." Aviation Week and Space Technology. January 25, 2007.
Indeed, Iran's missile programme has reached an unprecedented level of sophistication and size for a proliferant country. Tehran is reported to possess a tactical arsenal comprising several hundred Shahab-1 and Shahab-2 missiles14-equivalent to Scud-B and Scud-C. The quest for longer-range systems reportedly started at the beginning of the 1990s with support from the DPRK. The first flight test of the 1,300km-range Shahab-3 in 1998 started a long series of tests and the official deployment of the missile in 2003.16 With such a missile Tehran gains the ability to threaten Israel as well as part of Europe. Iran has also conducted the development of modern anti-ship cruise missiles, culminating with the announcement from Tehran of the deployment of a Raad anti-ship cruise missile in 2004. Furthermore, Iran allegedly illegally acquired six AS-15 missiles from Ukraine in 2001. The transfer was revealed by Hryhoriy Omelchenko, member of the Ukrainian parliament, in February 2005, and since then has been the subject of a legal investigation in Ukraine. According to this investigation, intermediaries of the operation-including a Russian national employed by the Oboronexport weapons export company- apparently used false end-user certificates to circumvent Ukrainian export control regulations. This missile, with a theoretical range of 2,500km, was apparently part of a batch of Soviet missiles for which the nuclear warheads had been returned to Moscow as part of a bilateral agreement in the middle of the 1990s. It would seem realistic to believe that Tehran has attempted to copy the received missiles since the sale, particularly the propulsion and navigation systems. On the other hand, considering information available about the state of the missiles as received by Iran and the relative inexperience of military units in the use of ground attack missiles, it seems improbable that they were immediately deployed. Gruselle, Bruno. "The final frontier: missile defence in space?." Disarmament Forum. No. 1 (2007): 53-57. [ 4 quotes ] [ page 55 ]
Israeli and U.S. intelligence are also assessing new data that indicate Iran could be developing the ability to launch multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle (MIRVed) warheads atop a missile capable of striking Western Europe or Israel. Iranian air force Gen. Hossein Salaami earlier hinted that such a development is underway. A MIRVed missile could increase the threat to Europe and Israel should the Iranians perfect biological or chemical weapons capability, let alone nuclear warheads. Iran could use such missile capability to deter the U.S. and European governments from challenging the expansion of Iranian authority in the Middle East. But the Iranian missile development surge also holds other risks. An assessment by strategic think tank Globalsecurity.org finds that Iranian missile developments could also "provide Iran with a rudimentary anti-satellite capability" threatening critical U.S., Israeli or European spacecraft. Couvalt, Craig. "Concerns Grow About Iranian, North Korean Missiles and Chinese Asats." Aviation Week and Space Technology. March 5, 2007.
Iran also has a significant ballistic missile development program. Besides its numerous short-range systems, Iran is developing a medium-range ballistic missile (Shahab-3) based on North Korean No Dong technology. In its quest for longer reach, Iran is developing an extended range Shahab-3 (which can travel 1,300 km and threaten Israel) and a new medium-range system (which may travel 2,000 km and reach into portions of Europe). In November 2006, Iran showcased on television several ballistic missile launches, to include the Shahab-3, demonstrating for the world the importance Tehran places on its ballistic missile development program. Iran is believed to be working on intercontinental range ballistic missiles, which may be in its arsenal by 2015, that is if it does not import longer-range systems from proliferators like North Korea earlier than that. Lambakis, Steven. "Leveraging Space to Improve Missile Defense." High Frontier Journal. Vol. 3, No. 2 (March 2007): 25-29. [ 6 quotes ] [ page 25-6 ]
A number of factors inform the need Iranians perceive for a space programme. The first is the enhancemnet of national pride. Satellites are cutting-edge technologies and like the Iranian nuclear programme, denotes technological and scientific elan, which becomes a source of national pride that can overcome political differences between reformists and conservatives. Much like the Chinese space programme, there is an element of nationalism to the Iranian space programme that can help legitimate an unpopular regime. Sheldon, John B. "A Really Hard Case: Iranian Space Ambitions and the Prospects for U.S. Engagement." Astropolitics. Vol. 4, No. 2 (Summer 2006): 229-251. [ 3 quotes ] [ page 242 ]
The second factor reflects the long-term desire to develop economically, socially and technologically. In this respect, the space programme is an opportunity for Iranian scientists to cut their teeth and hopefully create high-tech spin-offs that may help the Iranian economy. Space systems are seen as a means to help develop several facets of the Iranian economy (energy, telecommunications) and society (the preservation of Iranian culture by being able to broadcast state-approved programming throughout Iran and beyond and the simultaneous eradication of all unsuitable foreign cultural influences). The notion that space systems may help Iranian science for the sakes of science seems does not seem to be a priority, despite signs of the flourishment of pure science towards the end of the Khatami administration. Whether Ahmedinejad is prepared to nurture Iranian science in the same spirit of free inquiry is an open question. Sheldon, John B. "A Really Hard Case: Iranian Space Ambitions and the Prospects for U.S. Engagement." Astropolitics. Vol. 4, No. 2 (Summer 2006): 229-251. [ 3 quotes ] [ page 242 ]
The third factor is Iranian national security. The attributes of space power may be tempting for a country that seeks both to increase its security, whilst at the same time assert its dominance in the region. The ability of imaging satellites, for example, to provide strategic intelligence and early warning against a surprise attack by any number of Iran's neighbouring states would be of enormous benefit. Of course, that same capability can provide Iran with the ability to accurately target its ballistic missile capabilities, thereby increasing the deterrent value of Iran's WMD-armed missiles (this assumes that Iran's goal is indeed to develop nuclear weapons). For Iran, such a capability would help lessen the disparities in space and missile power that exists today between it and Israel. Indeed, it could be argued that Iran's nuclear actiivies are already spurring a number of its neighbours to look at procuring their own imaging satellites in order to help hedge against a surprise Iranian nuclear breakout. Turkey has expressed an interest in such a capability, as have the members of the Gulf Cooperation Council, Egypt and Pakistan. Saudia Arabia has an advanced space programme and is one of the countries in the region that might feel most threatened by a nuclear Iran. Sheldon, John B. "A Really Hard Case: Iranian Space Ambitions and the Prospects for U.S. Engagement." Astropolitics. Vol. 4, No. 2 (Summer 2006): 229-251. [ 3 quotes ] [ page 242-3 ]
Iran's state radio says the country has successfully sent its first domestically made satellite into orbit. "Raw Video: Iran Launches Its First Satellite." Associated Press. February 3, 2009.
Iran's state radio says the country has successfully sent its first domestically made satellite into orbit.
Iran could utilize its space-launch capability in other ways besides building long-range ballistic missiles to threaten the U.S. and its friends and allies. Tehran might mimic the Chinese and develop an anti-satellite (ASAT) capability. The ASAT presents a challenge to the American military's "Achilles heel: its space based assets and their related ground installations." On January 11, 2007, the Chinese military destroyed an aging weather satellite in LEO using an MRBM. The ballistic missile's "kill vehicle" collided with the satellite at an altitude of 864 kilometers. The Chinese realize both the importance and vulnerability of American military space assets. One People's Liberation Army (PLA) analyst concluded U.S. military space assets constitute its "soft ribs" and "for countries that can never win a war with the United States by using the method of tanks and planes, attacking the U.S. space system may be an irresistible and most tempting choice." Iran may take the necessary steps, including developing a kinetic kill vehicle, to build up an ASAT program (perhaps, with Chinese assistance). George C. Marshall Institute. "Persia in Space: Implications for U.S. National Security." . February 1, 2009. [ page 2 ]