India's space program does not present a military threat to the United States. India's Space program is predominantly oriented to civilian development applications and threatens nobody. For a nation which has fought over four major wars since its birth and a variety of insurgents, the decision to continue with a civilian program is not easy. A conscious decision has been made and continued with. Not many can boast of such conviction. The program is also the most transparent in the world.
Keywords: India.
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China's test of an ASAT (anti-satellite) weapon last month may have served as a rude wake-up call for India's defence establishment but the grim fact remains that it's still at least six to seven years away from establishing a fully-operational aerospace command to integrate air and space-based assets. India may have a strong civilian space programme but the use of space or space-related technologies for military purposes has been rather limited so far. The Defence Space Vision-2020, which outlines the roadmap for the armed forces in the realm of space, is just about getting ready to kick off, with intelligence, reconnaissance, surveillance and navigation as the thrust areas in its first phase (2007-2012). Consequently, the armed forces are still some distance away from exploiting space for "real-time" military communications and reconnaissance missions, leave alone uses like missile early-warning, delivery of precision-guided munitions through satellite signals or jamming enemy networks. "India years away from setting up aerospace command." Times of India. February 6, 2007.
Instead of accelerating its space-launch and missile programs, New Delhi has allowed the asymmetry to widen to a point where China has now laid bare India's battlefield vulnerability. Indeed, the Chinese ASAT lethality arguably holds the greatest import for India. The only counter to ASAT weapons is a capability to pay back in kind. The United States and Russia can cripple China's communications and expose its ground assets if their space assets were struck. Japan, also concerned over the test, is fortunate to be ensconced under the U.S. security umbrella. India, by contrast, neither has the missile reach for a counter-offensive in the Chinese heartland nor seeks ASAT power to deter the destruction of its space assets. Chellaney, Brahma. "India's Vulnerability Bared." Japan Times. February 9, 2007.
Before it can think of developing a counter-capability to shield itself from an ASAT menace, it will have to deal with two obtrusive mismatches that hobble its deterrence promise. The first mismatch is between its satellite and launch capabilities. Greater operational capability necessitates large satellites. While India has first-rate satellite-manufacturing expertise, it still needs a foreign commercial launcher like the Ariane 5 of the European Aeronautic Defense and Space Company to place its INSAT-4 series satellites in geostationary orbit. The second mismatch is in the military realm -- between the technical sophistication to build nuclear warheads and the extent to which they can be delivered reliably by missiles. Nearly a decade after it went overtly nuclear and almost a quarter-century after the missile program launch, India still lacks the full reach against China. The thermonuclear warhead India tested with a controlled yield in 1998 still awaits a delivery vehicle of the right payload range. Chellaney, Brahma. "India's Vulnerability Bared." Japan Times. February 9, 2007.
India's expression of its intentions to set up an aerospace command and its announcement of the Integrated Space Cell has raised concern in some quarters that India is entering the arms race in space. Such fears might be premature, given that the Integrated Space Cell is at a very rudimentary stage. "India is just putting in place a very minimal budget initiative that will take several years to develop," argued Prabhakar. "Besides satellites in space, India's space architecture of offensive and defensive systems are yet to be conceived, built and deployed," said Prabhakar, pointing to the different kinds of satellites, space-based laser systems, space stations and ground-based laser stations for offensive space operations that the "space superpowers" - the United States, Russia and China - have. "India goes to war in space." Asia Times. June 18, 2008.
In the event of their satellites being knocked out by enemy action during a crisis, the US, Russia and China have the capability to launch substitute satellites into space at short notice. The US can move its satellites from one orbit level to another, higher level to escape being taken out by an enemy anti-satellite system (ASAT). India can program a satellite launch only on a programmed sequence basis and not on short notice for rapid launches to replenish lost satellites, Prabhakar said. "India doesn't have even preliminary capability to defend its satellites," he said, adding "it will take another 15 to 20 years or more before India can put these systems in place." For all its impressive achievements in building and launching satellites, India is decades away from establishing a fully-operational aerospace command. It has formidable capability in building satellites. It is now trying to find a way to defend them. "India goes to war in space." Asia Times. June 18, 2008.
Perhaps more worrying is the prospect that China's chief regional rival, India, may move to develop ASATs or space-based weapons. India has a robust civil space program, and Indian Air Force officials for a number of years have been pushing for a military space program that includes space weapons. "[I]t is necessary to develop a sound doctrine and strategy for development of space capabilities and their utilisation for defence. This should help to develop space forces . . . to access, use and, if directed, control space for national security," wrote retired Air Commodore Jasjit Singh in March 2006, in the introduction to a book on India's military space needs. Indian defense officials have also long bemoaned the suspected Chinese support of Pakistan's missile development. Further, India, like China, has never really accepted the concept of "open skies," the norm established during the cold war in which reconnaissance satellites are given free passage over national territory. Trade journal Defense News on 9 April 2007 quoted unnamed Indian Defense Ministry sources as saying that India has already begun developing ASAT weapons, and has reinstated plans to establish an Aerospace Command to manage a cohesive military space program. "Sources in the ministry said space-based options must be used to protect national security, and that space programs should shift from support missions . . . to space control efforts," Defense News reported.51 Of course, a confirmed Indian ASAT program would no doubt be followed rapidly by similar Pakistani efforts, given their ever-fraught relations. Hitchens, Theresa. "Debris, Traffic Management and Weaponization." Brown Journal of World Affairs. Vol. 14, No. 1 (Fall / Winter 2007): 173-186. [ 5 quotes ] [ page 181 ]