Chinese threats against Taiwan ring hollow due to lack of space
reconnaissance and anti-satellite attack capability, a new analysis of
the East Asian military situation reports. ( More ... )

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Sietzen, Frank. "Lack of Space Assets Limits Chinese Military." Space.com. (August 10, 1999). [ 1 reference ]

 

A nation with a few ASATs might use that capability as a deterrent, offensive
weapon, or terrorist device. Such a nation may not want the United
States to use its space resources over a particular area or during a
certain time period. For example, because it might not want a US reconnaissance satellite
to detect or watch an amphibious invasion of Taiwan, or support a US
counterstrike against the PRC, China might use its ASATs to blind or
disable a number of US military space satellites until the successful
conclusion of the operation. ( More ... )

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Chun, Clayton K. S. Shooting Down a Star: Program 437, the U.S. Nuclear ASAT System and Present Day Copycat Killers. Maxwell AFB, AL: USAF Air University, April 2000. [ 11 quotes ] [ page 70 ]

 

With a military strategy that absolutely depends on vulnerable space assets to protect the homeland, an American president would face the unenviable task of choosing between launching a surprise attack on China or risking the loss of space-based intelligence, strike and missile defense assets that protect against nuclear attack. ( More ... )

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Lewis, Jeffrey. What if Space Were Weaponized? Possible Consequences for Crisis Scenarios. Washington, D.C.: Center for Defense Information, July 2004. [ 16 quotes ] [ page 19 ]

 

Not surprisingly, the Pentagon is extremely worried about possible Chinese ASATs, and the threat that such weapons would pose to U.S. military superiority. The most recent Pentagon report on Chinese military power warns that "China is said to be acquiring a variety of foreign technologies which could be used to develop an active Chinese ASAT capability." The report also warns that, at the outset of a conflict, "the PLA would attempt to weaken U.S. or other third party's resolve by demonstrating the capability to hold at risk -- or actually striking -- high-value assets. The PLA would seek to leverage emerging asymmetric capabilities to counter or negate an adversary's superiorities." ( More ... )

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Lewis, Jeffrey. What if Space Were Weaponized? Possible Consequences for Crisis Scenarios. Washington, D.C.: Center for Defense Information, July 2004. [ 16 quotes ] [ page 19 ]

 

It is important to note that the Chinese don't even have to actually acquire ASATs for this nightmare scenario to happen. The Pentagon's assessments of Chinese ASATs are based largely on circumstantial evidence -- a Hong Kong newspaper report here; a commercial purchase by a Chinese company there. In fact, the Pentagon admits that "specific Chinese programs for a laser ASAT system have not been identified" and that press reports of a so-called "parasitic" microsatellite "cannot be confirmed." Such gaps in U.S. knowledge are dangerous, given the natural tendency of defense planners to assume the worst. ( More ... )

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Lewis, Jeffrey. What if Space Were Weaponized? Possible Consequences for Crisis Scenarios. Washington, D.C.: Center for Defense Information, July 2004. [ 16 quotes ] [ page 20 ]

 

The keys to any Chinese military action against Taiwan would first be deterrence of US intervention and then, if an attack is initiated, limiting America's capacity and will to respond. If China elects to use military measures to secure national unity, its primary goal will be to achieve a quick outcome through surprise, speed, and deception. America's space-dependent information infrastructure presents an alluring target, making a non-lethal strike against US space assets a likely precursor or adjunct to an attack. ( More ... )

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France, Martin E.B. and Richard J. Adams. "The Chinese Threat to US Superiority." High Frontier Journal. Vol. 1, No. 3 (Winter 2005): 17-22. [ 12 quotes ] [ page 19 ]

 

China's Rise. Specific to the rise of China, dissuasion has already proved of little utility. The United States has attempted to dissuade China from solving the Taiwan issue militarily. However, the Chinese continue to pursue a military capable of overrunning Taiwan, amphibious assault forces, a blue water navy, advanced SAM, and counter-space weaponry. Beijing also continues to make strong and even provocative statements about Taiwanese independence. In light of these actions, it appears that dissuasion is failing. The opportunities for dissuasion to succeed with respect to China are similar to those stated in the previous section. Efforts by Washington to dissuade PLA actions and instead channel its efforts in directions more favorable to America are not realistic. This is especially true given China's growing economy, military modernization, and increasing partnerships with other states. However, US strategists are compelled to do something to protect American influence abroad. Britain faced a similar dilemma when it began to fall from its position as global hegemon during the first half of the twentieth century. Unfortunately, Washington is slowly realizing, much like Britain's leadership, that only so much can be done to protect these high levels of power.

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Meteyer, David O. The Art of Peace: Dissuading China from Developing Counter-Space Weapons. USAF Academy, CO: USAF Institute for National Security Studies, August 2005. [ 20 quotes ] [ page 84 ]

 

Chinese authorities acknowledge their country is a newcomer in space, and insist they aren't challenging the leading position of the Americans, or of the Russians, for that matter. However, China’s recent ASAT tests may have been a deterrent signal, planting seeds of doubt about the assumption of U.S. supremacy in space. A decade ago, the Chinese regime showed its displeasure with pro-independence politicians on Taiwan by conducting live missile tests near the island. (Beijing considers Taiwan a renegade province that must be reunited with the mainland—by force, if necessary.)

In a warning to Beijng to lay off, Washington moved two aircraft carrier groups near the Taiwan Strait. Now, although it's far from operational, Beijing appears to be seeking the capability to cripple the satellites on which U.S. military operations depend—which could change the calculation in any future Taiwan crisis. "The U.S. relies heavily on specialized satellites, so this test might make the U.S. think over whether they would want to get involved in the Taiwan Strait," says Arthur Ding, a security analyst at Taipei's National Chengchi University.

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"Can U.S. and China Avoid Space Arms Race?." Newsweek. January 27, 2007.

 

If deployed, Chinese antisatellite weapons could threaten a range of U.S. military capabilities that rely on space assets and might have significant consequences for a Taiwan contingency. The United States has a range of options for countering Chinese ASAT capabilities and limiting their impact, but there is no simple or cost-free solution. Because the direct-ascent ASAT system that China tested could threaten satellites in LEO, U.S. military capabilities for reconnaissance, remote sensing, surveillance, electronic surveillance, and meteorology could be at risk. Satellites in medium Earth orbit and geostationary orbit are not vulnerable to a direct-ascent ASAT system boosted by a twostage DF–21 launcher. Although China has demonstrated the ability to launch satellites into geostationary orbits using larger rockets, the techniques required to reach higher orbits would significantly alter the dynamics for an effective hit-to-kill kinetic kill vehicle, making the current ASAT design unusable for such purposes.

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Lutes, Charles D. and Phillip C. Saunders. China's ASAT Test: Motivations and Implications. Washington, D.C.: Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, June 2007. [ 10 quotes ] [ page 2 ]

 

Perhaps the most significant operational implication concerns the U.S. ability to respond to a Taiwan contingency. Given American military advantages, China's best chance of success in a conflict over Taiwan would be to delay the arrival of U.S. forces until after it forced Taiwan to capitulate, presenting Washington with a fait accompli. Most agreed that Chinese ability to destroy U.S. satellites in LEO would significantly increase the costs and risks of U.S. intervention on behalf of Taiwan. One China expert pointed out that ASAT weapons are only one in a range of military capabilities that China is developing to complicate and delay U.S. military responses. Even if any individual program had only a marginal impact, the cumulative impact could still be significant. A comprehensive net assessment of new Chinese technologies and potential U.S. counters is necessary to consider how to mitigate strategic risk.

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Lutes, Charles D. and Phillip C. Saunders. China's ASAT Test: Motivations and Implications. Washington, D.C.: Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, June 2007. [ 10 quotes ] [ page 3 ]

 

The near-term objective of preventing what Beijing would call Taiwanese secession from the mainland—and defeating any U.S. expeditionary forces that may be committed in support -- remains the dominant consideration for China's military modernization. The resulting capabilities would then become the nucleus for servicing more ambitious geostrategic aims as the country's economic strength increases over time. For the moment, both objectives converge admirably in that they require Beijing to develop all the capabilities required to prevent superior U.S. forces from being able to enter the relevant theater of operations and, if that goal should prove unsuccessful, deny them the freedom to operate. Whether the theater of action is the limited geographic area around Taiwan or a wider expanse like the western Pacific, the tasks facing the Peoples' Liberation Army (PLA) therefore remain the same in the short to medium terms: It must be able to successfully prosecute antiaccess and battle-spacedenial operations against all threatening American military forces.

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Tellis, Ashley J. Punching the U.S. Military's "Soft Ribs": China's Anti-Satellite Weapon Test in Strategic Perspective. Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, June 2007. [ 15 quotes ] [ page 2 ]

 

Third, the growing Chinese capability for space warfare implies that a major conflict in the Taiwan Strait would entail serious deterrence and crisis instabilities. If such a clash were to compel Beijing to attack U.S. space systems—primarily intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, military communications, navigation and guidance, and meteorology assets— right at the beginning of a war to increase China’s chances of achieving its objectives, the very prospect of such a “Space Pearl Harbor” could, in turn, provoke the United States to contemplate preemptive attacks or horizontal escalation on the Chinese mainland, particularly if such a conflict were to occur before Washington had the opportunity to fully invest in survivable space capabilities. Already, U.S. Strategic Command officials have publicly signaled that conventionally-armed Trident submarine-launched ballistic missiles would be appropriate weapons for executing the prompt strikes that might be necessary in such a contingency. These types of attacks on space launch sites, sensor nodes, and command- and-control installations on the Chinese mainland could well be perceived as precursors to an all-out war. This indicates how difficult it would be for all sides to limit the intensification of such a conflict, even if one discounts the complications of accidents and misperception.

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Tellis, Ashley J. Punching the U.S. Military's "Soft Ribs": China's Anti-Satellite Weapon Test in Strategic Perspective. Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, June 2007. [ 15 quotes ] [ page 7 ]