The U.S. has several military projects underway to develop advanced anti-satellite weapon capabilities and already has few tested methods including kinetic strike and electronic disruption. There is also a growing movement within the U.S. Government to change military doctirne and policy to allow U.S. forces to attack enemy space assets.
Keywords: Anti-Satellite Weapon (ASAT).
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Since size and the need for refueling limit current laser weapons designs, the US is pursuing solid state laser (SSL) designs, which are generally lighter, smaller, and of longer operational life, but have not been able to generate the same level of continuous power as other types. The Pentagon's Joint High-Power Solid-State Laser (JHPSSL) program is funding the development of a 25-kilowatt SSL capable of more than 300 seconds of run-time. Twenty-five kilowatts is the approximate minimum power needed to heat-to-kill electronics on satellites in LEO and 300 seconds is the typical flyover time of a satellite in LEO. JHPSSL contractor Northrop Grumman announced on 9 November 2005 that it had successfully tested a 27-kilowatt SSL for 350 seconds, the most powerful continuous SSL to date. ( More ... ) Collard-Wexler, Simon, Thomas Graham et al. Space Security 2006. Waterloo, Ontario: Space Security Index, July 2006. [ 26 quotes ] [ page 140 ]
The US has a variety of ongoing programs developing advanced technologies that would be foundational for a space-based conventional ASAT program, including maneuverability, docking, and on-board optics. The Experimental Spacecraft System (XSS) employs microsatellites to test proximity operations, including autonomous rendezvous, maneuvering, and close-up inspection of a target. For example, XSS-10 was launched in 2002 and performed maneuvers within 40 meters of another satellite. The Near-Field Infrared Experiment (NFIRE), designed to provide support to ballistic missile defense, would employ a kill vehicle to encounter a ballistic missile at close range, with a sensor to record the findings. Although NFIRE is not designed for space systems negation, it could be modified for such use. Another missile defense technology currently under development which could enable space systems negation is the space-based interceptor (SBI). The SBI, tentatively scheduled for a 2011-2012 deployment, will test ballistic missile interception using small, light-weight kill vehicles from a space-based platform. ( More ... ) Collard-Wexler, Simon, Thomas Graham et al. Space Security 2006. Waterloo, Ontario: Space Security Index, July 2006. [ 26 quotes ] [ page 136 ]
The Air Force is putting increased emphasis on research into directed energy for both offensive and defensive purposes. Colonel Gail Wojtowicz, chief of the Air Force future concepts and transformation directorate, told an October 11, 2005, conference sponsored by the American Enterprise Institute: "Directed energy is the next weapons race," stressing the service’s "big push" to pursue such technologies. Furthermore, the 2003 Transformation Flight Plan notes a "recently completed Directed Energy Master Plan" that "articulates a strategy to develop and transition directed energy applications such as . . . space superiority and ballistic missile defense." The Transformation Flight Plan outlines directed-energy technologies to attack satellites, including ground- and space-based lasers, relay mirrors, and radio-frequency weapons. Lewis, Jeffrey, Michael Katz-Hyman et al. "U.S. Space Weapons: Big Intentions, Little Focus." Non Proliferation Review. Vol. 13, No. 1 (March 2006): 35-56. [ 5 quotes ] [ page 40 ]
American scholars closely monitoring the situation correctly note that the future of the U.S. space weapons program is far from certain and that China's ASAT test has only fanned the flames of its proponents in the United States. Significant political, budgetary and even technological obstacles constantly threaten to derail the program. For instance, in the past several years a number of space weapons systems have had their funding cut or the program shelved altogether and the U.S. Air Force is under increasing pressure to prove economic viability of its military space programs. Numerous technological difficulties continue to plague the NMD program. Also important is the perennial domestic political debate over whether such systems will enhance America's security or threaten to undermine it. With Congress now under control of the Democrats, and U.S. military quagmired in Iraq, Bush's military space ambitions would have been scrutinized far more and perhaps even reversed. Hagt, Eric. "China's ASAT Test: Strategic Response." China Security. (Winter 2007): 31-51. [ 5 quotes ] [ page 40 ]
Rather than a kinetic approach, say officials and experts, the United States has adopted a method that relies on spy satellites’ most vulnerable aspect: the need for constant housekeeping from the ground. To maintain satellite orbits, particularly low Earth orbits, controllers on the ground must send their satellites a constant barrage of signals from ground stations around the world. For example, the United States maintains the Satellite Control Network, a string of eight tracking stations in places as remote as Thule Air Base on Greenland, and Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean. By interfering with those signals — called telemetry, tracking and control signals — the United States can put satellites out of commission for critical periods of time or send them spiraling out of control. Intelligence experts call the strategy “electronic negation” or “intrusion.” ( More ... ) Windrem, Robert. "U.S. favors stealthy anti-satellite strategy." MSNBC News. April 11, 2007.
The memo once classified “Top Secret” but now available at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library (and online) lays out presidential fears of Soviet dominance in the area and the means to counter it. “The Soviets should not be allowed an exclusive sanctuary in space for critical military supporting satellites,” Scowcroft wrote. Scowcroft, on behalf of the president, proposed a twofold strategy. The more obvious solution was to be pursued in the open—the acquisition of an low-orbit anti-satellite interceptor capable of destroying “a small number (6 to 10) of important military satellites within a period of one week.” But the “fact of” an electronic ASAT capability — one that would “electronically nullify critical Soviet military satellites at all altitudes up to synchronous” — was to be “classified and special compartmented,” meaning kept at the highest security level possible. The reason: “to avoid stimulating” counter measures by the Soviets. ( More ... ) Windrem, Robert. "U.S. favors stealthy anti-satellite strategy." MSNBC News. April 11, 2007.