The U.S. is currently planning to develop and deploy space weapons.
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In the next decade, planned U.S. military activities in outer space will cross several important thresholds. By 2008 the U.S. Missile Defense Agency intends to deploy a test bed of space-based kinetic-energy kill vehicles (KKVs) to destroy high-speed collision test targets that mimic nuclear-armed reentry vehicles in the midcourse of their arc through space. In early 2006 a Missile Defense Agency satellite experiment, NFIRE, is planned to attempt to intercept a rocket in or near boost phase. Beyond missile defense, these U.S. space-deployed weapons will have broad implications for the entire space sector. Because a KKV designed to intercept missiles could also function as an antisatellite weapon (ASAT) and as a means to deny other countries' access to space, U.S. adversaries might feel compelled to develop means to counter these and other U.S. space weapons with their own systems based in space or on the ground. ( More ... ) Deblois, Bruce M., Jeremy C. Marwell et al. "Space Weapons: Crossing the U.S. Rubicon." International Security. Vol. 29, No. 2 (Fall 2004): 50-84. [ 3 quotes ] [ page 45 ]
In August 2004, the USAF released a Counterspace Operations doctrine document, the first to clarify the concepts of 'space situation awareness,' 'defensive counterspace,' and 'offensive counterspace.' As well, it was the first to make explicit mention of military operations conceived "to deceive, disrupt, deny, degrade, or destroy adversary space capabilities." Although the Counterspace Operations document represents the views of the USAF and not necessarily that of the US Government, it did provide an important indicator of where US policy may be heading. For example, in December 2004, the US issued a Presidential directive calling on the US Department of Defense to develop its ability to deny an adversary the use of satellite-based positioning, navigation, and timing systems during a conflict. ( More ... ) Cowan-Sharp, Jessy, Robert Lawson et al. Space Security Index 2004. Waterloo, Ontario: Space Security Index, June 2005. [ 13 quotes ] [ page 38 ]
Nonetheless, it is apparent that the current campaign by the US Air Force's Space Command to garner domestic political approval for a space war strategy has reached a peak not seen since the darkest days of the Cold War. Further, for the first time in US history, a string of US Defence Department and Air Force documents have now been published officially articulating US plans for war-fighting "in, from and through" space, based on a desired future arsenal of ASATs, space-based missile defences, and space-based weapons deployed against both terrestrial and on-orbit targets. ( More ... ) Hitchens, Theresa. "Safeguarding Space: Building Cooperative Norms to Dampen Negative Trends." Disarmament Diplomacy. No. 81 (Winter 2005). [ 9 quotes ]
The US is expected to release a new military space directive to replace the existing policy that was formulated in 1996, although the release has been delayed several times for revisions. Media reports have indicated that the new space directive would provide freer access in space for the USAF and would call for the deployment of capabilities to ensure that space systems or services cannot be used for purposes hostile to US national interests. The new policy directive is widely speculated to build on certain recommendations of the 2001 Rumsfeld Commission report that "explicit national security guidance and defense policy is needed to direct development of doctrine, concepts of operations and capabilities for space, including weapons systems that operate in space." ( More ... ) Collard-Wexler, Simon, Thomas Graham et al. Space Security 2006. Waterloo, Ontario: Space Security Index, July 2006. [ 26 quotes ] [ page 61 ]
Since entering office, President Bush has issued two significant space policy addendums; a policy on U.S. commercial remote sensing; and a policy on U.S. Space-based Position, Navigation, and Timing. ... Both policies are clear gestures toward solidifying the nation’s space control doctrine. ( More ... ) Henderson, Scott A. The Third Battle: Is the U.S. Ready to Wage the Next Conflict in Space?. Maxwell AFB, AL: USAF Air University, March 2004. [ 7 quotes ] [ page 32 ]
Air Force long-range planning documents do identify near-, mid- and long-term capabilities that could help fight ‘‘in, from and through space.’’ Matching such wish lists with actual spending reveals a number of proof-of-technology efforts that may become full-fledged space weapon programs. Two recent Air Force documents, called ‘‘Transformation Flight Plans,’’ outline the service’s planned transformation to meet modern warfare needs, including capabilities for warfighting in space between now and 2030. The November 2003 version included an annex that named desired weapons programs. Air Force officials downplayed the 2003 Transformation Flight Plan as a ‘‘wish list,’’ but the 2004 version describes the series as a ‘‘reporting’’ document that does ‘‘not represent new policy guidance or propose what the Air Force should do, but is instead intended to reflect decisions, information, and initiatives already made and/or approved [emphasis added] by the Air Force capability-based planning, programming and budgeting process.’’ Lewis, Jeffrey, Michael Katz-Hyman et al. "U.S. Space Weapons: Big Intentions, Little Focus." Non Proliferation Review. Vol. 13, No. 1 (March 2006): 35-56. [ 5 quotes ] [ page 37-8 ]
Some experts are quick to point out in response that the Pentagon does not presently have an arsenal of such weapons on order, and that in fact many high-profile programs like the Space-Based Laser have been canceled. The absence of present acquisition programs and the termination of specific projects is not necessarily the same as a lack of interest in space forces. On the contrary, several well-publicized and ongoing projects are indicative of such interest, such as the array of directed-energy weapons under development. At least one of these has been tested against satellites (the Mid-Infra-Red Chemical Laser, back in 1997), and this year the Defense Department requested the funding to research dedicated anti-satellite lasers. Another example is the development of the X-37 spaceplane as a future “space bomber,” able to launch from inside the United States and deliver strikes anywhere in the world in as little as ninety minutes after a presidential order. (After languishing for several years, the Air Force revived the X-37 earlier this month as the Orbital Test Vehicle, with its first launch scheduled for 2008.) Elhefnawy, Nader. "The National Space Policy and space arms control." The Space Review. November 27, 2006.
Since 2003, the US Air Force (USAF) has promoted a concept called Operationally Responsive Spacelift (ORS), that aims to reduce satellite costs and deployment times from years or months to days. Such savings are made possible by new launch capabilities, combined with miniaturization technologies that have dramatically increased the “capability per kilogram on orbit” equation for satellites. These ORS efforts seek the capability to replace US satellites on short notice, allowing the US to rapidly recover from space negation attacks and reducing general space system vulnerabilities. ORS would also allow deployments of space systems designed to meet the needs of specific military operations. For example, the US TacSat will be an ORS demonstration imaging satellite, weighing just 110 kilograms and combining existing military and commercial technologies with new commercial launch systems to provide “more rapid and less expensive access to space.” The satellite will be controlled directly by deployed US commanders. Collard-Wexler, Simon, Thomas Graham et al. Space Security 2006. Waterloo, Ontario: Space Security Index, July 2006. [ 26 quotes ] [ page 99 ]
Thus far, research for U.S. space weapons includes: (1) the ballistic missile defense system (BMDS); (2) the Experimental Spacecraft Systems, which are microsatellites that can disturb and disrupt other satellites; (3) the Near Field Infrared Experiment, which encompasses tests for destroying objects in orbit; (4) the Microsatellite Propulsion Experiment, which involves launching kill vehicles to destroy satellites; and (5) the Hypervelocity Rod Bundles (dubbed "Rods from God"), which plunge from space to destroy targets on Earth. Further, the United States is still pursuing laser research, along with the Kinetic Energy Interceptor, which could operate as an anti-satellite weapon, and the Kinetic Energy Anti-Satellite Weapon (KE-ASAT), a weapon designed to launch from Earth to destroy orbital satellites with energy equivalent to an explosion of almost one ton of TNT. While all of these potential space weapons are still in the research and development stage, the sheer number of programs currently being funded points to the imminence of space weaponization. Illustrating this point, the Department of Defense's budget proposal for the 2007 fiscal year includes funding for "a missile launched at a small satellite in orbit, testing a small space vehicle that could disperse weapons while traveling at twenty times the speed of sound, and determining whether high-powered ground-based lasers can effectively destroy enemy satellites." Scheetz, Lori. "Infusing Environmental Ethics into the Space Weapons Dialogue." Georgetown International Environmental Law Review. Vol. 19, No. 1 (Fall 2006): 57-82. [ 8 quotes ] [ page 61 ]
Recent US actions and other internal statements, however, paint a much more aggressive picture of US plans for the weaponization of outer space. In 2001, a high-level commission headed by Donald Rumsfeld and charged with examining the future of US space security concluded that to avoid a "Space Pearl Harbor" the "U.S. government should vigorously pursue the capabilities called for in the National Space Policy to ensure that the President will have the option to deploy weapons in space to deter threats to, and, if necessary, defend against attacks on U.S. interests." In addition, the commission stated that since space warfare is a "virtual certainty," the "U.S. must develop the means both to deter and to defend against hostile acts in and from space." The commission called for improvements in "defense in space" and "power projection in, from and through space." Before the commission concluded its work, Donald Rumsfeld assumed the post of secretary of defense. In 2006, President Bush issued a new US National Space Policy that emphasized the US determination to remain free of restraint in outer space. "The United States will oppose the development of new legal regimes or other restrictions that seek to prohibit or limit U.S. access to or use of space. Proposed arms control agreements or restrictions must not impair the rights of the United States to conduct research, development, testing, and operations or other activities in space for U.S. national interests." In 2004, the Air Force published a paper called Counterspace Operations that begins with the assertion that "counterspace operations are critical to success in modern warfare." The document goes on to explore the sorts of actions that would be included in a US offensive counterspace operation, including possible preemptive attacks on satellites, veillance and reconnaissance systems. Blazejewski, Kenneth S. "Space Weaponization and US-China Relations." Strategic Studies Quarterly. Vol. 2, No. 1 (Spring 2008): 33-55. [ 12 quotes ] [ page 36 ]