Anti-satellite space weapons are feasible with today's technology. There are multiple low-tech options (ex. direct-ascent, high altitude nuclear detonation, information warfare) within range of most spacefaring states and the more advanced methods (directed energy weapons, microsatellites) are probably within reach of the advanced nations within a few years. Recent anti-satellite weapon tests also confirm this. Russia conducted several anti-satellite weapon tests up until 1981 and the U.S. destroyed a satellite using a missile launched from an F-15 in 1985. Even more recently, China destroyed a weather satellite using a ground-to-earth, direct ascent anti-satellite weapon on January 11, 2007.
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Technology and cost concerns are entirely reasonable and should factor prominently into any US decision on how to proceed with our space program. Having said that, the arguments space weapons opponents make regarding technology and costs bear a strong resemblance to those that were made in opposition to the early space and missile programs. ( More ... ) Ruhm, Brian C. Finding the Middle Ground: The U.S. Air Force, Space Weaponization, and Arms Control. Maxwell AFB, AL: USAF Air University, April 2003. [ 2 quotes ] [ page 28 ]
It is also widely believed that only sophisticated states or groups will be able to mount attacks on global communications, particularly against the space nodes. In fact, this is not true. Consider an incident in 1996 between the states of Tonga and Indonesia -- neither highly developed technologically. Both states had claimed a GEO satellite communications slot. When Tonga moved its national communications satellite into this disputed spot, Indonesia protested. However, it appears that Indonesia did more than just protest, for Tongan soon began having difficulties in using their satellite; apparently it was being jammed. ( More ... ) Shaw, John E. and Simon P. Worden. Whither Space Power?: Forging a Strategy for the New Century. Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama: Air University, 2002. [ 8 quotes ] [ page 91 ]
The ASAT potential of high-energy lasers has been extensively explored by the US and to a lesser degree by the USSR. As many as 30 states may already have the capability to use low-power lasers to degrade unhardened sensors on satellites. In 1997, the US Mid-Infrared Advanced Chemical Laser (MIRACL) was test-fired against a satellite in a 420-kilometer orbit, damaging the satellite's sensors. Reportedly, it was not the mega-watt MIRACL laser, but a 30-watt laser used for alignment that actually damaged the target satellite's sensors. This suggests that even a commercially available low-watt laser could be used to 'dazzle,' or temporarily disrupt, a satellite functioning from the ground. ( More ... ) Cowan-Sharp, Jessy, Robert Lawson et al. Space Security Index 2004. Waterloo, Ontario: Space Security Index, June 2005. [ 13 quotes ] [ page 128 ]
FP: If the United States were to start tomorrow, how far away would it be from developing functional space weapons? TH: We could take out a satellite today with a missile. We did that in 1985. We’re experimenting with lasers on the ground that could disable, disrupt, and destroy satellites. We’re not there yet, and it’s probably another 10 years before we have an actual, working weapon. The limitations are the engineering, not the physics. We could launch—tomorrow if we wanted—a microsatellite designed to maneuver into a larger, target satellite. We have the prototype of that technology in space now. So we’re not far away from having those kinds of capabilities. And I would say that any other space-faring nation that wished to spend the money would not be far from developing those kinds of capabilities, either. Krepon, Michael. "Seven Questions: Space Weapons." Foreign Policy. (July 2005). [ 3 quotes ]
Relatively simple technology suffices to take out a satellite the way the Chinese government apparently did last week, space weapons analysts say. Essentially any country that can put a satellite in orbit could launch a weapon to destroy one. The US government says China launched a ballistic missile on 11 January that destroyed one of its own spacecraft, a defunct weather satellite called Fengyun-1C, in an apparent test of anti-satellite technology "Anti-satellite Weapon Used Simple Technology." New Scientist. January 21, 2007.
Direct-attack weapons. Although the January 11 test should lay to rest any doubts about the seriousness of China’s ASAT program, such weapons represent only one facet of its current counterspace effort. Direct-ascent weapons are particularly effective against satellites flying in low Earth orbits, where most of America’s remote-sensing, meteorological, and imaging (electro-optical, infrared, and radar) intelligence satellites, and their associated relays, currently operate. They can also threaten spacecraft in medium and geosynchronous orbits, however, provided the attacker has a sufficiently powerful booster. This is where U.S. navigation and guidance satellites, military communications platforms, and early-warning and nuclear-detonation-detection systems now operate. There are several Chinese space launch vehicles and ballistic missiles like the DF-31 that could easily carry an ASAT payload to geosynchronous orbit, and it is not unreasonable to expect such dedicated systems in the future. One reputed analyst, Geoffrey Forden at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, has already concluded that the payload used to intercept the weather satellite “could be used to destroy geostationary satellites in a direct ascent mode.” Tellis, Ashley J. Punching the U.S. Military's "Soft Ribs": China's Anti-Satellite Weapon Test in Strategic Perspective. Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, June 2007. [ 15 quotes ] [ page 4 ]