There is no credible evidence that China is actively planning to develop and deploy anti-satellite space weapons.
Keywords: Anti-Satellite Weapon (ASAT), China.
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Although open source information clearly indicates Chinese interest and scientific research in ASAT weapons and technologies, the available evidence is insufficient to determine if China has an active program to develop and deploy ASAT weapons. This conclusion is based largely on an assessment of China's current space capabilities and inferences based on open-source information about Chinese ASAT-relevant scientific research. Direct information on Chinese ASAT weapons programs and possible operational capabilities is limited and of questionable reliability. The evidence is insufficient to reach a definitive judgment on whether China has an active ASAT weapons program or a limited operational ASAT capability. However, if China did have a robust operational capability, there would probably be more indications (in terms of tests and physical infrastructure) than have been observed to date. ( More ... ) Deters, Angela, Jing-dong Yuan et al. China's Space Capabilities and the Strategic Logic of Anti-Satellite Weapons. Monterey, CA: Center for Nonproliferation Studies, July 22, 2002. [ 5 quotes ]
Despite numerous indications that China is interested in developing ASAT weapons and significant overall improvements in China's space program over the last two decades, China still lacks a number of capabilities that would be required for a viable ASAT program. These limitations include: Limited tracking capabilities. China continues to rely heavily on shared and leased space tracking facilities, which might not be available in the event of a conflict. Despite a domestic network, two foreign sites, and four tracking ships, the Chinese tracking system does not have a global reach. Limited launch capabilities. Although its launch capabilities have been improving, China still lacks the launch on-demand capability required for space warfare and for an effective ASAT system. Vulnerable infrastructure. China's immobile launch facilities, tracking facilities, space infrastructure, and possible ground-based laser sites would all be vulnerable to attack. ( More ... ) Deters, Angela, Jing-dong Yuan et al. China's Space Capabilities and the Strategic Logic of Anti-Satellite Weapons. Monterey, CA: Center for Nonproliferation Studies, July 22, 2002. [ 5 quotes ]
Nevertheless, a dedicated yet secretive space weapons program, however defined, is unlikely as such an effort would be difficult, if not impossible, to keep concealed. More importantly, the political fallout for China if caught at this game makes this scenario highly implausible. ( More ... ) Hagt, Eric. "Mutually Assured Vulnerabilities." China Security. Vol. 1, No. 2 (2006): 84-106. [ 6 quotes ] [ page 95 ]
There are other instances of misinterpretation as well. Challenges to Space Superiority, published by the National Air and Space Intelligence Center at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base in March 2005, highlighted quotes suggesting that China will "threaten on-orbit assets" by Liying Zhan of the Langfang Army Missile Academy. Kulacki and Wright again tracked down the quotes and the source, and again found several key errors; fully documented in a published Union of Concerned Scientists research paper on Chinese military space capabilities. Key words were omitted from the actual Chinese quote and there were misinterpretations of what was included. For example, "should" (indicating a recommendation about a decision not yet made) was misinterpreted as "will," (indicating what China intends to do or is doing). Further, the author was found to be a junior faculty member at a facility primarily responsible for live-fire and simulated training for junior artillery officers, where ASAT research was likely not even going on, and which subsequently has been shut down. Not exactly an authoritative source for U.S. government planning purposes. Johnson-Freese, Joan. "Strategic Communication with China: What message about space?." China Security. Vol. 1, No. 2 (2006): 37-57. [ 2 quotes ] [ page 42 ]
Based on the orbits of US military satellites determined by the worldwide network of amateur observers, there appears to be a large number of low Earth orbit military satellites over China several times each week. To hit them, China would have to preposition its ASAT-tipped missiles and their mobile launchers in remote areas of China, one position for each satellite. (If reports of low reliabilities for these missiles are correct, two or more missiles might be assigned to each satellite.) Furthermore, these positions are really only suitable for a particular day. If China’s political and military planners have any uncertainty at all about which day to launch their space war, they would need to pre-position additional launchers around the country. Thus, attacking nine low Earth orbit satellites could require as many as 36 mobile launchers—enough for two interceptors fired at each satellite with a contingency day if plans change—moved to remote areas of China; areas determined more by the satellite orbits than China’s network of road. (As will be discussed below, nine is about the maximum they could reasonably expect to hit on the first day of the space war.) Forden, Geoffrey. "How China Loses the Coming Space War." Wired Magazine. January 10, 2008.