As a long-time space power, the Russian Federation is highly concerned about maintaining the integrity of both its military and commercial space capabilities. However, that concern emanates less from worries about external threats to its assets, and more from the fact that the Russian space programme has deteriorated due to lack of funding. ( More ... )

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Hitchens, Theresa. "Monsters and Shadows: Left Unchecked, American Fears Regarding Threats to Space Assets Will Drive Weaponization." Disarmament Forum. No. 1 (2003): 15-33. [ 5 quotes ] [ page 259 ]

 

In all of its military doctrine documents since 1992, Russia has expressed concern that attacks on its early warning and space surveillance systems would represent a direct threat to its security. Therefore, a basic Russian national security objective is the protection of Russian space systems, including ground stations. These concerns derive from Russia's assessment that modern warfare is increasingly becoming dependent upon space-based force enhancement capabilities. ( More ... )

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Cowan-Sharp, Jessy, Robert Lawson et al. Space Security Index 2004. Waterloo, Ontario: Space Security Index, June 2005. [ 13 quotes ] [ page 36 ]

 

As we can see, although Russia continues to support its military space program, the scale of that effort is just enough to maintain the programs that are most important. In addition to the systems described above, Russia invests significant effort into its early-warning and military communication satellites. Neither of these systems, however, is related to space-based weapons or anti-satellite capability. Russia does seem to preserve the basic industrial infrastructure that theoretically would allow it to develop and eventually deploy these kind of weapons, but that infrastructure has been steadily deteriorating in the recent years and it is extremely unlikely that Russia will be able to undertake any serious development effort in the area of space weapons or ASAT. As for other space-based military capabilities-imagery, signal intelligence, navigation-that might potentially play important role in a military conflict, the existing systems do not seem to provide Russia with capabilities that would significantly improve performance of its military. Besides, Russia has yet to demonstrate its ability to integrate space-based systems into military operations. ( More ... )

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Podvig, Pavel. "Russian Military Space Capabilities." Ensuring America's Space Security. Ed. Phillip E. Coyle. Washington, D.C.: Federation of American Scientists, September 2004. [ 3 quotes ] [ page 131 ]

 

The ability of the Russian space industry to embark on a serious ASAT development effort seems highly questionable. First of all, Russia has lost both the military and industrial organizational infrastructure that was responsible for research and development in the area of anti-satellite or space-based weapons. On the military side, the anti-satellite research and development programs were managed by the Air Defense Forces, which used to be a separate service in the Soviet armed forces. This service, however, was disbanded during the military reform of 1997. ... The changes in the defense industry have been much more serious. While Russia has managed to keep most of its space industry intact, this does not apply to the companies that were involved in the development of anti-satellite systems. ... As a result of these transformations, Russia now does not have an agency that would be capable of supporting development program in the area of anti-satellite systems or spacebased weapons. ( More ... )

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Podvig, Pavel. "Russian Military Space Capabilities." Ensuring America's Space Security. Ed. Phillip E. Coyle. Washington, D.C.: Federation of American Scientists, September 2004. [ 3 quotes ] [ page 127-8 ]

 

The exact status of the ASAT system deployed in Baykonur is unclear, but it is most likely that it is no longer operational. There were reports that the system underwent a modernization in 1991, but since it was done without flight tests it is highly unlikely that this modernization involved any significant upgrades. Significant parts of the space surveillance network that is an integral part of the system, have been lost during the break up of the Soviet Union. Although Russia has not formally announced that the system is decommissioned, the current structure of the Russian Space Forces does not include any units that could operate the system, which almost certainly means it is no longer functional. ( More ... )

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Podvig, Pavel. "Russian Military Space Capabilities." Ensuring America's Space Security. Ed. Phillip E. Coyle. Washington, D.C.: Federation of American Scientists, September 2004. [ 3 quotes ] [ page 127 ]

 

In practical terms, Russian military space policy appears to have two main priorities. The first is transferring to a new generation of space equipment capabilities, including cheaper and more efficient information technology systems. The second priority is the upgrade of the Russian nuclear missile attack warning system. Together, these recent developments are seen as having a critical role in guaranteeing Russia's secure access to space. Russia has expressed concern about the potential weaponization of space and the extension of the arms race to outer space, especially in light of the development of US missile defense systems. ( More ... )

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Collard-Wexler, Simon, Thomas Graham et al. Space Security 2006. Waterloo, Ontario: Space Security Index, July 2006. [ 26 quotes ]

 

Russia also has a Space Surveillance System (SSS), which functions using Russia's early warning radars in space and more than 20 optical and electro-optical facilities at 14 locations on Earth. The main optical observation system, Okno, allows detection of objects to an altitude of 40,000 kilometers,63 although its capacity to detect smaller objects is unclear. The Russian Academy of Sciences also participates in the SSS. The system cannot track satellites at very low inclinations and the operation of Russian surveillance sensors is reportedly erratic. The network as a whole carries out some 50,000 observations daily, contributing to a catalogue of approximately 5,000 objects, mostly in LEO. While information from the system is not classified, Russia does not have a formal structure to widely disseminate information about observations.

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Collard-Wexler, Simon, Thomas Graham et al. Space Security 2006. Waterloo, Ontario: Space Security Index, July 2006. [ 26 quotes ] [ page 52-3 ]

 

In all of its military doctrine documents since 1992, Russia has expressed concern that attacks on its early warning and space surveillance systems would represent a direct threat to its security. Therefore, a basic Russian national security objective is the protection of Russian space systems, including ground stations on its territory. These concerns derive from Russia's assessment that modern warfare is becoming increasingly dependent on space-based force enhancement capabilities. In 2001, Anatoliy Perminov, then Commander-in-Chief of the space corps, stated that the international trend of armed force modernization demonstrates "the continuously rising role of national space means in ensuring the high combat readiness of troops and naval forces." In practical terms, Russian military space policy appears to have two main priorities. The first is transferring to a new generation of space equipment capabilities, including cheaper and more efficient information technology systems. The second priority is upgrading the Russian nuclear missile attack warning system. Together, these recent developments are seen as having a critical role in guaranteeing Russia's secure access to space. Russia has expressed concern about the potential weaponization of space and the extension of the arms race to outer space, especially in light of the development of US missile defense systems. Thus, Russia has actively argued for a treaty prohibiting the deployment of weapons in space. In the interim, Russia has pledged not to be the first to deploy any weapons in outer space and has encouraged other space-faring nations to do the same. However, various Russian officials have also threatened retaliatory measures against any country that attempts to deploy weapons in space.

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Graham, Thomas and William Marshall. Space Security 2007. Waterlo, Ontario: Project Ploughshares, August 2007. [ 20 quotes ] [ page 49 ]

 

Even if the United States decided to introduce weapons in space, Russia would be unlikely to follow. Its experience with anti-satellite programs is discouraging—the capabilities of the Soviet system were very limited and if used would have had virtually no impact on the ability of the United States to op- erate its own space-based systems. With the increase in U.S. capabilities in space, a system of the kind that the Soviet Union had in the 1970s would be even less useful today. Among other factors that would make development of space-related weapons systems less likely are the very high cost of such sys- tems and the lack of a proper organizational structure to support a development project in this area.

It is more likely that Russia would turn to a policy of "asymmetric response," planning measures to counter the systems developed by the United States should they present a threat to Russia's space assets. This policy would be relatively easy to implement, for, as already noted, Russia's limited reliance on space systems does not make its armed forces overly susceptible to an attack on space assets.

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Zhang, Hui and Pavel Podvig. Russian and Chinese Responses to U.S. Military Plans in Space. Cambridge, MA: American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 2008. [ 16 quotes ] [ page 28-9 ]

 

The development of the Soviet ASAT system began in the early 1960s, and the first test flights of maneuverable spacecraft were performed in 1963–1964. The TsNII Kometa design bureau of the Ministry of Radio Industry managed the development of the system. The space launcher used in the system was a modified R-36 (SS-9) missile, developed by OKB-586 design bureau (now Yuzhnoye Design Bureau). In addition to the launcher and the interceptor spacecraft, the system included a network of space-surveillance radar and the command and control center.

Initial tests of the system were conducted in 1968. During subsequent tests, the system demonstrated its ability to destroy satellites in low orbits, with altitudes of up to 1000 km. The system was tested with different inter- cept geometries, onboard sensors, and proximity fuses (infrared and radar). The system was accepted for service and commissioned for active duty in 1979. The launchers were deployed at the Baykonur test site, where testing continued until 1982. In November 1983, the Soviet leadership announced a unilateral moratorium on further ASAT tests.

The status of the ASAT system deployed in Baykonur has never been officially disclosed, but it is certain that the system is no longer operational. Some reports indicate that the system underwent modernization that was completed in 1991. Parts of the space-surveillance network that were integral to the ASAT system were lost to Russia during the breakup of the Soviet Union. Russia formally decommissioned the system in 1993.

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Zhang, Hui and Pavel Podvig. Russian and Chinese Responses to U.S. Military Plans in Space. Cambridge, MA: American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 2008. [ 16 quotes ] [ page 22 ]

 

First, Russia's ability to deploy a range of space-based military systems that would support the operations of the Russian armed forces—optical reconnaissance, navigation, and signal intelligence systems—is an essential component of competition in space. Russia does operate a number of systems of this kind, but, as discussed, none of them operates at full capacity. In addition, most of these systems were developed in the 1980s and have not been modernized for a substantial period of time, which hardly makes them suitable for support of modern military operations. In many cases, Russia has to deal with the low reliability of satellites developed in the Soviet Union. This was not a serious problem when the military had access to a virtually unlimited launch capacity. It is a problem for Russia now, however, as a large number of launches are required just to maintain constellations in a very limited configuration.

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Zhang, Hui and Pavel Podvig. Russian and Chinese Responses to U.S. Military Plans in Space. Cambridge, MA: American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 2008. [ 16 quotes ] [ page 26-7 ]

 

There is another problem, potentially more serious, with the current Russian military space program. Realizing the full potential of space requires a significant investment in the creation of an infrastructure that would allow troops to use information and capabilities provided by the space-based components of the system. Although Russia has been improving its capability to launch satellites and to maintain and operate satellite constellations, the development of infrastructure on the ground remains the weakest link, limiting much of the effort to broaden the use of space systems. The Glonass satellite navigation system illustrates these points particularly well. It was developed in the 1970s and became operational in the mid-1980s. In recent years, Russia has invested considerable effort into having a full constellation of 24 Glonass satellites in orbit. In order to achieve this deployment, it had to upgrade the spacecraft to extend their lifetimes, as it could not otherwise provide enough launches to replace the satellites in orbit. However, even if the plan to populate all slots in the constellation succeeds, the ground infrastructure does not seem to be ready to take advantage of the system. For example, it was reported that the aircraft of Military Transport Aviation do not have Glonass receivers onboard and rely on the GPS system of the United States instead.

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Zhang, Hui and Pavel Podvig. Russian and Chinese Responses to U.S. Military Plans in Space. Cambridge, MA: American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 2008. [ 16 quotes ] [ page 27 ]

 

Most of the same problems are common to photoreconnaissance and signal intelligence systems. Although Russia has the capability to collect imaging information and to monitor communications, these capabilities are not integrated into the command structure of the armed forces to the extent that would make these systems directly usable in military operations. The launch schedule of the satellites that provide these capabilities confirm this lack of integration—for example, there have been no serious efforts to constantly maintain the presence of imaging satellites in orbit. The same is true of signal intelligence satellites— Russia does not maintain fully operational constellations. Although this may be explained in part by a lack of sufficient funding, success with other systems, namely communication satellites, shows that funding was probably not the only, or even the main, factor. As the recent history of communication-satellite launches demonstrates, Russia has been investing considerable effort into its space-based communication network. This was due partly to the dual-use nature of the satellites, which are used for both military and civilian communications; however, military systems like the Strela system have been maintained at close to full capacity.

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Zhang, Hui and Pavel Podvig. Russian and Chinese Responses to U.S. Military Plans in Space. Cambridge, MA: American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 2008. [ 16 quotes ] [ page 27 ]

 

The situation with early-warning satellites is also very characteristic of the current Russian space program. Although the space-based early-warning system is considered an important element of the strategic command and control system, Russia in effect discontinued its efforts to maintain a full constellation of satellites in orbit after 2001, seemingly satisfied with the limited capability provided by the few satellites it can support. Expansion of the system does not appear to the have the urgency that would justify efforts to deploy the constellation in its full capacity. All of these factors make Russia's space systems unlikely targets for space-based or anti-satellite weapons. Although an attack on some Russian military—or civilian—space assets could theoretically have adverse effects on Russia's capability to conduct military operations, in practice none of the currently deployed military space systems is advanced enough for an attack to make a significant difference militarily.

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Zhang, Hui and Pavel Podvig. Russian and Chinese Responses to U.S. Military Plans in Space. Cambridge, MA: American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 2008. [ 16 quotes ] [ page 27-8 ]