As a long-time space power, the Russian Federation is highly concerned about maintaining the integrity of both its military and commercial space capabilities. However, that concern emanates less from worries about external threats to its assets, and more from the fact that the Russian space programme has deteriorated due to lack of funding. ( More ... )

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Hitchens, Theresa. "Monsters and Shadows: Left Unchecked, American Fears Regarding Threats to Space Assets Will Drive Weaponization." Disarmament Forum. No. 1 (2003): 15-33. [ 5 quotes ] [ page 259 ]

 

In all of its military doctrine documents since 1992, Russia has expressed concern that attacks on its early warning and space surveillance systems would represent a direct threat to its security. Therefore, a basic Russian national security objective is the protection of Russian space systems, including ground stations. These concerns derive from Russia's assessment that modern warfare is increasingly becoming dependent upon space-based force enhancement capabilities. ( More ... )

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Cowan-Sharp, Jessy, Robert Lawson et al. Space Security Index 2004. Waterloo, Ontario: Space Security Index, June 2005. [ 13 quotes ] [ page 36 ]

 

The exact status of the ASAT system deployed in Baykonur is unclear, but it is most likely that it is no longer operational. There were reports that the system underwent a modernization in 1991, but since it was done without flight tests it is highly unlikely that this modernization involved any significant upgrades. Significant parts of the space surveillance network that is an integral part of the system, have been lost during the break up of the Soviet Union. Although Russia has not formally announced that the system is decommissioned, the current structure of the Russian Space Forces does not include any units that could operate the system, which almost certainly means it is no longer functional. ( More ... )

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Podvig, Pavel. "Russian Military Space Capabilities." Ensuring America's Space Security. Ed. Phillip E. Coyle. Washington, D.C.: Federation of American Scientists, September 2004. [ 3 quotes ] [ page 127 ]

 

In practical terms, Russian military space policy appears to have two main priorities. The first is transferring to a new generation of space equipment capabilities, including cheaper and more efficient information technology systems. The second priority is the upgrade of the Russian nuclear missile attack warning system. Together, these recent developments are seen as having a critical role in guaranteeing Russia's secure access to space. Russia has expressed concern about the potential weaponization of space and the extension of the arms race to outer space, especially in light of the development of US missile defense systems. ( More ... )

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Collard-Wexler, Simon, Thomas Graham et al. Space Security 2006. Waterloo, Ontario: Space Security Index, July 2006. [ 26 quotes ]

 

Russia also has a Space Surveillance System (SSS), which functions using Russia's early warning radars in space and more than 20 optical and electro-optical facilities at 14 locations on Earth. The main optical observation system, Okno, allows detection of objects to an altitude of 40,000 kilometers,63 although its capacity to detect smaller objects is unclear. The Russian Academy of Sciences also participates in the SSS. The system cannot track satellites at very low inclinations and the operation of Russian surveillance sensors is reportedly erratic. The network as a whole carries out some 50,000 observations daily, contributing to a catalogue of approximately 5,000 objects, mostly in LEO. While information from the system is not classified, Russia does not have a formal structure to widely disseminate information about observations.

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Collard-Wexler, Simon, Thomas Graham et al. Space Security 2006. Waterloo, Ontario: Space Security Index, July 2006. [ 26 quotes ] [ page 52-3 ]

 

Even if the United States decided to introduce weapons in space, Russia would be unlikely to follow. Its experience with anti-satellite programs is discouraging—the capabilities of the Soviet system were very limited and if used would have had virtually no impact on the ability of the United States to op- erate its own space-based systems. With the increase in U.S. capabilities in space, a system of the kind that the Soviet Union had in the 1970s would be even less useful today. Among other factors that would make development of space-related weapons systems less likely are the very high cost of such sys- tems and the lack of a proper organizational structure to support a development project in this area.

It is more likely that Russia would turn to a policy of "asymmetric response," planning measures to counter the systems developed by the United States should they present a threat to Russia's space assets. This policy would be relatively easy to implement, for, as already noted, Russia's limited reliance on space systems does not make its armed forces overly susceptible to an attack on space assets.

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Zhang, Hui and Pavel Podvig. Russian and Chinese Responses to U.S. Military Plans in Space. Cambridge, MA: American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 2008. [ 16 quotes ] [ page 28-9 ]

 

The development of the Soviet ASAT system began in the early 1960s, and the first test flights of maneuverable spacecraft were performed in 1963–1964. The TsNII Kometa design bureau of the Ministry of Radio Industry managed the development of the system. The space launcher used in the system was a modified R-36 (SS-9) missile, developed by OKB-586 design bureau (now Yuzhnoye Design Bureau). In addition to the launcher and the interceptor spacecraft, the system included a network of space-surveillance radar and the command and control center.

Initial tests of the system were conducted in 1968. During subsequent tests, the system demonstrated its ability to destroy satellites in low orbits, with altitudes of up to 1000 km. The system was tested with different inter- cept geometries, onboard sensors, and proximity fuses (infrared and radar). The system was accepted for service and commissioned for active duty in 1979. The launchers were deployed at the Baykonur test site, where testing continued until 1982. In November 1983, the Soviet leadership announced a unilateral moratorium on further ASAT tests.

The status of the ASAT system deployed in Baykonur has never been officially disclosed, but it is certain that the system is no longer operational. Some reports indicate that the system underwent modernization that was completed in 1991. Parts of the space-surveillance network that were integral to the ASAT system were lost to Russia during the breakup of the Soviet Union. Russia formally decommissioned the system in 1993.

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Zhang, Hui and Pavel Podvig. Russian and Chinese Responses to U.S. Military Plans in Space. Cambridge, MA: American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 2008. [ 16 quotes ] [ page 22 ]

 

The situation with early-warning satellites is also very characteristic of the current Russian space program. Although the space-based early-warning system is considered an important element of the strategic command and control system, Russia in effect discontinued its efforts to maintain a full constellation of satellites in orbit after 2001, seemingly satisfied with the limited capability provided by the few satellites it can support. Expansion of the system does not appear to the have the urgency that would justify efforts to deploy the constellation in its full capacity. All of these factors make Russia's space systems unlikely targets for space-based or anti-satellite weapons. Although an attack on some Russian military—or civilian—space assets could theoretically have adverse effects on Russia's capability to conduct military operations, in practice none of the currently deployed military space systems is advanced enough for an attack to make a significant difference militarily.

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Zhang, Hui and Pavel Podvig. Russian and Chinese Responses to U.S. Military Plans in Space. Cambridge, MA: American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 2008. [ 16 quotes ] [ page 27-8 ]

 

Even after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia remains the United States' greatest potential adversary in space. The Soviet Union fielded an operational co-orbital ASAT system in 1979 and, even earlier, a nuclear-armed ABM system around Moscow. It also developed, though never fielded, a space-based platform for delivering nuclear warheads and a high-powered, ground-based ASAT laser system. Once again, however, the question is not what the Russians possessed in the past, but what capabilities they wield today. According to current estimates, the Russian co-orbital ASAT is not operational, and new development of any ASAT capability would require dramatic change in the present structure of Russian forces. So, although Russia has the technological history conducive to fielding effective counterspace forces, its force structure suggests that it likely has neither the current capability to strike in space nor the political desire to create such a capability. However, it remains a major military power and, like the United States, possesses robust space launch. It has nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles that could effectively carry out asymmetric attacks in space. Additionally, the fact that Russia supplied Iraq with global positioning system (GPS) jammers prior to Operation Iraqi Freedom indicates that it has fielded earthbound counterspace technology.

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Weston, Scott A. "Examining Space Warfare: Scenarios, Risks, and US Policy Implications." Air & Space Power Journal. XXIII, No. 1 (Spring 2009): 73-82. [ 7 quotes ] [ page 76 ]

 

[PAVEL PODVIG] It would be actually be fairly difficult to do that in practical terms. In terms of actual programs and developments, things are not very good for either space weapons or ASAT in Russia because most of the industrial and organizational infrastructure that supported those programs has been scattered around, and we don’t have either the military service dedicated to this kind of thing but also Russia does not have a unified ministry in the defense industry that would carry enough weight to lobby for this kind of a program.

Besides, looking from the other direction, Russia, the discussion about ASAT and space, military uses of space, is actually influenced by the fact that Russia doesn’t really have a lot of space assets to protect. The integration of military satellites into the actual military operations is actually not very good.

Again, on a positive note, access to space is basically controlled largely by the space forces, by Roscosmos, the civilian agency, to a certain extent the rocket forces, and none of those institutions actually has great interest or any real investment in any kind of an ASAT capability or any weapon-in-space developments.

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Krepon, Michael, Pavel Podvig et al. "The Space Nuclear Nexus." 2009 Carnegie International Nonproliferation Conference. Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, April 07, 2009. [ 4 quotes ]

 

A group of retired Russian generals warned on Thursday that the country's space defenses are obsolete and have a limited capability to counter possible threats from space.

"Frankly, our space defense capabilities are limited and insufficient to ensure our national security," former Air Force commander Anatoly Kornukov told a roundtable on the future of Russia's air and space defenses in Moscow.

He said Russia is lagging behind the United States in the development of space-based weapons and space defense systems by at least 25-30 years and the Russian defense industry cannot meet the demand for advanced weaponry.

The Russian political and military leadership have long announced plans to develop strong missile and space defenses by 2020, but no concrete steps have been taken so far and the country doesn't even have a well-defined command structure to tackle this problem, Kornukov said.

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"Russia's Space Defenses in Shambles - Experts." RIA Novosti. May 13, 2010.