Damage to U.S. space assets would not cripple the U.S. military or economy, the system is already redundant and robust enough to absorb an ASAT attack.
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The United States has had a number of anti-satellite research and development programs under way for many years, and some are said to have produced experimental devices that have military utility. The planned U.S. ballistic missile defense system will also have some anti-satellite capability. U.S. conventional military capabilities for precision attack, even without the support of its full panoply of space assets, are not trivial. It is quite likely that an opponent’s own satellites, and its ground stations and bases for attacking U.S. satellites, would quickly come under sustained attack. The most plausible outcome of a war over space is that the United States would, after a period of difficulty, rebuild its space assets. The fight would not only leave the adversary devoid of space capability, but would also cause the United States to insist on the permanent antisatellite disarmament of the challenger, which it would try to enforce. Finally, the United States would probably assert some special interest in policing space. ( More ... ) Posen, Barry R. "Command of the Commons: The Military Foundation of U.S. Hegemony." International Security. Vol. 28, No. 1 (Summer 2003): 5-46. [ 3 quotes ] [ page 14 ]
The record of maverick leaders to date suggests that they are, indeed, capable of surprising steps but, above all, they are keenly interested in maintaining power. To initiate space warfare against the United States is not a good way to maintain power. But if irrationality rules behavior, and if a maverick leader were intent on using a nuclear weapon in a losing cause, why would that leader target satellites instead of an invading army? Asymmetric warfare in space does not favor the weak against the strong. The strong have greater means to reduce their weaknesses in space and to exploit the weaknesses of others. Moreover, weaker states have a greater chance of causing harm to the United States on the ground than in space. Attacks by weaker states against U.S. satellites would complicate and perhaps extend somewhat the Pentagon's military campaigns, but they would not change the outcome of warfare, given the dominating and growing power projection capabilities enjoyed by the United States. ( More ... ) Katz-Hyman, Michael and Michael Krepon. Assurance or Space Dominance? The Case Against Weaponizing Space. Washington, D.C.: Henry L. Stimson Center, April 2003. [ 16 quotes ] [ page 48-9 ]
Strategists must recognize that space communication, surveillance, reconnaissance, and navigation systems are not COGs because they are in space; they are COGs because they are centralized communication, surveillance, reconnaissance, and navigation systems. Options exist, however, to share these missions with other terrestrial systems and pursue a widely distributed space architecture. This decentralization would not only reduce American vulnerability in space, but might do so without degradation of mission performance. Significantly, as the vulnerability is reduced the case for space weapons weakens. Protection is accomplished through decentralization and diversification rather than through active defenses. Deblois, Bruce M. "Space Sanctuary: A Viable National Strategy." Air & Space Power Journal. XII, No. 4 (Winter 1998). [ 4 quotes ] [ page 38 ]