In a world of sovereign nations, a unilateral U.S. space-control capability would raise profoundly troubling questions about the meaning of sovereignty in the 21st century. An attempt to deploy a space-control capability and insert weapons into orbit surely would be regarded by many states as an intolerable violation of global norms and of their sovereignty. Today's threats do not require the United States to pursue high-tech, space-based weaponization. To do so would threaten relations with the rest of the world and possibly set off a damaging arms race in space. ( More ... )

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Moore, Mike. "A New Cold War?." SAIS Review. XXVI, No. 1 (Winter-Spring 2006): 175-188. [ 7 quotes ] [ page 186 ]

 

There has long been a substantial gulf between the hawkish pro-space weaponization crowd and the actual civilian and military operators who have to build, fly, and make policy for military space systems. Among the latter, ASATs have never been a very popular option - which explains why during most of the time it has had a space program, the United States has not had any anti-satellite weapons. The last ASAT system that the United States actually tested, the ASM-135A missile carried by an F-15, was developed not because the United States Air Force saw great military utility in such a weapon, but because the White House viewed it as a deterrent against the Soviet Union (see "Blunt arrows: the limited utility of ASATs", The Space Review, June 6, 2005). In the 1990s the United States Army began development of a ground-based kinetic energy (KE) ASAT, but the military dropped its support for it in 1993. The only reason it stayed alive was because of congressional action (i.e. earmarks). The fact that the US military did not want the weapon that Congress was forcing upon it demonstrates that the military has long been ambivalent about ASAT weapons. It is also worth noting that although that system was designed to minimize debris by using a mylar "flyswatter" to smack the target rather than smash it, even the U.S. military determined that it still would have generated too much debris. The military turned its attention toward systems that a) would produce no debris, and b) were potentially reversible, like jammers or other electronic warfare systems. Producing minimal debris does not place our own spacecraft at risk, and reversible systems can be used against a much wider array of targets or satellites that might be required after the cessation of hostilities. Lasers are also useful as ASAT weapons because they could damage a satellite without producing debris, but their effects are not reversible.

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Day, Dwayne. "Letter: Regarding "sticky airbags"." The Space Review. January 29, 2007.

 

The United States would likely find a focused approach more acceptable than a broad approach. While it bans space-based weapons and ASATs, the former would allow deployment of the GMD system that composes the central part of the Missile Defense Agency’s current budget and development efforts. In practice, as a number of studies show, there is no rationale for the U.S. to deploy space weapons and ASATs. For example, an enormously expensive space-based interceptor system for missile defense would be intrinsically vulnerable to a number of cost-effective ASAT attacks and be overwhelmed by the simultaneous launch of several missiles from a compact area. Moreover, the negative impacts of using space weapons for other military missions – protecting satellites, denying the hostile use of space to adversaries and projecting force – would far outweigh the benefits, since the utility of space weapons is limited by three main factors: high cost, considerable susceptibility to countermeasures, and the availability of cheaper, more effective alternatives.

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Zhang, Hui. "Space Weaponization and Space Security: A Chinese Perspective." China Security. Vol. 1, No. 2 (2006): 24-36. [ 5 quotes ] [ page 32 ]

 

Either by implementing a blanket ban on space weapons to comport wholly with the goals of sustainable development or by striking a balance between environmental objectives and national security interests with a more flexible model banning only space-based weapons, the present generation will ensure adequate protection of the space commons for future generations. Although national security interests will almost always take precedence over other interests, because of the fragile characteristics of the space environment and its critical role for the continued existence of Earth, international restrictions on the weaponization of space are justifiable and necessary. While contemporary national security threats are causing a sense of trepidation in many Western nations, including the United States, in the long-term, irreparable damage to the space environment could result in a global threat to mankind's security. There is no better time than the present to inject real meaning into the phrase "province of all mankind" by focusing on environmental protection of the space commons and halting efforts to weaponize space.

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Scheetz, Lori. "Infusing Environmental Ethics into the Space Weapons Dialogue." Georgetown International Environmental Law Review. Vol. 19, No. 1 (Fall 2006): 57-82. [ 8 quotes ] [ page 81 ]

 

It doesn't take much imagination to realize how badly war in space could unfold. An enemy -- say, China in a confrontation over Taiwan, or Iran staring down America over the Iranian nuclear program -- could knock out the American satellite system in a barrage of antisatellite weapons, instantly paralyzing American troops, planes and ships around the world.

Space itself could be polluted for decades to come, rendered unusable.

The global economic system would probably collapse, along with air travel and communications. Your cellphone wouldn't work. Nor would your A.T.M. and that dashboard navigational gizmo you got for Christmas. And preventing an accidental nuclear exchange could become much more difficult.

"The fallout, if you will, could be tremendous," said Daryl G. Kimball, executive director of the Arms Control Association in Washington.

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Myers, Steven Lee. "Look Out Below. The Arms Race in Space May Be On." New York Times. March 9, 2008.