Supporters of space weapons point to the role of strong U.S. naval forces in keeping the sea lanes open and enforcing freedom of the seas as a model for a similar U.S. policy in space. Yet the Navy itself has concluded that a stable international legal regime provides a less costly and dangerous way to ensure freedom of the seas than sole reliance on unilateral "enforcement" through its Freedom of Navigation Program (FON). In this policy, the Navy deliberately challenges, through diplomatic protests and assertive fleet operations, what it sees to be excessive coastal claims over the oceans. ( More ... )

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Tannenwald, Nina. Law Versus Power on the High Frontier: The Case for a Rule-Based Regime for Outer Space. : , Summer 2004. [ 7 quotes ] [ page 40 ]

 

Still other states favor intermediate steps in the form of confidence-building measures believing that such measures would constitute a constructive move towards the prevention of an arms race in outer space. The process of building confidence between states involves step-by-step reductions in perceptions of threat or conditions of uncertainty. In connection with military operations in space, the purpose of confidence-building measures is to obtain greater transparency and predictability through activities such as notification, verification, and monitoring, in order to reduce suspicion and tension between nations while enhancing international peace and stability. ( More ... )

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Billick, Thomas W. Arms Control Implications for Military Operations in Space. Maxwell AFB, AL: USAF Air University, May 2001. [ 6 quotes ] [ page 47 ]

 

Given the lack of U.S. enthusiasm to develop space weapons, some ask why not sign a treaty to halt a space arms race before it starts? That's a legitimate question, but it's also one with a good answer. I am among those who believe that the threat of space weapons--particularly space-based missile defenses--played an important role in ending the Cold War. If the very threat of space weapons could yield such leverage against a peer competitor, what could someone offer the United States now that's worth giving up that potentially powerful position for all time? ( More ... )

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Worden, Simon P. "High Anxiety." Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. Vol. 62, No. 2 (March/April 2006): 21-23. [ 2 quotes ]

 

By leveraging existing space law, advocating space arms control, increasing economic interdependence, and using skillful diplomacy, the United States may prevent a space race as well as avoid the counterproductive results likely to arise from a dissuasive strategy. Table 6 reveals that dissuasion’s success is in fact most likely to occur when a combination of several policy tools are employed simultaneously. However, the 2002 NSS and 2001 QDR do not describe dissuasion in this manner. Instead, both documents focus on increasing military superiority to such a high level that the enemy or allies give up weapons development. Unfortunately, the conditions are not present for this policy as currently defined to succeed. ( More ... )

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Meteyer, David O. The Art of Peace: Dissuading China from Developing Counter-Space Weapons. USAF Academy, CO: USAF Institute for National Security Studies, August 2005. [ 20 quotes ] [ page 81 ]

 

A final reason for U.S. reluctance has been the fact that the likely forum for any negotiations: the U.N. Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, is an unwieldy 65-nation body. Despite such concerns, says Gary Samore, a former defense official on the Clinton-era National Security Council and now director of studies at the Council on Foreign Relations: "It might be worth seeing if we could get together with the half-dozen or so nations that have real space capabilities, to see if we could all agree to either tacit or explicit measures to constrain antisatellite work. We haven't tried that approach yet."

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"Can U.S. and China Avoid Space Arms Race?." Newsweek. January 27, 2007.

 

With no legal restrictions on ASAT weapons, and with the evident strong interest in ASAT-capable technologies by the leading space power, other states may decide ASAT weapons are the answer to their perceived security needs. The Chinese rationale for developing and testing its ASAT weapon is unknown to us. However, its repeated calls along with the Russian Federation for diplomatic discussions about space security were rejected by the United States. Although it is impossible to say where such discussions could have led, that there were no discussions guaranteed that there was no law banning the Chinese destruction of an orbiting satellite. Additionally, although there were two tests of the ASAT system that were observed by the United States prior to the January test, there was reportedly no effort to dissuade China from testing it against a satellite.[6] It remains to be seen whether China sees this ASAT capability as important to its military posture. Performing another test of the system may indicate this is so; however, if China does not pursue additional tests, which would be required for the system to be considered operational, it may indicate that China is not committed to developing this capability and remains open to diplomacy.

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Grego, Laura. "Statement of Dr. Laura Grego." Testimony before the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs. Ed. . Washington, D.C.: , May 23, 2007. [ 6 quotes ]

 

Establish international partnerships to support peaceful uses of space. The Proliferation Security Initiative offers an example of partnerships among like-minded nations to counter malevolent international behavior. A Space Security Initiative could be developed to discipline actors who seek to limit international uses of space. The goal would be to enlist governmental and nongovernmental space users in efforts to prevent and penalize actions that might threaten the operation of satellites, including issues such as ASAT weapons, space debris, nuclear accidents in space, jamming of satellite communications, or intrusions into satellite broadcasts. The partnership could offer benefits such as shared surveillance of space debris and also serve as a vehicle for sanctions against countries or entities that violate a space code of conduct (whether they are signatories or not). All space-faring nations, including China, could become members of the partnership by agreeing to the code and enforcing its norms.

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Lutes, Charles D. and Phillip C. Saunders. China's ASAT Test: Motivations and Implications. Washington, D.C.: Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, June 2007. [ 10 quotes ] [ page 4 ]

 

The US refusal to engage in discussions on the weaponization of outer space imposes two significant costs. First, it increases Chinese uncertainty and suspicion, leading China to assume its worst-case scenario about US space weaponization. Second, it prevents the international community from developing new rules and norms in areas such as advancing situational awareness, coordinating launches, and deterring the further development and proliferation of ASAT weapons that could benefit US space assets. There is broad consensus that the United States can no longer afford to remain silent in the international debate on the weaponization of outer space. The Rumsfeld Commission, the US-China Commission, and many space arms-control advocates all recommend greater US participation in setting rules for the use of outer space beyond the existing legal framework.

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Blazejewski, Kenneth S. "Space Weaponization and US-China Relations." Strategic Studies Quarterly. Vol. 2, No. 1 (Spring 2008): 33-55. [ 12 quotes ] [ page 43 ]

 

A focused space weapons ban would reduce the proliferation of ASATs. It would reduce the risk of a "Space Pearl Harbor" for other military and civilian satellites. As many experts in the United States point out, the heavy de- pendence of the United States on its space assets means that it "has more to lose than to gain by opening the way to the testing and deployment of ASATs and space weapons." For example, the United States is now more depend- ent on satellites to perform important military functions than is any other state. By placing weapons in space, the United States might stimulate others to balance symmetrically and asymmetrically against U.S. space assets. It would be very difficult for the United States to maintain unchallenged hegemony in space weaponization, and many have argued that the United States' current military advantage in space assets would be lost or degraded by wea- ponization. Space weaponization would also threaten U.S. civilian and com- mercial assets. The economy and society of the United States are highly de- pendent on the applications of commercial satellites. Placing weapons in space would make these satellites much more vulnerable.

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Zhang, Hui and Pavel Podvig. Russian and Chinese Responses to U.S. Military Plans in Space. Cambridge, MA: American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 2008. [ 16 quotes ] [ page 74 ]

 

The decision to subject the Non-Proliferation treaty to a comprehensive review was a result of a compromise at the negotiating table and the realization that "the treaty was not perfect and that its provisions might not stand the test of time."

Similarly, a potential ASAT treaty should incorporate a twenty-five year review so the signatories could reassess whether the treaty had fulfilled its goals. For the United States, this means that in twenty-five years, Washington could determine whether its interests were best being served by safeguarding its satellites and resisting the weaponization of space. If no other country had deployed space assets threatening America's terrestrial military hegemony, then continued reliance on the treaty would be appropriate. If, however, other nations had begun to field innovative and potentially destabilizing weapons, then the United States could find that withdrawal from an ASAT treaty would be in its best interests. With the inclusion of a twenty-five year horizon, an ASAT/Space Weapons ban effectively codifies the status quo in space power for review at a future date. For the United States, the current terrestrial and space superpower, preserving the status quo power balance equates to preserving American dominance.

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Walsh, Frank M. "Forging a Diplomatic Shield for American Satellites: The Case For Reevaluating The 2006 National Space Policy in Light of a Chinese Anti-Satellite System." Journal of Air Law and Commerce. Vol. 72 (Fall 2007): 759. [ 28 quotes ] [ page 794-795 ]

 

A second way to preserve future operational freedom would be to incorporate a standard withdrawal provision into the treaty. Generally, withdrawal provisions allow party-states to withdraw in response to "extraordinary events related to the subject matter" after giving other members notice of their intent to withdraw. For example, the NPT allows for withdrawal with three months notice and the ABM treaty allows for withdrawal with six months notice. Functionally, an ASAT treaty with a withdrawal provision would preserve the status quo of no ASAT weapons while giving party-states the ability to respond to changes in circumstances that threaten the status quo. More importantly, the chances that China could covertly test and deploy an effective ASAT are slim because of America's intelligence capacity. The United States detected the SC-19's previous launches and knew about the January 11, 2007 test before the launch. America's verification capability would only improve under a treaty regime that allowed for greater access.

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Walsh, Frank M. "Forging a Diplomatic Shield for American Satellites: The Case For Reevaluating The 2006 National Space Policy in Light of a Chinese Anti-Satellite System." Journal of Air Law and Commerce. Vol. 72 (Fall 2007): 759. [ 28 quotes ] [ page 795-796 ]