When and why is it in the interest of nations to make and abide by such treaties, and as deemed necessary, withdraw from such treaties (with or without notice)? In one way, it is easy to answer these questions according to an old Roman proverb: �Salus rei publicae supremus lex est���the health of the republic is the supreme law.� In other words, regardless of treaties or rules, governments will do whatever they can to preserve the sovereignty and well being of the state they rule. However, as the American entries into the War of 1812 and World War I illustrate, when the leaders of a state do whatever they must to win a war for survival, they can provoke neutral states into joining the conflict against them. Given the growing importance of space systems for economic, national security and environmental purposes, damaging or destroying them could trigger widespread violence on Earth.

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Oberg, James. Space Power Theory. Maxwell AFB, AL: USAF Air University, 2001. [ 5 quotes ] [ page 85 ]

 

Discussions on banning weapons in space remain frozen at the Conference on Disarmament due to a U.S.-Chinese dispute over whether a new space treaty should be the ultimate goal. It is unlikely there will be concrete results any time soon. International efforts for a new treaty governing space activities (and particularly weapons), or for an amendment to the Outer Space Treaty, remain almost exclusively at the proposal stage. ( More ... )

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Moltz, James Clay. "Reining in the Space Cowboys." Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. Vol. 59, No. 1 (January/February 2003). [ 2 quotes ]

 

On balance, the prospects for ASAT arms control are distinctly dim, even in these post-cold-war years. Great powers do not bar themselves from being able to do something that could be very important militarily. Space is a geographically distinctive environment but is dominated militarily by the same policy impulses that produce conflict on earth. The incentive to cheat on agreements would likely be matched by the ease with which cheating could be effected. The more critical space becomes as a field of competitive military endeavor, the greater the incentives to avoid legal constraints on (peacetime) behavior. ( More ... )

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Gray, Colin S. "Space Power Survivability." Air & Space Power Journal. (Winter 1993). [ 1 reference ]

 

It is clear that the U.S. perceives its own national interests to be at variance with international interests in space arms control negotiations, at least as represented in the CD. Like other states, the U.S. has shown considerable antipathy toward arms control agreements that significantly restrict current and future military flexibility or limit arenas in which the U.S. has a substantial advantage or a particular interest. ( More ... )

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Billick, Thomas W. Arms Control Implications for Military Operations in Space. Maxwell AFB, AL: USAF Air University, May 2001. [ 6 quotes ] [ page 47 ]

 

Ambassador Robert T. Grey, Jr., United States Representative to the Conference on Disarmament, has made several statements to the CD to explain the U.S. position and deflect criticism by other states, particularly China, on the issue of preventing an arms race in outer space. In doing so, Ambassador Grey has made a number of important points. . . . Third, there is no arms race in outer space, no foreseeable prospect of an arms race in outer space, and no indication of significant ongoing development by any state with respect to arms in space. Fourth, allegations that actions or plans of the United States attest to a desire for hegemony, or any intent to carry out nuclear blackmail, or any supposed quest for absolute freedom to use force or threaten to use force in international relations have no basis in reality. ( More ... )

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Billick, Thomas W. Arms Control Implications for Military Operations in Space. Maxwell AFB, AL: USAF Air University, May 2001. [ 6 quotes ] [ page 52 ]

 

Fifth, the Charter of the United Nations, existing multilateral treaties relating to outer space, arms control provisions of other multilateral and certain bilateral treaties relating to outer space, together with customary international law and the domestic law of individual nations, interact with and complement each other in such a way that together, they provide an extensive and comprehensive system for limiting the uses of outer space to those that are peaceful, while providing a framework for the legitimate military uses of outer space. Therefore, the U.S. believes new legally binding instruments are unnecessary at this time. Lastly, Ambassador Grey questioned the logic for immediate negotiations on a space arms control treaty. ( More ... )

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Billick, Thomas W. Arms Control Implications for Military Operations in Space. Maxwell AFB, AL: USAF Air University, May 2001. [ 6 quotes ] [ page 52 ]

 

At the United Nations last year, 160 countries called for negotiations on a proposal to ban weapons from space, and the United States was the only nation to vote against it. An administration led by John Kerry might have acted differently: Kerry has called space weapons "very disturbing" and has indicated that he favors a ban on them.This would be devastating to American interests. For one thing, ICBMs are space weapons. As they travel from their launch pads to their destinations, they leave the earth's atmosphere. Likewise, anti-ballistic missiles, such as those currently deployed in Alaska and California, are meant to intercept ICBMs in space -- they don't merely travel through space, but actually engage their targets up there. Eliminating these would hobble the United States in its effort to protect itself from the likes of North Korea, which of course would pay no attention to what any treaty said. ( More ... )

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"Spacing Out." National Review. October 24, 2006.

 

Unfortunately, this idealistic vision of an enhanced and elaborated normative regime is destined to fail if it does not take into consideration the realist-minded security concerns of the United States. These concerns are namely the lack of universal political will to prevent the weaponization of space and the belief that other nations have incentives to weaponize space exclusive of the desire to counter U.S. weaponization efforts. First, without consensus among the nations or any universal political will against weaponization, it will be difficult, if not impossible, to enforce a boundary between where war is acceptable and where it is not. Second, according to many inevitable weaponizers, even if the United States chooses not to build space weapons, other countries will certainly do so, in large part because of the great and still growing degree to which U.S. military operations depend upon what has traditionally been known as “space force enhancement,” . . . without which American military power would be crippled. In other words, why do arms controllers presume that other states will not seek to weaponize space simply to counter the operational advantages the United States currently enjoys there?

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Park, Andrew T. "Incremental Steps for Achieving Space Security: The Need for a New Way of Thinking to Enhance the Legal Regime for Space." Houston Journal of International Law. Vol. 28, No. 3 (2006): 871-911. [ 11 quotes ] [ page 892 ]

 

Also instructive is the experience of the Clinton Administration which declined to negotiate an agreement on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space, commonly referred to as PAROS, in the UN Committee on Disarmament. The basis for the Clinton Administration's decision was that the existing outer space legal regime is sufficient and that there is no arms race in space that needs to be prevented, which by the way is also the current Administration's position. Thus, you could say that there has been a long standing realization that an effective space arms control agreement is unachievable. ( More ... )

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Joseph, Robert G. "Remarks on the President’s National Space Policy – Assuring America’s Vital Interests." . January 11, 2007.

 

In other words, with a new space treaty the United States would be practicing an advanced version of "unilateral disarmament" that was used as the centerpiece for the nuclear disarmament arguments of the 1950s-1960s, i.e., if the United States disarms itself, the Soviet Union will surely follow – the argument that led ultimately to the MAD doctrine of hostage holding and the subsequent ABM Treaty, which, of course, did not prevent a huge nuclear arms race. A new space treaty would become an advanced version in that it would be unilateral disarmament before the fact, not even progressing to a point where there would be something to disarm.The ramifications of this new application of unilateralism are staggering, for they would preclude the United States from making full use of its science and technology to stay on the cutting edge of space development of both offensive and defensive means to protect current and future space assets, as well as the American people. It would leave the way open to be perpetually vulnerable to the weapons that other nations might develop in the absence of any conceivable viable means of treaty enforcement that would serve U.S. vital interests (discussed elsewhere in this report). As Portugal and later Spain both lost dominance of the seas during the middle of the last millennium, so would the United States be edged out of any leadership role in space development.

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Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis. Independent Working Group on Missile Defense, the Space Relationship, and the Twenty-First Century, 2007 Report. Washington, D.C.: Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, August 28, 2006. [ 13 quotes ] [ page 75 ]

 

CHRISTINA ROCCA (United States) Some had asserted that the recent test of an anti-satellite weapon constituted a further reason to pursue outer space arms control. They had drawn the wrong conclusion. It was regrettable that China had conducted the anti-satellite demonstrations, endangering hundreds of satellites with the resulting debris. It was also regrettable that China continued to call for an arms control arrangement which would not ban its anti-satellite activities nor address the fears that its actions had stoked. The system that was tested by China on 11 January had not been based in space, but had been launched from the ground. Prevention of an arms race in outer space, as they had usually discussed it in the Conference, would therefore not ban such a weapon.

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United Nations - Conference on Disarmament. "Conference on Disarmament Hears Statements from 17 States on Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space." . February 13, 2007.

 

Proponents of an anti-weapons treaty are essentially saying that the rest of the world is dying to formally agree to leave the United States in possession of an overwhelming military advantage based on space-based assets, and to willingly submit to any future utilization of those capabilities. If the military forces of at least half a dozen other nations are not at this time working out ways to neutralize the US space-based military advantage, they should be court-martialed for incompetence and lack of imaginative planning. And if they are making such plans, the efforts become even more potentially effective if the US can be persuaded that they are not making such preparations. Experience has shown that paper makes a very poor shield against potential attack, and parties that thought so have almost always been eventually faced with unpleasant and costly surprises.

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Oberg, James. "The Dozen Space Weapons Myths." The Space Review. March 17, 2007.

 

Placing controls on dedicated ASAT weapons would not eliminate the threat posed to US space systems. Such arms control measures are flawed by problems of definition, commonality between civilian and military technologies, information disclosure, verification, and enforcement. Controls on dedicated ASAT weapons would not eliminate the threat posed by non-dedicated systems (e.g., modified ballistic missiles or space launch vehicles, exo-atmospheric ballistic missile defense interceptors, electronic warfare systems, maneuvering spacecraft, etc.) to US space systems. Even a treaty banning ASAT testing, deployment, and use would not ensure the survivability of the space systems' launch, communications, processing, and ground segments. Such arms control measures simply could not substitute for unilateral survivability measures. Moreover, such arms control would not constrain the threat posed by an adversary's use of space systems for purposes hostile to US national interests. Indeed, controlling ASAT weapons while permitting space-based force enhancement assets to run free would ensure a sanctuary for an enemy's "gun sights" in space. Space systems which support hostile operations against the US homeland and military forces should be placed at risk.

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Berkowitz, Marc J. "Protecting America's Freedom of Action in Space." High Frontier Journal. Vol. 3, No. 2 (March 2007): 13-18. [ 11 quotes ] [ page 16 ]

 

The United States is constantly pressed by other governments, by NGOs, and by individuals to engage in arms control processes (sometimes disguised as "codes of conduct" or "rules of the road") aimed at agreements to ban certain activities in space. Unfortunately, many such proposals would include unhelpful restrictions on the United States. Almost all contain provisions that are unverifiable and unenforceable. While these provisions would hinder the United States, they would have no significant impact on nations determined to cheat and circumvent the proposed agreements. A putative ban on anti-satellite weapons, or ASATs, for example, has been shown to be unworkable after years of consideration. There is no way to verify whether a space system is designed for ASAT applications, has significant but latent ASAT capabilities, or only minimal ASAT capabilities because every space system that can maneuver or transmit has some ASAT potential. Direct ascent ASAT weapons—kinetic, explosive, or directed energy—cannot be prevented as long as there are ballistic missiles.

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U.S. State Department. Study on Space Policy: Report of the International Security Advisory Board. Washington, D.C.: U.S. State Department, April 27, 2007. [ 9 quotes ] [ page 7-8 ]

 

A strong effort should be made to shift the space debate from the prevailing arms control paradigm to the national security and economic areas. The National Space Policy designates the Secretary of State as the lead for the U.S. government in public diplomacy efforts to build an international understanding of, and support for, U.S. national space policies and programs. It is important for the Department of State to develop a public diplomacy game plan to enhance international understanding of U.S. space policy. Too often, detractors erroneously and summarily dismiss U.S. policy today as advocacy for "weapons in space." U.S. space dependence and vulnerabilities are too critical for the U.S. government to remain silent, leaving the playing field open for those in the international community who would seek to misconstrue and undermine our interests. It is important that friends and allies understand the United States commitment to freedom of action and protection of the civil uses of space. The State Department should work closely with allies that share our interests in a dialogue to promote understanding and support of U.S. space policy and requirements.

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U.S. State Department. Study on Space Policy: Report of the International Security Advisory Board. Washington, D.C.: U.S. State Department, April 27, 2007. [ 9 quotes ] [ page 10 ]

 

Responding to Cheating: Do Viable Response Options Exist in the Event That Cheating or Breakout Is Detected?

Before response options can be pursued, there first needs to be agreement that cheating or a plan for breakout has occurred and warrants response. Even in cases where a party to a legally-binding agreement might have a history of employing denial and deception techniques or a spotty compliance record, achieving agreement on identifying certain actions as noncompliant would be uncertain. There is a correspondingly high risk, therefore, that it would be difficult or impossible to garner the necessary support for countering those risks in a timely fashion to deny violators the potential benefits of their violations. Moreover, many proposals for additional space arms control measures would prohibit some of the most promising defensive response options.

As noted in the President's Space Policy, an attack on our space assets would be an attack on a vital U.S. national security interest. Would our options for response be any greater if we could also note that such an event might be a violation of an arms control agreement?

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DeSutter, Paula A. Is An Outer Space Arms Control Treaty Verifiable?. Washington, D.C.: U.S. State Department, March 4, 2008. [ 6 quotes ]