Space-based weapons as thus defined are not the only threat to space assets (as noted earlier), but a ban on such weapons represents a useful place to start and a fairly straightforward expansion from the current prohibitions in the Outer Space Treaty of 1967. Considerable work has also been done on the issue of verification of such a ban, including the Canadian PAXSAT study in the mid-1980s, leading to the conclusion that the technical means for such verification existed ? given the necessary political will. The passage of time since then has only reinforced this observation; recent developments in space surveillance and situational awareness linked to non-weapons missions in space have already greatly enhanced the means available to distinguish a weapon from an otherwise benign space object. ( More ... )

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Baines, Phillip and Robert McDougall. "Military Approaches To Space Vulnerability: Seven Questions." Future Security in Space: Commercial, Military, and Arms Control Trade-Offs. Ed. James Clay Moltz. Monterey, CA: Center for Nonproliferation Studies, 2002. [ 4 quotes ] [ page 16 ]

 

The need to clandestinely conduct illicit anti-satellite programs would impose substantial constraints on the functionality of the systems. Adversaries would have little confidence in ASATs that have not been tested, given the abysmal record of Soviet and U.S. ASAT tests. The most basic ASAT systems need to be distributed in multiple locations to attack satellites in different orbital planes -- but too many interceptor sites would increase the risk of detection. ( More ... )

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Lewis, Jeffrey. "Rumsfeld Aims for the Stars: An Arms Control Alternative to the Pentagon's Plans in Space." Georgetown Journal of International Affairs. (Winter/Spring 2002). [ 6 quotes ] [ page 116 ]

 

Opponets of arms control argue that these treaties cannot be verified because surface-to-air missiles, manned capsules, and even the space shuttle all have some residual anti-satellite capability. Although true in a strict sense, opponents of such a ban seldom differentiate the threat posed by the residual capability of these systems and past ASAT tests from the threat posed by unrestricted development of anti-satellite weapons. The residual threat posed by existing systems is quite limited. First, the existing ASATs were designed and tested only in low earth orbit. Although many important satellites are located in low earth orbit, many other important systems are safely out of range in medium earth orbit and geo-synchronous orbit. Some systems in low-earth orbit might be moved to slightly higer orbits as imaging and electronic intelligence capabilities improve. ( More ... )

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Lewis, Jeffrey. "Rumsfeld Aims for the Stars: An Arms Control Alternative to the Pentagon's Plans in Space." Georgetown Journal of International Affairs. (Winter/Spring 2002). [ 6 quotes ] [ page 116 ]

 

Arms control skeptics typically reply that even if an agreement could be useful, the compliance of other nations would be difficult to verify, and at any rate an agreement may be just a tactic to hamper American efforts while they secretly develop their own capabilities. (See “Space weapons: hardware, paperware, beware?”, The Space Review, November 13, 2006) It is considerably more difficult to inspect for biological and chemical weapons than monitor a space weapons program, however, and as the United Nations’ inspections in Iraq proved, even these can be effective. Additionally, given the inability of any likely rival to compete with the United States in this realm, it seems very unlikely that an arms control proposal would be a realistic way of secretly gaining an advantage. Rather than trying to cheat at the game to secure an advantage, they may be trying to minimize their disadvantage by avoiding the game as much as possible.

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Elhefnawy, Nader. "The National Space Policy and space arms control." The Space Review. November 27, 2006.

 

Such a ban should be verifiable from the ground, perhaps with the already existing observational assets, perhaps with additional assets and coordination between observers. Countries that consider this idea may convene a panel of experts who could assess existing national technical means and their suitability for the purpose.

For example, U.S. early warning sensors could detect the launch of the booster carrying a ground-based hit-to-kill weapon; China’s destructive anti-satellite test as well as the tests leading up to it (that did not destroy a satellite) were observed in this way by the United States. Additionally, preferably with—but perhaps initially without—launch detection, all possible satellite targets for tests of a destructive ASAT test could be monitored and verified that they have not been destroyed in an ASAT test. The US Space Surveillance Network (SSN) regularly tracks thousands of objects of size greater than around 10 cm; its tracking of active satellites and inactive satellites and large pieces of debris is considered to be complete. ( More ... )

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Grego, Laura. "Statement of Dr. Laura Grego." Testimony before the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs. Ed. . Washington, D.C.: , May 23, 2007. [ 6 quotes ]

 

Ultimately, cheating is a risk that countries run whenever they agree to be bound by a shared international agreement. However, certain factors significantly reduce this risk. First, while the secret development of space weapons technology might be possible, any effort to deploy or test space weapons will be clearly visible to the international community. Without the capacity to test, any space weapons program will be stifled at an early stage of development. Second, there is little reason to think that in the foreseeable future the technological capacity of the United States would fall far behind that of any state planning to launch space weapons. A commitment not to deploy weapons does not mean that all research and development must cease immediately. Once it becomes clear that a state is preparing to launch space weapons, the United States could respond by executing its own space weapons contingency plan. Third, as stated above, space weapons are relatively easy targets for ASAT attack, a feature that can work in the interests of the United States if others deploy first. Fourth, a universal ban on space weapons would engender a normative framework that would justify a swift reaction by the United States, such as the deployment of its own space weapons or ASAT attack if another country violated the ban first. Finally, if the United States is able to negotiate for greater transparency in Chinese military planning, as suggested above, it would reduce the possibility of a surprise Chinese launch. ( More ... )

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Blazejewski, Kenneth S. "Space Weaponization and US-China Relations." Strategic Studies Quarterly. Vol. 2, No. 1 (Spring 2008): 33-55. [ 12 quotes ] [ page 46-7 ]

 

Banning ASAT activity at the testing, deployment, and use stages is verifiable. Using satellites and other remote monitoring devices known as national technical means (NTM), it would be "relatively easy" to detect the testing, deployment, or actual use of ASAT technologies. NTM was the mainstay of arms control verification during much of the Cold War and was fundamental to the verification regimes in the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF), and the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START). The immediate detection of the January 11, 2007 Chinese ASAT test showcased how effectively American intelligence could detect ASAT tests; indeed, the United States also detected the two previous tests of the Chinese SC-19 ASAT weapon. The United States can also likely detect any deployments of ASAT weapons by using reconnaissance satellites. In fact, America's ability to track China's deployment of SC-19 mobile launchers before the January test is a testament to the prowess of American reconnaissance efforts. Finally, the United States can detect the actual use of ASATs by identifying the destruction of a known satellite. In sum, the United States currently has the NTM to reliably detect when other countries test, deploy, or use ASAT technologies.

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Walsh, Frank M. "Forging a Diplomatic Shield for American Satellites: The Case For Reevaluating The 2006 National Space Policy in Light of a Chinese Anti-Satellite System." Journal of Air Law and Commerce. Vol. 72 (Fall 2007): 759. [ 28 quotes ] [ page 791-792 ]

 

An ASAT treaty could rely on other verification mechanisms aside from NTM. First, on-site inspections could give investigating countries valuable information on facilities not observable by NTM. While countries may be reluctant to allow intrusive on-site inspections of classified space-research laboratories, inspection concerns may be alleviated if an ASAT treaty established a formalized inspection regime similar to the regime set up in the 1987 INF Treaty. The Soviet Union proposed this kind of an independent ASAT inspectorate in March 1987. Under the Soviet plan, the international inspectorate would station permanent observers at all space launch facilities. The utility of on-site inspections in the ASAT context is questionable, however, because ASATs can be launched from mobile launchers that can evade inspectors. But even if on-site inspections might be better suited to large-scale weapons systems that are stationary in nature, the inspections might nevertheless have a place in ASAT verification as a guard against new ASAT technologies like highly-concentrated lasers that require substantial energy. Alternatively, countries could supplement NTM with a less intrusive consultation regime. Similar to the mechanisms described in the Outer Space Treaty and the Moon Treaty, party-states to an ASAT treaty could agree to discuss any perceived violations of the treaty. Consultation adds little confidence to a verification procedure, however, because consultations are largely dependent on the good will of the party-states to the treaty. With this in mind, NTM remains the best means for verifying potential violations of an ASAT treaty.

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Walsh, Frank M. "Forging a Diplomatic Shield for American Satellites: The Case For Reevaluating The 2006 National Space Policy in Light of a Chinese Anti-Satellite System." Journal of Air Law and Commerce. Vol. 72 (Fall 2007): 759. [ 28 quotes ] [ page 792-793 ]

 

The ability to verify ASAT technology deteriorates with every successful ASAT test because ASAT technology is most observable at the testing stage. NTM can detect missile tests that hit or pass near satellites, so monitoring ASAT development at this point is relatively easy. However, once an ASAT "weapon is developed and deployed[,] its small size and non-distinctive deployment mode" would make verification of a ban impossible. The need for an ASAT treaty is time sensitive: the longer the United States and China wait to negotiate a treaty, the less reliable the treaty will be. The January 11, 2007 Chinese test, the Soviet tests in the 1970s, and the American ASAT tests in the 1980s have all shown a rudimentary ability to use ASATs. An ASAT treaty is needed now before any further ASAT tests move weapons development from the testing to deployment stage.

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Walsh, Frank M. "Forging a Diplomatic Shield for American Satellites: The Case For Reevaluating The 2006 National Space Policy in Light of a Chinese Anti-Satellite System." Journal of Air Law and Commerce. Vol. 72 (Fall 2007): 759. [ 28 quotes ] [ page 793-794 ]