Currently, satellites are expensive and fragile and can be disrupted by relatively inexpensive weapons. Although several countries possess the latent capability to engage in space warfare, this option has never been exercised. A direct attack against a satellite would be a first and would be unlikely to be an isolated attack. The consequences of engaging in such a conflict would likely be severe. Depending on the scale of the exchange, it is possible that many low-Earth orbit assets could be affected, thereby denying both military and civilian users these resources. This is precisely why the United States must work to dissuade hostile parties from further developing these capabilities, deter them from using them if they do develop them, and be prepared to both respond and minimize the consequences should deterrence fail. ( More ... )

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Spencer, Jack and Kathy Gudgel. "The 2005 Quadrennial Defense Review: China and Space—The Unmentionable Issues." . WebMemo #819 (August 11, 2005). [ 2 quotes ]

 

Common to all hedging strategy proponents is the fear that placing weapons in space will spur a new arms race. Unfortunately, such a strategy increases the likelihood of a space arms race if and when space weapons are ultimately deployed, as the only plausible response by the US would be to at least match the opposing capabilities. This dithering approach blatantly ignores the current real world situation. At present, the US has no peer competitors in space. For the US to refrain from weaponizing until another state proves the capacity to challenge it allows for potential enemies to catch up to American capabilities. At a minimum, there is no risk for potential peer competitors to try. On the other hand, should the US reject the hedging strategy and unilaterally deploy weapons in space, other states may rationally decide not to compete. The cost of entry will simply be too great; the probability of failure palpable. In other words, the fear of an arms race in space, the most powerful argument in favor of the hedging plan, is most likely if the US follows its counsel. ( More ... )

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Dolman, Everett C. "Strategy Lost: Taking the Middle Road to Nowhere." High Frontier Journal. Vol. 3, No. 1 (Winter 2005): 31-33. [ 1 reference ] [ page 33 ]

 

The benefits of space-based defense are manifold. The deployment of a robust global missile defense that includes space-based interdiction capabilities will make more expensive, and therefore less attractive, the foreign development of technologies needed to overcome it, particularly with regard to ballistic missiles. Indeed, the enduring lesson of the ABM Treaty era is that the absence of defenses, rather than their presence, empowers the develop­ment of offensive technologies that can threaten American se­curity and the lives of American citizens. And access to space, as well as space control, is key to future U.S. efforts to provide disincentives to an array of actors seeking such power.

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Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis. Independent Working Group on Missile Defense, the Space Relationship, and the Twenty-First Century, 2007 Report. Washington, D.C.: Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, August 28, 2006. [ 13 quotes ] [ page VIII ]

 

Modern Military Industrial Complex. Current US naval capabilities offer an example of this criterion. The substantial industrial tail that goes along with the sizable US naval fleet would be difficult for another country to imitate. The amount of finances required to build 12 aircraft carriers, associated support vessels, docking facilities, logistical supplies, capable seamen, as well as executable doctrine and training is well beyond anything that China or any other country in the world could afford. In essence, the gap between the US navy and other navies is so wide that states are dissuaded from pursuing a large capital fleet because of the economic costs associated with such a venture is just too high, relative to the strategic advantages it would afford. Japan and Germany both attempted to pursue navies that were beyond their means in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, and both failed at sustaining them. A host of arguments can be made that explain this failure and some even argue that it had less to do with economics and more to do with the long-standing interests of these states. Regardless of exactly how much economics was a factor, whether it was the most important or simply one of many, it was nonetheless a factor in these failures.

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Meteyer, David O. The Art of Peace: Dissuading China from Developing Counter-Space Weapons. USAF Academy, CO: USAF Institute for National Security Studies, August 2005. [ 20 quotes ] [ page 67 ]