This issue is often muddled by the failure to maintain a clear distinction between "militarization" and "weaponization." Such equivocation often appears to be a rhetorical strategy of those who wish to argue that something is inevitable because something that sounds like it has already occurred. There is no debate about the fact that space is exploited for military purposes and has been for more than four decades. This is what is conventionally meant by "the militarization of space." But no nation is known to have permanently stationed in space devices capable of projecing destructive force against targets in space or on Earth, readied large numbers of such weapons for rapid launch into space in a "pop-up" deployment mode, or deployed ground-based anti-satellite weapons in numbers capable of attacking a significant fraction of targets in space. The latter scenarios are conventionally known as "space weaponization." Furthermore, if "weaponization" were to occur, it is expected that a number of states would engage in an arms race leading to a quick buildup of such forces in space, or ready for launch, to as large numbers as may be economically and technologically feasible. While experimental prototypes of space weapons or small numbers of systems such as ground-based lasers and "antimissile" missiles with inherent antisatellite capabilities may exist, space weaponization would be characterized by the deployment in large numbers of systems specifically designed for space warfare. Thus, while "space militarization" has already occurred, "space weaponization" has not.
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Nor has any other country clearly crossed this threshold. It is believed that in October and November of 1975, the Soviets used intense beams of radiation to interfere with three American satellites, although the US government later officially explained these incidents as having been caused by forest fires or volcanoes. More recently, disruption of satellite systems -- by Russia against satellite phone communications being used by Chechen rebels and by Iran against Western satellite broadcasts -- has been reported. Also, one could interpret American air attacks on Iraqi satellite ground stations early in the 1991 Persian Gulf War as space control insofar as the intent was to deny Iraq access to overhead systems. Nonetheless, lethal or destructive force application from, to, or within near-earth space basically lies in the future. ( More ... ) Watts, Barry D. The Military Use of Space: A Diagnostic Assessment. Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, February 2001. [ 8 quotes ] [ page 10 ]
Some definitions may be useful here. The most general concept--space power--can be defined as using the space medium and assets located in space to enhance and project U.S. military power. Space militarization describes a situation in which the military makes use of space in carrying out its missions. There is no question that space has been militarized; U.S. armed forces would have great difficulty carrying out a military mission today if denied access to its guidance, reconnaissance, and communications satellites. But to date, military systems in space are used exclusively as "force enhancers," making air, sea, and land force projection more effective. The issue now is whether to go beyond these military uses of space to space weaponization: the stationing in space of systems that can attack a target located on Earth, in the air, or in space itself. Arguably, space is already partially weaponized. The use of signals from Global Positioning System (GPS) satellites to guide precision weapons to their targets is akin to the role played by a rifle's gunsight. But there are not yet space equivalents of bullets to actually destroy or damage a target. ( More ... ) Logsdon, John M. "Just Say Wait to Space Power." Issues in Science and Technology. Vol. 17, No. 3 (Spring 2001). [ 4 quotes ]
The political climate for achieving a space weapons ban appears as grim as during the Cold War, when both the United States and Russia were actively testing ASAT weaponry. That said, no nation has yet committed to strong policies embracing space weapons, or major budget support for their development. And it is fairly certain that no nation currently has any such weapons in operation (although of course it is impossible to rule out that some nation has covertly acquired some type of simple ASAT or on-orbit weapon). Indeed, it is clear that many nations (and the general publics in nearly all nations) fear that the advent of space weapons will be catastrophic for the future of the human race. ( More ... ) Hitchens, Theresa. "Safeguarding Space: Building Cooperative Norms to Dampen Negative Trends." Disarmament Diplomacy. No. 81 (Winter 2005). [ 9 quotes ]
These ‘‘residual’’ or ‘‘latent’’ space warfare capabilities are also cited by those who claim that space is already weaponized. By these standards, the NPT has no meaning, since dozens of nations with strong nonproliferation credentials possess the technical capabilities to build nuclear weapons. While the potential misuse of latent military capabilities remains critically important, so, too, does the distinction between residual and dedicated space warfare capabilities. Capability has not turned into actuality, in part because latent capabilities have served as an insurance policy and deterrent against the initiation of dedicated space warfare programs by potential adversaries. ( More ... ) Katz-Hyman, Michael and Michael Krepon. "Viewpoint: Space Weapons and Proliferation." Non Proliferation Review. Vol. 12, No. 2 (July 2005): 323-341. [ 15 quotes ] [ page 325 ]
MUELLER: The second misconception is that the transition from space not being weaponized to being weaponized may be a gray, indistinct thing. It is not true that it is not going to be a big political deal when it happens, even if we don’t know exactly what form it will take. People with engineering backgrounds in the space weapons community have a tendency, I think, to say, "Space is already so weaponized and so militarized because we use GPS for the guidance of many of our weapons, or because in the 1980s there were anti-satellite systems, or because ICBMs cross space on their way to targets, that we have al-ready crossed the weaponization frontier. Stop talking to me about it." I would liken them to the people who on December 31, 1999 were running around saying, "We shouldn't have these big parties tonight! The millennium doesn’t start for another year; it starts in 2001, not 2000." That may be technically correct, but it is totally irrelevant be-cause this is about what the public believes. The party is tonight and you can go or not, it’s up to you. Dolman, Everett C., Karl P. Mueller et al. "Toward a U.S. Grand Strategy in Space." Washington Roundtable on Science & Public Policy. Washington, D.C.: George C. Marshall Institute, March 10, 2006. [ 10 quotes ] [ page 16 ]