Foreign leaders will not passively accept U.S. initiatives to implement a doctrine of space dominance. They will have ample, inexpensive means to take blocking action, as it is considerably easier to negate U.S. dominance in space than on the ground, at sea, and in the air. The introduction of space weaponry and ASAT testing are therefore likely introduce grave complications for the terrestrial military advantages that the United States has worked so hard, and at such expense, to secure. ( More ... )

---

Katz-Hyman, Michael and Michael Krepon. Assurance or Space Dominance? The Case Against Weaponizing Space. Washington, D.C.: Henry L. Stimson Center, April 2003. [ 16 quotes ] [ page 89 ]

 

The likely consequences of a dynamic, but uneven, space warfare competition are not hard to envision. Potential adversaries are likely to perceive American initiatives to weaponize space as adjuncts to a U.S. military doctrine of preemption and preventive war. Depending on the scope and nature of U.S. space warfare preparations, they could also add to Chinese and Russian concerns over the viability of their nuclear deterrents. ( More ... )

---

Katz-Hyman, Michael and Michael Krepon. Assurance or Space Dominance? The Case Against Weaponizing Space. Washington, D.C.: Henry L. Stimson Center, April 2003. [ 16 quotes ] [ page 62 ]

 

In light of international opposition, unilaterally deploying weapons in space has little to recommend it. Such an offensive attitude (in both senses of the word) would do little to generate international support for actions such as the 1991 Gulf War. Some may argue that the United States's current position of power makes international support irrelevant and that the United States did not need a coalition to defeat Iraq, but the costs of acting unilaterally would undoubtedly have been much higher. It seems unwise to alienate potential allies at the same time that force reductions may make acting unilaterally difficult or impossible.

---

Spacy, William L. Does the United States Need Space-Based Weapons?. Maxwell AFB, AL: USAF Air University, September 1999. [ 11 quotes ] [ page 98 ]

 

Although it is unlikely that weapons in space would threaten or sever strong existing diplomatic ties, simple unpopularity might prompt a shift in the international center of gravity. Countries opposing or alienated by one states' space policy might gravitate to other alignments, possibly creating an international coalition to oppose the space-weaponizing country on these and other issues within international organizations such as the UN or the World Trade Organization (WTO). A decision to posture weapons in space might also diminish the ability of the space-weaponizing country to assemble international coalitions. In the case of the United States, such international political clout has been crucially important to the military, political, judicial and economic conduct of the war on terrorism. These forms of diplomatic influence might be more important than hard power in the maintenance of global stability in the twenty-first century. ( More ... )

---

Deblois, Bruce M. "The Advent of Space Weapons." Astropolitics. Vol. 1, No. 1 (Summer 2003). [ 15 quotes ]

 

In short, U.S. plans for expanded military activities in space, especially when combined with the strategic doctrine of coercive prevention, are perceived internationally as presenting a serious problem, but the United States will not acknowledge any legitimate reason for concern. It has unilaterally withdrawn from the ABM treaty and is refusing to discuss, let alone negotiate, new rules for military space activities in the C.D., in the U.N. Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Space (COPUOS), or in any other multilateral forum. ( More ... )

---

Gallagher, Nancy. Towards a Reconsideration of the Rules for Space Security. College Park, MD: Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM), April 20, 2005. [ 2 quotes ] [ page 19 ]

 

In today's globalized society, the United States must balance its security needs with the implications of U.S. actions on the international community. Despite the changing geopolitical environment, the United States should act only after careful consultation and negotiation with its friends and allies. Earnest consultations do not guarantee agreement, however, and the United States may have to act unilaterally to protect its interests. Such actions may animate other nations to conclude that the United States is too powerful and must be opposed at every level to reduce the level of U.S. dominance in a particular domain. In particular, the idea of using space in support of U.S. missile defense capabilities will quite likely meet with skepticism and disagreement abroad. How can the
United States, then, pursue its own interests in a manner that might engender support or at least bring about neutral reactions on the part of others? ( More ... )

---

McLaughlin, Kevin. "Would Space-Based Defenses Improve Security?." Washington Quarterly. Vol. 25 (Summer 2002): 177-191. [ 3 quotes ] [ page 187 ]

 

Today, weaponizing space could reinforce the image of a unilateralist United States too quick to reach for the gun and disinclined to heed the counsel of others. Given that almost all countries routinely support an annual UN resolution calling for a treaty outlawing the weaponization of space, and that most currently find the United States too ready to flex its military muscle, any near-term decision to weaponize space would be very bad timing ( More ... )

---

O'Hanlon, Michael E. Neither Star Wars nor Sanctuary: Constraining the Military Uses of Outer Space. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institute, 2004. [ 6 quotes ] [ page 21-2 ]

 

Moreover, space weaponization would seriously disrupt the arms control and disarmament process. The initiation of U.S. space-based missile defenses would likely cause Russia as well as the United States (in response to Russia) to make smaller reductions in their nuclear arsenals. China would likely be forced to build more warheads to maintain its nuclear deterrent, which could in turn encourage India and then Pakistan to follow suit. Also, Russia has threatened to respond to any country?s deployment of space weapons. ( More ... )

---

Zhang, Hui. "Action/Reaction: U.S. Space Weaponization and China." Arms Control Today. Vol. 35, No. 10 (December 2005). [ 10 quotes ]

 

U.S.-led space weaponization might also lead China to reconsider its participation in some multilateral nuclear arms control treaties. As Ambassador Sha Zukang stated, "China cannot afford to sit on its hands without taking the necessary measures while its strategic interests are being jeopardized. China, inter alia, may be forced to review the arms control and nonproliferation policies it has adopted since the end of the Cold War in light of new developments in the international situation." For example, a need for more weapons would mean a need for more plutonium and highly enriched uranium (HEU) to fuel those weapons and thus likely hurt China?s support for a proposed fissile material cutoff treaty (FMCT). ( More ... )

---

Zhang, Hui. "Action/Reaction: U.S. Space Weaponization and China." Arms Control Today. Vol. 35, No. 10 (December 2005). [ 10 quotes ]

 

Point One: space weapons will cause global instability. Beyond obvious adversarial symmetric and asymmetric responses, allies and partners abroad will no doubt react unfavorably to any nation's unilateral decision to weaponize space. That, of course, will have great negative consequences on diplomatic relations worldwide. Although it is unlikely that weapons in space will completely sever strong existing diplomatic ties, simple unpopularity might prompt a shift in the international environment. Countries opposing or alienated by one nation's space policy might
gravitate to other alignments, possibly creating an international camp to oppose the space-weaponizing nation, on these and other issues, within international organizations such as the UN or World Trade Organization. ( More ... )

---

Deblois, Bruce M. "Weapons in Space." Carnegie International Non-Proliferation Conference. Ed. . Washington, D.C.: Council on Foreign Relations, . [ 3 quotes ]

 

Non-American opponents of weaponizing space make many of the same arguments. They also worry about a unilateralist America pursuing its own military advantage at the expense of other countries, most of which do not favor putting weapons in space. This dispute has much of its origins and motivation in the history of the ballistic missile defense debate, as well as the ASAT debate of the 1980s. But it has taken on a new tone in what many view as an era of American unipolarity or hegemony. In recent years, China and Russia have been consistently vocal in their opposition to the weaponization of space and their desire for a treaty banning the testing, deployment, and use of such capabilities. So have a number of U.S. allies, including Canada, which in 1998 proposed that the United Nations convene a committee on outer space in its Conference on Disarmament in Geneva. ( More ... )

---

O'Hanlon, Michael E. "The State of Space: From Strategic Reconnaissance to Tactical Warfighting to Possible Weaponization." Testimony before the Subcommittee on Strategic Forces of the House Armed Services Committee. Ed. . Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, June 21, 2006. [ 4 quotes ] [ page 13 ]

 

A nation able to deny access to space to hostile states in a time of conflict would have the latent capability to deny access to anyone at any time. Why would any nation-state that values its own sovereignty be content with that? The people of many nations already hate, fear or mistrust the United States, in part because of its staggering lead in high-tech warfare, which has been repeatedly demonstrated not only in war games, but in actual battle. One suspects most countries already have come to terms with the fact that the United States will continue indefinitely to be the most powerful state the world has ever known, militarily, economically, and culturally. But is there a tipping point? A line beyond which even a nation as relatively benign as the United States cannot go without provoking reactions that ultimately would compromise the security of its own citizens? ( More ... )

---

Moore, Mike. "A New Cold War?." SAIS Review. XXVI, No. 1 (Winter-Spring 2006): 175-188. [ 7 quotes ] [ page 178 ]

 

Further, what other nation could reliably bet that the United States would simply fail in its efforts to develop a robust space-control and spaceweapons capability because of overwhelming technical difficulties and horrendous costs? Americans, after all, are in the habit of making the impossible look easy when it comes to the technology of war. Thirty years ago, scarcely anyone anywhere thought the United States would someday be able to strike targets as small as a house from 20,000 feet and a dozen miles downrange with near-unerring accuracy. Now it is routine, and existing space assets-particularly Global Positioning System satellites-make it possible. ( More ... )

---

Moore, Mike. "A New Cold War?." SAIS Review. XXVI, No. 1 (Winter-Spring 2006): 175-188. [ 7 quotes ] [ page 177 ]

 

Weaponizing space also decreases the United States’ ability to influence adversaries and achieve policy objectives short of military action (soft power). It undermines the legitimacy of the United States’ actions and its role as the leader of the free world. How can the United States assume the mantle of world leadership if it continues to act unilaterally at the expense of the international cooperation, peace, and interests it claims to value? Putting weapons in space is the ultimate unilateral act and affords no opportunity to form “coalitions of the willing.” ( More ... )

---

Coffelt, Christopher A. The Best Defense: Charting the Future of US Space Strategy and Policy. Maxwell AFB, AL: USAF Air University, June 2005. [ 11 quotes ] [ page 80 ]

 

Beyond the din generated by the international community, the United States will need to consider the actual destabilizing effects of deploying a space weapon, even if nominally defensive. As the world's superpower, a rush to weaponize in absence of an impending threat to its military superiority will be regarded with suspicion. American politicians must be prepared to respond to the question, “What threat is so grave that it cannot be handled by America’s prodigious terrestrial capability?” Although competitors may not respond militarily to U.S. weaponization, some will see it as a dangerous move by a hegemon and will shift to create a counterbalance. Coalitions are likely to form, particularly in diplomatic circles, in resistance to any effort to capitalize on weaponization, and adversaries will look to field asymmetric countermeasures against those weapons. Even a U.S. policy to build space weapons to be held in reserve until needed is certain to draw fire from those who perceive little difference between a quick-reaction defensive capability and an offensive capability.

---

Latchford, Stephen. Strategies for Defeating Commercial Imagery Systems. Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama: USAF Center for Strategy and Technology, December 2005. [ 9 quotes ] [ page 11 ]

 

The U.S. should never lose sight of the ability of the international community to collectively weaken American military options indirectly. Responding to the suggestion that the U.S. is the only world superpower, Joseph Nye writes, “On interstate economic issues, the distribution of power is already multipolar. United States cannot obtain outcomes it wants on trade, antitrust, or financial regulation issues without the agreement of European Union, Japan, and others.” Accepting his position, and the position that military power is a tool of last resort for achieving objectives, the obvious conclusion is non-military space power—that which comes from humanitarian, economic, scientific, and other nonmilitary prominence— must be maintained through leadership in the international community. While America moves ahead to use space for military operations, it must not jeopardize its broader interests abroad by trying to do so without a level of international acquiescence.

---

Latchford, Stephen. Strategies for Defeating Commercial Imagery Systems. Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama: USAF Center for Strategy and Technology, December 2005. [ 9 quotes ] [ page 26 ]

 

Despite the enormous cost of space-based weapon systems, they are vulnerable to a number of low-cost and relatively low-technology ASAT attacks including the use of ground-launched small kinetic-kill vehicles, pellet clouds or space mines. It is reasonable to believe that China and others could resort to these ASAT weapons to counter any U.S. space-based weapons. This, however, would lead to an arms race in space. To protect against the potential loss of its deterrent capability, China could potentially resort to enhancing its nuclear forces. Such a move could, in turn, encourage India and then Pakistan to follow suit. Furthermore, Russia has threatened to respond to any country’s deployment of space weapons. Moreover, constructing additional weapons would produce a need for more plutonium and highly enriched uranium to fuel those weapons. This impacts China’s participation in the fissile material cut-off treaty (FMCT). Eventually, failure to proceed with the nuclear disarmament process, to which the nuclear weapon states committed themselves under the Non-Proliferation Treaty, would damage the entire nuclear nonproliferation regime itself, which is already at the breaking point. As Hu Xiaodi, China’s ambassador for disarmament affairs, asked, “With lethal weapons flying overhead in orbit and disrupting global strategic stability, why should people eliminate weapons of mass destruction or missiles on the ground? This cannot but do harm to global peace, security and stability, and hence be detrimental to the fundamental interests of all States."

---

Zhang, Hui. "Space Weaponization and Space Security: A Chinese Perspective." China Security. Vol. 1, No. 2 (2006): 24-36. [ 5 quotes ] [ page 26-7 ]