The argument presented here is that terrestrial U.S. military dominance would be impaired, rather than enhanced, by American initiatives to weaponize space. While the United States clearly has the ability to outspend competitors, and to produce more advanced types of space weaponry, weaker adversaries will have affordable, asymmetric means to counter U.S. initiatives in space, as well as on earth. The net result of an uneven competition to weaponize space would be that prudent U.S. defense planners could not count on protecting space assets, and that weaker adversaries could not count on the negation of U.S. advantages. Neither could be certain of the outcome of space warfare, but both adversaries would have to fear the worst. Because of the vulnerability of space assets to ASATs, both would need to assume a dangerous “hair-trigger” posture in space—unless the United States employed preemptive military means to prevent the launch or deployment of presumably hostile space assets belonging to other states. ( More ... )

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Katz-Hyman, Michael and Michael Krepon. Assurance or Space Dominance? The Case Against Weaponizing Space. Washington, D.C.: Henry L. Stimson Center, April 2003. [ 16 quotes ] [ page 61-2 ]

 

The particulars of escalation have necessarily changed from the Cold War to asymmetric warfare, but the inherently escalatory nature of ASAT use remains inescapable. The flight-testing and deployment of space weaponry by any nation would likely generate responses in kind, as well as asymmetric responses. U.S. battle stations in space would become prime targets in the event of warfare and thus magnets for space mines or other countering devices that would cost a small fraction of the platforms to be defended. ( More ... )

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Katz-Hyman, Michael and Michael Krepon. Assurance or Space Dominance? The Case Against Weaponizing Space. Washington, D.C.: Henry L. Stimson Center, April 2003. [ 16 quotes ] [ page 90 ]

 

Space weapons are destabilizing for other reasons, as well. Space warfare is unlikely to be confined to space, since the platforms that would be primary targets for attack support terrestrial military operations. Civil societies have worked diligently to affirm laws of war to limit dangers to noncombatants. The dictates of international law that warfare be pursued in a discriminating and proportional fashion -- guidelines that are reinforced by the "revolution in military affairs" pursued by the United States -- are undercut by space warfare, since satellites subject to attack provide essential services to noncombatants as well as to armies, navies, and air forces. ( More ... )

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Katz-Hyman, Michael and Michael Krepon. Assurance or Space Dominance? The Case Against Weaponizing Space. Washington, D.C.: Henry L. Stimson Center, April 2003. [ 16 quotes ] [ page 91 ]

 

Deployment of space weapons is also likely to generate the sort of situation that fosters tension and risks poor decisionmaking. First deployment may face other states with unacceptable new vulnerabilities, resulting in unpredictable reactions. The Cuban Missile Crisis, it may be remembered, was itself the result of weapons deployment creating new and unexpected vulnerabilities. ( More ... )

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Baines, Phillip and Robert McDougall. "Military Approaches To Space Vulnerability: Seven Questions." Future Security in Space: Commercial, Military, and Arms Control Trade-Offs. Ed. James Clay Moltz. Monterey, CA: Center for Nonproliferation Studies, 2002. [ 4 quotes ] [ page 15 ]

 

Intelligence gathering satellites are already in space and were an important asset through the Cold War and remain vital today. Nations have begrudgingly tolerated their existence because they could either do nothing about it or the information the satellites provided served to prevent a broader and devastating conflict. Opponents to weapons in space theorize that intelligence assets in space are 'stabilizing' due to the information they provide while weapons in space are 'overtly threatening and destabilizing.' Weapons in space do present the problem of directly threatening a nation, much as an armed aircraft does, but with little or no way to detect or prevent attack. ( More ... )

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Liller, Dwayne. "America Needs Space." High Frontier Journal. Vol. 2, No. 1 (September 2005): 34-37. [ 3 quotes ] [ page 35 ]

 

One such Commander in a recent war game commented, 'If I don't know what's going on because I have lost my eyes and ears in space, I have no choice but to hit everything, with everything I have.' That this conclusion actually surprised strategists suggests that we have not fully explored the implications of space weapons. What is common knowledge, described from years of futuristic war games, is that permanently based space weapons invite pre-emption and escalation. Local to a regional situation of heightened tensions, the existence of space weapons on one side, the other, or both could be the determining catalyst for full-scale war. ( More ... )

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Deblois, Bruce M. "Weapons in Space." Carnegie International Non-Proliferation Conference. Ed. . Washington, D.C.: Council on Foreign Relations, . [ 3 quotes ]

 

Subtly underlying all of this is a striking similarity between nuclear weapons and space weapons which helps inform current space strategy. The intrinsic quality common to both nuclear missile systems and many space weapons is that their mere presence or deployment generates an offensive omnipresence which puts others under a state of constant threat. Admittedly, the special destructive power and status of nuclear weapons does not easily lend itself to direct comparison with other means of applying combat power. However, the common effect created by the constant presence of an orbiting weapons platform is, indeed, highly similar to that created by nuclear missiles, giving the case studies an extra measure of informative power for the development, consideration, and implementation of us space strategy. ( More ... )

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Coffelt, Christopher A. The Best Defense: Charting the Future of US Space Strategy and Policy. Maxwell AFB, AL: USAF Air University, June 2005. [ 11 quotes ] [ page 71 ]

 

As there are currently no weapons in space, the United States cannot credibly claim it is deploying them as a necessary measure for defensive purposes; rather, it will appear entirely offensive. Further, the omnipresence of orbital weapon systems and their dual use potential renders any weapon deployed into orbit as inherently offensive. Terrestrial-based weapon systems that target orbital systems also present an offensive, destabilizing threat in peacetime as they are continually postured and primed to inflict damage meant to deny and destroy enemy capability vice protect one’s own. Due to the orbital deployment of their intended target, these weapons exhibit some of the offensive, omnipresent characteristics seen in orbital weapon systems. Unable to secure the perception that these weapons are intended for defensive purposes, the United States must deal with the distinct disadvantage that offensive weapons bring, namely: security dilemmas. ( More ... )

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Coffelt, Christopher A. The Best Defense: Charting the Future of US Space Strategy and Policy. Maxwell AFB, AL: USAF Air University, June 2005. [ 11 quotes ] [ page 79 ]

 

The deployment of weapons is orbit generates the same omnipresent posture observed in nuclear missiles. The omnipresence of weapons in space creates the perception that they are for offensive purposes, no matter what their stated or intended purpose. Space weapons are a damoclean sword, hanging by a hair over the head of every world leader and citizen every moment of every day. Deploying weapons in space fuels the perception that the United States wants to dominate and control the planet. The dual use potential of these weapons further fuels the perception they serve offensive aims. Even if an orbital weapon is deployed for defensive purposes such as missile defense or active defense of itself or other orbital spacecraft, the potential always exists to employ the weapon in an offensive manner. Adversaries and others will most likely perceive the worst case scenario, and believe the weapons are primarily intended for offensive purposes. Unlike armies, navies, and air forces, which have the strategically advantageous ability to foster either offensive or defensive perceptions, all orbital weapons present an inherently offensive threat and destabilize the security environment.

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Coffelt, Christopher A. The Best Defense: Charting the Future of US Space Strategy and Policy. Maxwell AFB, AL: USAF Air University, June 2005. [ 11 quotes ] [ page 92 ]

 

MUELLER: Finally, there is an argument that there are many problems with space weapons but look at the bright side: if you can't afford to build them and they won't work at least they won’t frighten anybody and we won’t have any political fallout to deal with. Unfortunately, the more I think about past military programs by a variety of nations, the less convinced I am that that is true. Military history is rife with examples of weapons pro-grams, military doctrines, strategies, military operations, that were ill-conceived, unsuccessful and very frightening to the neighbors. So those are both things you want to watch out for when you are thinking about what sort of space policy you want to pursue. You don’t want to invest in things that aren’t going to work and accomplish what you want; you also don’t want to put resources into things that are going to have political fallout that you don’t like or would be happier if you hadn’t done.

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Dolman, Everett C., Karl P. Mueller et al. "Toward a U.S. Grand Strategy in Space." Washington Roundtable on Science & Public Policy. Washington, D.C.: George C. Marshall Institute, March 10, 2006. [ 10 quotes ] [ page 21 ]

 

Many in the arms control community, on the other hand, believe that space weapons will destabilize the global community and promote a costly arms race. Emphasizing the destabilizing consequences of space weapons, Thomas Graham Jr. asserts that, because American missile interceptors in space could quickly wipe out Russian early warning satellites, the mere existence of these weapons will escalate tension between the two countries and place Russia on constant alert. One false signal from an early warning satellite could lead to a Russian nuclear strike. Moreover, weaponization of space might not significantly reduce American vulnerability to attack because most weapons systems will depend on ground facilities and radio links, which can be attacked through electronic hacking and jamming. The actual weaponry based in space is also susceptible to attack.

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Scheetz, Lori. "Infusing Environmental Ethics into the Space Weapons Dialogue." Georgetown International Environmental Law Review. Vol. 19, No. 1 (Fall 2006): 57-82. [ 8 quotes ] [ page 62 ]