Despite a proposed 7% increase in the Department of Defense (DoD) budget, resources are constrained. The billions of dollars -- some estimates are in the tens of billions -- needed to develop space-based weapon capabilities will take money from transformation efforts that will make greater contributions to the nation's security, both now and in the long term. Retired Navy Vice Admiral Arthur Cebrowski, DoD's new Director of Force Transformation is correct in his oft-stated view that "numbers matter." Weaponizing space will mean fewer ships, planes, tanks, and other platforms capable of taking the fight to the enemy.

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Coleman, Sean J. "Space Based Weapons are Wrong." U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings. (February 2002): 96. [ 1 reference ] [ page 96 ]

 

In this budget-constrained environment, funding for space weapons could only come at the expense of other US defense forces. These forces are constantly challenged by global competitors for technological and operational superiority. So far, the United States has done well to preserve its advantage through relentless modernization of its systems. Those modernizations are expensive, however, and today are stretched out beyond the life cycle of the systems they replace. ( More ... )

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Ziegler, David W. Safe Heavens: Military Strategy and Space Sanctuary Thought. Maxwell AFB, AL: USAF Air University, June 1997. [ 9 quotes ]

 

There are significant long-term-opportunity costs within the military, particularly in these times of diminishing DOD budgets. One can meet the same requirements with cheaper alternatives, such as combat unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV). Weaponizing space will necessarily come at the expense of satisfying documented military deficiencies (strategic-lift deficiencies and the C-17, air-superiority deficiencies and the F-22 or joint strike fighter, forward-basing deficiencies and carriers, ISR deficiencies and the next generation of ISR satellites, etc.)

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Deblois, Bruce M. "Space Sanctuary: A Viable National Strategy." Air & Space Power Journal. XII, No. 4 (Winter 1998). [ 4 quotes ] [ page 50 ]

 

A more robust system, requiring 120 or more satellites, could cost as much as $500 billion or several trillion dollars. Furthermore, space systems -- such as the Space Shuttle and International Space Station -- have often grossly overrun their budgets, due to underestimation during the budgeting process and unforeseen technical hurdles encountered during development and construction. For the sake of argument, $1 trillion for a significant space weapons capability is a reasonable estimate. All of this presages adverse impacts on other national security programs. ( More ... )

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Deblois, Bruce M. "The Advent of Space Weapons." Astropolitics. Vol. 1, No. 1 (Summer 2003). [ 15 quotes ]

 

The immediate budget impact of significant funding increases for space weapons would be to decrease funding for combat aircraft, the surface battle fleet, and ground forces. This may well set the proponents of space weaponization at odds with both proponents and opponents of increased defense spending. Space advocates must sell their ideas to fellow pro-weapons groups by making the case that the advantages they provide outweigh the capabilities forgone. This is a mighty task. The tens or even hundreds of billions of dollars needed to develop, test and deploy a minimal space weapons system with the capacity to engage a few targets around the world could displace a half-dozen or more aircraft carrier battle groups, entire aircraft procurement programs such as the F-22, and several heavy armored divisions. This is a tough sell for supporters of a strong military. ( More ... )

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Dolman, Everett C. "U.S. Military Transformation and Weapons in Space." SAIS Review. XXVI, No. 1 (Winter-Spring 2006): 163-174. [ 10 quotes ] [ page 170-1 ]

 

Not only have international issues effected U.S. space actions, but competing interests are holding space back. Space systems are expensive. The U.S. is currently developing a number of systems expected to reach $5-10 billion each not including the $11,000 per pound it will take to launch them. The economics here on earth have a large impact on operations in space. National economic and budget woes have conspired to slow the rigorous growth once projected in U.S. space, particularly on the commercial satellite side of the house. Defense budgets, on the rise since 1996, have begun to retract. The U.S. national budget has gone from a surplus of nearly 2% of GDP in 1996 to a projected deficit of 5% of GDP in 2005. The cost of current operations in Iraq, estimated at over $200 billion has dug into military modernization budgets. ( More ... )

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Henderson, Scott A. The Third Battle: Is the U.S. Ready to Wage the Next Conflict in Space?. Maxwell AFB, AL: USAF Air University, March 2004. [ 7 quotes ] [ page 36 ]

 

National security space leaders are now faced with a difficult decision—enable the U.S. to maximize the gains from the space commons by developing systems to find and track new target sets in the contested zones; or develop space control systems to assure command of the space commons by protecting satellites and ground architectures from a threat in space. It is unlikely that U.S. defense budgets will support both. ( More ... )

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Henderson, Scott A. The Third Battle: Is the U.S. Ready to Wage the Next Conflict in Space?. Maxwell AFB, AL: USAF Air University, March 2004. [ 7 quotes ] [ page 29 ]

 

DOLMAN: What we have to think about then is what would a space-weapons-heavy American military force structure look like? And here we get a number of issues. It would be very, very expensive. I would like to leave you with one thought here: what are the opportunity costs forgone? The money that will have to go into space is not going to come from school budgets or from transportation budgets; it is going to come from the DOD. It is sc going to be at the cost of other military things. It has been pointed out that space weaponization and military space operations are not going to do anything new. These things could be done by other cheaper and possibly less incendiary means. The billions it would cost for a proper recapitalization of all of the aging space support systems that we have and for potentially using space as an integral part of our ability to project violence abroad, which we will be doing – we are not going to give up the right to do that – means that we will have to atrophy some of our existing capabilities to go into other countries and stay there for a long time.

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Dolman, Everett C., Karl P. Mueller et al. "Toward a U.S. Grand Strategy in Space." Washington Roundtable on Science & Public Policy. Washington, D.C.: George C. Marshall Institute, March 10, 2006. [ 10 quotes ] [ page 24 ]

 

We must strike a balance between continuing with legacy systems and moving ahead with modernized systems. I support a measured approach that overlaps new acquisition programs with continuing legacy programs and one that avoids any drastic changes that could severely impact the delivery of war-fighter capability or affect the stability of the industrial base. This thinking is reflected in the House-passed defense bill, which curtails some new-start acquisition programs such as the Alternative Infrared Satellite System and the High Integrity GPS concept. We provide resources for an additional legacy AEHF satellite to mitigate any risk of a gap to our protected strategic communications and fully fund continuing technology and system development of TSAT. We are responsive to the war fighter’s demand for orders of magnitude increases in communications and Internet-like connectivity across platforms and users. ( More ... )

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Everett, Terry. "Arguing for a Comprehensive Space Protection Strategy." Strategic Studies Quarterly. Vol. 1, No. 1 (Fall 2007): 20-35. [ 6 quotes ] [ page 29 ]