It is not surprising, therefore, that risks associated with weaponizing low-Earth orbit do not sit well with many members of Congress, who want to see U.S. military, scientific, and commercial leadership in space protected. According to defense analyst Theresa Hitchens, U.S. satellite providers are already nervous about possible future U.S. government decisions to try to shut off foreign access to U.S. communications satellites in times of crisis and to shoot down U.S. and foreign satellites providing such access. They fear that this may lead foreign customers to develop their own satellite industries to ensure the availability of spares, thus stimulating competition and cutting into existing U.S. market share.

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Moltz, James Clay. "Breaking the Deadlock on Space Arms Control." Arms Control Today. (April 2002). [ 1 reference ]

 

Beyond the use of weapons in space, the satellite insurance business is extremely volatile. In the last four years, satellite insurance rates have risen by 129 per cent, driven by increasing complexity and anomalies of satellite systems. The mere presence of weapons poses a risk, and insurance companies structure their rates on risk estimates. The resolution approach for the insurers will be to strengthen their exclusion clauses for acts of war -- and pass the risks to the financiers, who will have to decide to go to space without such insurance coverage, or not go at all. The combination of weapons posturing and/or use may well cause increasing debris, expensive hardening and increasing risk (perceived by insurers and/or assumed by financiers), all producing an inaccessible international commercial space environment. ( More ... )

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Deblois, Bruce M. "The Advent of Space Weapons." Astropolitics. Vol. 1, No. 1 (Summer 2003). [ 15 quotes ]

 

Unfortunately, there are between 30,000 and 100,000 untracked objects between 1 cm and 10 cm diameter (large enough to cause serious damage to spacefaring vehicles), and an unknown but enormous number of particles smaller than 1 cm (many of which could damage sensitive systems on impact). While the space environment is extremely large and the probability of an impact is still small, that probability is growing. .or some space missions active protection through shielding is already a requirement (e.g. the International Space Station). Getting this shielding to orbit is an added expense to an already low-profit-margin industry. Any weapon use in space, but particularly proliferating weapons use in space, could readily make space a no-go area of dangerous debris, in the process pre-empting commercial and civil development. ( More ... )

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Deblois, Bruce M. "The Advent of Space Weapons." Astropolitics. Vol. 1, No. 1 (Summer 2003). [ 15 quotes ]

 

In addition to posing insurmountable military opportunity costs and the potential of another costly arms race, space weapons directly threaten the fiscal health of the space sector itself. Use of destructive weapons in space would obviously promote an orbital debris problem that is on the threshold of becoming a major inhibitor to space commerce. Currently, the US Space Surveillance Network uses ground-based radar and optical/infrared sensors to track roughly 7,500 objects across orbital space. That constitutes objects greater than 10 cm in diameter in low Earth orbit to objects greater than 1 m diameter in geostationary orbit. Only approximately five per cent of those objects are operating satellites; the rest are effectively debris, 40 per cent of which are fragments of disintegrated satellites and upper stages of rockets. ( More ... )

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Deblois, Bruce M. "The Advent of Space Weapons." Astropolitics. Vol. 1, No. 1 (Summer 2003). [ 15 quotes ]

 

The competitive and cost challenges the U.S. satellite industry faces could be increased if the United States moved to make space a battlefield. Until now, the threat that commercial satellites could become direct wartime casualties has been negligible. But an aggressive U.S. pursuit of ASATs would likely encourage others to do the same, thus potentially heightening the threat to commercial satellites. This could be costly for industry, especially because current commercial satellites have little protection (electronic hardening, for example, has been considered too expensive). There would be costs for increasing protection, not to mention the likely further skyrocketing of already sky-high insurance costs, and it is not at all clear that the U.S. government would cover all those costs. ( More ... )

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Hitchens, Theresa. "Space Weapons: More Security or Less?." Future Security in Space: Commercial, Military, and Arms Control Trade-Offs. Ed. James Clay Moltz. Monterey, CA: Center for Nonproliferation Studies, 2002. [ 2 quotes ] [ page 31 ]

 

Certainly, it is in the interest of no spacefaring power for near-Earth orbit to become so polluted as to become unusable – an outcome that cannot be ruled out over the long-term in a weaponized space environment. But even in the short-term, an increase in the threat from space debris could have negative consequences for space-faring nations and space operators. A report on the potential market impacts of the Chinese ASAT test by U.S. market consulting firm Teal Group found: "About the last thing that the satellite market needs now is the uncertainty that will accompany any moves to start blowing up objects in space or arming military satellites with protective countermeasures. The added debris problem is bad enough. An ASAT weapons race will have the effect of increasing the financial risk of any satellite program, and this will undoubtedly be felt most within the commercial market through decreased investor confidence and(or) higher insurance rates."

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Hitchens, Theresa. "U.S.-Sino Relations in Space: From "War of Words" to Cold War in Space." China Security. (Winter 2007): 12-30. [ 6 quotes ] [ page 26 ]