States possessing nuclear weapons that might become adversaries to the United States could view U.S. initiatives to weaponize space as an attempt to negate their deterrents. Space-to-ground warfare initiatives to further extend U.S. military advantages could therefore prompt compensatory steps by weaker states, including the accelerated pursuit of unconventional weapons. ( More ... )

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Katz-Hyman, Michael and Michael Krepon. Assurance or Space Dominance? The Case Against Weaponizing Space. Washington, D.C.: Henry L. Stimson Center, April 2003. [ 16 quotes ] [ page 102 ]

 

The Russians already continue to maintain their forces on high rates of alert -- something that the United States has apparently been encouraging to reduce Russian fears about U.S. missile defenses. The follow-on Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START II) agreement contained provisions for eliminating missiles with multiple warheads (which are usually kept on higher rates of alert), but the administration of President George W. Bush abandoned that restriction in the Moscow Treaty and Russia may resort to multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs) to maintain a larger nuclear force. Russian President Vladimir Putin has called the prospects of space weapons "particularly alarming," while the commander of Russian Space Forces implied that Russia would respond to U.S. deployments of space weapons. ( More ... )

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Lewis, Jeffrey. What if Space Were Weaponized? Possible Consequences for Crisis Scenarios. Washington, D.C.: Center for Defense Information, July 2004. [ 16 quotes ] [ page 22 ]

 

Global instability is the core issue in an international context. One country's pursuit and deployment of space weapons is destabilizing from the perspective of both foe and friend. Weaponization could prompt adversaries to develop ASAT or space-based weapons. In the extreme case, a peer competitor might engage in an escalatory arms race. Probably a greater threat, however, is dispersed, low-level proliferation. A number of countries are capable of building limited ASAT or rudimentary space weapons, and might choose to do so. The wide proliferation of micro-satellites or other ASAT weapons would threaten all space assets, due to the varying (and perhaps unpredictable) motivations of countries that could obtain them. Those countries capable of posturing space weapons are generally those that have the most assets to lose in a space war. The acquisition of such weapons might well present an irresistible first-strike opportunity for a country unlikely to win in a conventional conflict. Other adversarial states, especially those incapable of building space weapons or achieving parity in conventional forces, might increase their efforts to acquire nuclear, biological or chemical weapons, or pursue other asymmetric activities (e.g. terrorism). ( More ... )

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Deblois, Bruce M. "The Advent of Space Weapons." Astropolitics. Vol. 1, No. 1 (Summer 2003). [ 15 quotes ]

 

Moreover, space weaponization would seriously disrupt the arms control and disarmament process. The initiation of U.S. space-based missile defenses would likely cause Russia as well as the United States (in response to Russia) to make smaller reductions in their nuclear arsenals. China would likely be forced to build more warheads to maintain its nuclear deterrent, which could in turn encourage India and then Pakistan to follow suit. Also, Russia has threatened to respond to any country?s deployment of space weapons. ( More ... )

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Zhang, Hui. "Action/Reaction: U.S. Space Weaponization and China." Arms Control Today. Vol. 35, No. 10 (December 2005). [ 10 quotes ]

 

Certainly, the best option for China is to reach an arms control agreement to prevent space weaponization, as it is advocating now. However, if this effort fails and if what China perceives as its legitimate security concerns are ignored, China would very likely develop other responses to neutralize the perceived threat. Because it is not clear what type of missile defense system the United States will finally deploy or whether the U.S. space control plans will be implemented, it is difficult to identify conclusively China?s specific countermeasures. Yet, there are certain options that it would be likely to consider. It should be noted that these discussions are based on China's capabilities and do not characterize China?s intentions. One of China's simplest options would be to build more ICBMs. Until now, although China has the smallest declared nuclear arsenal of the five nuclear-weapon states, its modernization efforts have been aimed more at quality than quantity. ( More ... )

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Zhang, Hui. "Action/Reaction: U.S. Space Weaponization and China." Arms Control Today. Vol. 35, No. 10 (December 2005). [ 10 quotes ]

 

U.S.-led space weaponization might also lead China to reconsider its participation in some multilateral nuclear arms control treaties. As Ambassador Sha Zukang stated, "China cannot afford to sit on its hands without taking the necessary measures while its strategic interests are being jeopardized. China, inter alia, may be forced to review the arms control and nonproliferation policies it has adopted since the end of the Cold War in light of new developments in the international situation." For example, a need for more weapons would mean a need for more plutonium and highly enriched uranium (HEU) to fuel those weapons and thus likely hurt China?s support for a proposed fissile material cutoff treaty (FMCT). ( More ... )

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Zhang, Hui. "Action/Reaction: U.S. Space Weaponization and China." Arms Control Today. Vol. 35, No. 10 (December 2005). [ 10 quotes ]

 

We argue that additional proliferation of nuclear weapons, rather than new arms races, is the most likely outcome of a renewed interest in space warfare. Proliferation will be a natural consequence of more nations feeling less secure as a result of space weapons. Adverse proliferation consequences could be both direct and indirect. China and Russia will likely feel most directly threatened by U.S. space warfare initiatives. ( More ... )

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Katz-Hyman, Michael and Michael Krepon. "Viewpoint: Space Weapons and Proliferation." Non Proliferation Review. Vol. 12, No. 2 (July 2005): 323-341. [ 15 quotes ] [ page 323 ]

 

It is unfortunate that the connection between space warfare initiatives and
proliferation has been little noted, since the two are bound together so closely. Unless the trade-off between flight-testing and deploying space warfare capabilities and proliferation is recognized, the implementation of the U.S. Air Force’s new doctrine for offensive counterspace operations will spur more proliferation and generate increased dangers for national, regional, and international security. We believe that the extension of
U.S. military dominance into space, when accompanied by a low regard for international compacts designed to prevent proliferation and promote disarmament, will result in more, not less, proliferation. ( More ... )

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Katz-Hyman, Michael and Michael Krepon. "Viewpoint: Space Weapons and Proliferation." Non Proliferation Review. Vol. 12, No. 2 (July 2005): 323-341. [ 15 quotes ] [ page 324 ]

 

Unlike space- and ground-based missile defenses, ASATs are relatively cheap to build and easy to deploy. Moscow is therefore likely to view the resumption of U.S. ASAT testing as a very real, potential threat. However, as was the case with Washington's withdrawal from the ABM Treaty and the start of limited national missile defense deployments, the resumption of ASAT testing by the United States is unlikely to prompt Moscow to engage in an arms race. Adjustments in Russia's strategic force posture, such as an increased commitment to deploying survivable, launch-ready, strategic forces, as well as continued heavy reliance on tactical nuclear weapons, might be expected within the context of financial and structural constraints. ( More ... )

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Katz-Hyman, Michael and Michael Krepon. "Viewpoint: Space Weapons and Proliferation." Non Proliferation Review. Vol. 12, No. 2 (July 2005): 323-341. [ 15 quotes ] [ page 330 ]

 

A direct, physical attack against a satellite would be an historic first in the annals of warfare. If new U.S. doctrine were implemented, space could no longer be relied upon to help those in harm's way or those who wish to engage in international commerce. Space warfare initiatives would accentuate differences among major powers and further weaken alliances. Life on earth would become more brutish, anxious, and threatening. The implementation of a new doctrine and new capabilities for space warfare would come at a time when nonproliferation and disarmament compacts are under severe strain, when hedging strategies are growing, strengthening measures are stymied, and united fronts to stop and reverse these trends are scarce. The pursuit of offensive space warfare initiatives would surely accelerate these negative trends. ( More ... )

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Katz-Hyman, Michael and Michael Krepon. "Viewpoint: Space Weapons and Proliferation." Non Proliferation Review. Vol. 12, No. 2 (July 2005): 323-341. [ 15 quotes ] [ page 337 ]

 

We argue that additional proliferation of nuclear weapons, rather than new arms races, is the most likely outcome of a renewed interest in space warfare. Proliferation will be a natural consequence of more nations feeling less secure as a result of space weapons. Adverse proliferation consequences could be both direct and indirect. China and Russia will likely feel most directly threatened by U.S. space warfare initiatives. Beijing will likely increase its nuclear weapon requirements to counter increased threat perceptions without engaging in an arms race, while Moscow will probably seek to adjust the contraction of its nuclear arsenal to the extent the Kremlin believes that its deterrent might be challenged by U.S. initiatives. Indirect, horizontal proliferation is likely to result from greater strains in major power relations and in U.S.-alliance ties triggered by U.S. initiatives to dominate space. In the absence of united fronts against proliferation by major powers and by America's friends and allies, international efforts to strengthen nonproliferation and disarmament norms are likely to fail, and hedging strategies against a more worrisome future are likely to multiply.

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Katz-Hyman, Michael and Michael Krepon. "Viewpoint: Space Weapons and Proliferation." Non Proliferation Review. Vol. 12, No. 2 (July 2005): 323-341. [ 15 quotes ] [ page 324 ]

 

Space warfare initiatives are, therefore, not merely emblematic of the difficulties facing existing norms, agreements, and institutions designed to promote nonproliferation and disarmament. A direct, physical attack against a satellite would be an historic first in the annals of warfare. If new U.S. doctrine were implemented, space could no longer be relied upon to help those in harm’s way or those who wish to engage in international commerce. Space warfare initiatives would accentuate differences among major powers and further weaken alliances. Life on earth would become more brutish, anxious, and threatening. The implementation of a new doctrine and new capabilities for space warfare would come at a time when nonproliferation and disarmament compacts are under severe strain, when hedging strategies are growing, strengthening measures are stymied, and united fronts to stop and reverse these trends are scarce. The pursuit of offensive space warfare initiatives would surely accelerate these negative trends. ( More ... )

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Katz-Hyman, Michael and Michael Krepon. "Viewpoint: Space Weapons and Proliferation." Non Proliferation Review. Vol. 12, No. 2 (July 2005): 323-341. [ 15 quotes ] [ page 337 ]

 

Successful efforts to stop and reverse proliferation face long odds when the dominant state demands to play by its own rules. These odds become even longer when the dominant state cannot enlist the active support of Moscow and Beijing on hard proliferation cases that bother Washington more than they do Russia and China. Nor do Russian or Chinese leaders appear unduly distressed over the difficulties U.S. forces presently face in Iraq. Burden sharing with respect to proliferation is not high on their list of priorities and is likely to drop lower if U.S. space warfare initiatives are pursued. Official Chinese and Russian threat perceptions of the United States are not articulated in public, but they may reasonably be inferred. Both capitals might well question why Washington seeks to extend its military dominance into space by pursuing capabilities that would not be particularly helpful in scenarios involving Iran, North Korea, or other developing countries. Instead, the pursuit of U.S. dominance into space may well be viewed by Moscow and Beijing as part of a broader effort to negate their nuclear deterrents. If so, prospects for nonproliferation and disarmament would further decline. When dominance poses a threat to major powers whose cooperation is most needed to halt and reverse proliferation, dominance becomes part of the problem, rather than part of the solution.

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Katz-Hyman, Michael and Michael Krepon. "Viewpoint: Space Weapons and Proliferation." Non Proliferation Review. Vol. 12, No. 2 (July 2005): 323-341. [ 15 quotes ] [ page 335-6 ]

 

Using Weapons of Mass Destruction to Prevent Strategic Defeat. The use of chemical or biological weapons by an adversary is to prompt a U.S. response in kind, perhaps using its capability for space-based global strikes. Since these weapons are will be integrated into U.S. military campaign plans, space-based global strike increase the ability of the theater commander to fill targeting gaps that are caused by chemical-biological attacks on friendly forces, including attacks against enemy chemical-biological forces. The implication is that the ability of the United States to systematically eliminate the adversary's capability for using weapons of mass destruction is bound to influence whether the adversary believes it must 'use or lose' these weapons. During the counter-offensive phase, when U.S. and coalition forces seek to strategically defeat the aggressor, global strike with CBMs and SOVs could be available to the theater commander as an 'on call' capability or an active part of the campaign plan.

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Sills, Larry G. Space-Based Global Strike: Understanding Strategic and Military Implications. Maxwell AFB, AL: USAF Air University, August 2001. [ 1 reference ] [ page 16-17 ]

 

I recommend that the United States accept a commitment to forgo placement of weapons in outer space. The costs of space weaponization simply outweigh the benefits. Above, I argue that China would respond to US space weaponization with some level of military buildup. In the least, this response would include the deployment of a more robust ASAT system capable of attacking and potentially eliminating space weapons. After all, space weapons, like military satellites, make for vulnerable military targets. The use of space-based weapons in a conflict must be discounted by the likelihood that they would be eliminated by Chinese ASAT attack. More importantly, increased ASAT deployment would have the counterproductive effect of exposing US satellites to greater threat. Aside from ASAT issues, Chinese response to US space weaponization would include an increase in China's ICBM fleet and nuclear arsenal. Vertical proliferation cannot be in the interests of the United States, if only for the increased peacetime risks of accidental launch or the terrorist risk associated with increased availability of weapons technology and components. Finally, the United States should not discount the possibility, often cited by opponents of space weaponization, that the deployment of US space weapons would instigate a space arms race.

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Blazejewski, Kenneth S. "Space Weaponization and US-China Relations." Strategic Studies Quarterly. Vol. 2, No. 1 (Spring 2008): 33-55. [ 12 quotes ] [ page 45 ]