There are severe technical barriers and high costs to overcome for all but the most rudimentary ASAT capabilities, especially for development of on-orbit weapons. It further remains unclear what political drivers�outside of American development of space-based weaponry�would force American competitors, in the near- to medium-term to seriously pursue such technology. Neither vulnerabilities in American systems nor the potential capabilities of others necessarily translate into threats. ( More ... )

---

Hitchens, Theresa. "Monsters and Shadows: Left Unchecked, American Fears Regarding Threats to Space Assets Will Drive Weaponization." Disarmament Forum. No. 1 (2003): 15-33. [ 5 quotes ] [ page 22 ]

 

As noted, there are scattered reports of Chinese interest in ASAT technologies, but evidence of actual progress is scant. The Russian Federation, like the United States, has explored ASAT technology since the beginning of the Cold War, but there is little reason to believe that Moscow has changed its policy against deploying such weapons (the Russian Federation has had a unilateral ban on ASAT testing for some time), especially given the current cash-starved state of the Russian space programme. No other country has shown visible signs of interest (although obviously any space-faring nation, such as India or Pakistan, has latent capability). ( More ... )

---

Hitchens, Theresa. "Monsters and Shadows: Left Unchecked, American Fears Regarding Threats to Space Assets Will Drive Weaponization." Disarmament Forum. No. 1 (2003): 15-33. [ 5 quotes ] [ page 23-24 ]

 

Although the Space Commission report and more ardent 'space hawks' might
lead one to believe otherwise, there is no current anti-satellite (ASAT)
threat. In fact, operational ASATs are vestiges of the Cold War era. ( More ... )

---

Pena, Charles V. and Edward Hudgins. Should the United States 'Weaponize' Space? Military and Commercial Implications. Washington, D.C.: CATO Institute, March 18, 2002. [ 5 quotes ] [ page 70 ]

 

Thus, although U.S. satellites�both military and commercial�might be
vulnerable to ASATs, the threat posed by ASATs is more hypothetical than
real. Space Commission staff member Tom Wilson states: The proliferation
of ballistic missile and space technology has made it easier to develop
direct ascent anti-satellite weapons and to obtain the capability to deliver
nuclear warheads into space. Studies have shown that the detonation of a
low-yield nuclear weapon in LEO [low earth orbit] will not only fatally
damage nearby satellites but will also increase the naturally occurring
radiation around the earth, reducing most LEO satellites� lifetimes from
years to months. Many countries such as China, India, Iran, Pakistan,
and Russia have this capability. It is important to point out that
�this capability� to which Wilson refers does not mean that those
countries have operational ASATs. It means, rather, that those countries
have a nuclear weapons capability or they have a capability to launch a
payload into a low earth orbit. It does not mean that they have mated
those two capabilities to develop and deploy an ASAT weapon.

---

Pena, Charles V. and Edward Hudgins. Should the United States 'Weaponize' Space? Military and Commercial Implications. Washington, D.C.: CATO Institute, March 18, 2002. [ 5 quotes ] [ page 70 ]

 

Other potential ASAT weapons include laser, radio frequency (RF), and particle beam weapons. Laser weapons would generate intense beams of light to inflict thermal damage on the target satellite. RF weapons would emit an intense burst of radio energy -- usually either high power microwave (HPM) or ultrawideband (UWB) -- to disable the satellite's electronic components. Particle beam weapons use accelerated atomic particles (such as negative hydrogen or deuterium ions) to generate an intense beam that disables electronic components. Again, it is important to emphasize that these are postulated -- not operational -- ASAT weapons. Further, they are all very technologically advanced, extremely expensive, and therefore outside the capabilities of most -- if not all -- potential adversaries, especially rogue states.

---

Pena, Charles V. and Edward Hudgins. Should the United States 'Weaponize' Space? Military and Commercial Implications. Washington, D.C.: CATO Institute, March 18, 2002. [ 5 quotes ] [ page 9-10 ]

 

What 21st-century leader would risk his nation's survival on a risky surprise attack? Any nation that wanted to launch a Pearl Harbor-style attack on U.S. space assets would first have to conduct many tests in space. U.S. observation satellites and ground stations would detect those tests. Does anyone really believe that United States, even if an Adlai Stevensonstyle president were in the White House, would fail to respond vigorously to such a provocation? The United States does not lack for enemies. But just as tigers do not attack a healthy bull elephant, it is difficult to imagine that any nation would directly challenge the United States in space. ( More ... )

---

Moore, Mike. "A New Cold War?." SAIS Review. XXVI, No. 1 (Winter-Spring 2006): 175-188. [ 7 quotes ] [ page 184 ]

 

The public discussion accompanying these developments has been limited and has not as yet penetrated to the fundamental issues involved. The assertion of inevitable threat has been repeatedly proclaimed and occasionally reported along with what are said to be indicative incidents, but mitigating details have generally been omitted. One of the most persistent jamming problems was diplomatically resolved after it was determined that the Libyan jammers were trying to interfere with satellite phones used by smugglers and might not have understood that they were disrupting service to legitimate satellite phone users outside of Libya. References to Iraqi interference with U.S. satellite-based navigation systems during the 2003 invasion of Iraq rarely mentioned that Iraqi forces jammed U.S. military GPS receivers, not satellite signals, or that the jammers were destroyed without space weapons. Repeated assertions that a Chinese microsatellite is being developed for “parasitic” or “killer” purposes are based on a single independent and unsubstantiated source in China. China’s January 2007 test of a direct-ascent ASAT against an aging weather satellite is the most recent incident to be used as evidence that “the threat to our space security is real and growing.” This test showed the world that China now also has a capability that the United States demonstrated two decades ago, but the purpose of the Chinese program is no more clearly offensive or defensive than is the intent behind the more advanced U.S. ASAT development programs. The distinct possibility that pursuit of the SPACECOM vision would stimulate or exacerbate threats beyond those that would otherwise occur is rarely if ever acknowledged when inevitability is asserted.

---

Steinbruner, John D. and Nancy Gallagher. Reconsidering the Rules for Space Security. College Park, MD: Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM), 2008. [ 17 quotes ] [ page 30-1 ]