China's space program, military doctrine, and current research efforts indicate that it is taking space very seriously and recognizes that in a conflict with the United States, control over outer space will be decisive.
Keywords: China.
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According to the DOD's 2004 report on Chinese military capabilities, the PRC realizes that the US is so dependent on space and, thus, it remains interested in counterspace capabilities that can deny or degrade America's ability to react to a PRC-Taiwan conflict. ( More ... ) Koskinas, Ioannis. "Space Warfare Foolosophy: Should the United States be the First Country to Weaponize Space?." Air & Space Power Journal. (January 2005). [ 1 reference ]
However, as indicated, much of China's interest in space seems to stem directly from concerns about American military activities in space. According to the Nuclear Threat Initiative, China's worries about protecting its space-based assets are due to concern about American development of missile defences and future American global dominance as a result of American space power. ( More ... ) Hitchens, Theresa. "Monsters and Shadows: Left Unchecked, American Fears Regarding Threats to Space Assets Will Drive Weaponization." Disarmament Forum. No. 1 (2003): 15-33. [ 5 quotes ] [ page 25 ]
Beijing views U.S. military power in the Pacific as an impediment to China's aspiration of becoming the dominant regional power. Beijing is modernizing and expanding China's military capabilities not only to keep an increasingly independent Taiwan in line, but also to effectively deny the U.S. military the ability to operate against China or its interests in Asia. Chinese military planners have realized that area denial operations require the conduct of space-based surveillance and the other dual-use benefits of space technology. The Dragon is eyeing the moon because the Dragon is also eyeing us. Antonellis, Robert and William S. Murray. "China's Space Program: The Dragon Eyes the Moon (and Us)." Orbis. (Fall 2003): 645-652. [ 1 reference ] [ page 652 ]
However, without global land, sea, or air capabilities, the military impact of China's space programs is likely to be limited to defense of China's homeland and support of regional activities undoubtedly pointed at Taiwan, the Spratly Islands, Tibet, and other areas of similar proximity and sensitivity to China. In a conflict, China also could assist nations allied against the US by providing launch support, ASAT activities, ISR data, and similar services. ( More ... ) Thompson, David J. China in Space: Civillian and Military Developments. Maxwell AFB, AL: USAF Air University, August 2001. [ 4 quotes ] [ page 26 ]
For example, in 2000 the PRC Defense Minister said that space-power is viewed as the key to China's planning to supplant the United States. PLA doctrine would deny the advantages of space to the US, seeking to leverage space for China's own advantage. This is in direct confrontation with the recently released Rumsfeld Commission report characterizing space as a "vital national interest" for the United States. ( More ... ) Thompson, David J. China in Space: Civillian and Military Developments. Maxwell AFB, AL: USAF Air University, August 2001. [ 4 quotes ] [ page 10 ]
China's threat as a space power goes beyond its own capabilities. The Chinese export their technology, selling their ballistic missile assets and space launch capabilities abroad. And they continually seek to import foreign technology useful for their missile and space programs. ( More ... ) Chun, Clayton K. S. Shooting Down a Star: Program 437, the U.S. Nuclear ASAT System and Present Day Copycat Killers. Maxwell AFB, AL: USAF Air University, April 2000. [ 11 quotes ] [ page 55 ]
Some instruction on these points may be found in a simulated war against the People's Republic of China conducted at the Naval War College in the spring of 1994. The war game, set in the year 2010, was a part of the Pentagon's ongoing study of the revolution in military affairs. In the scenario, Beijing provokes the U.S. Navy into patrolling China's shores, luring vulnerable aircraft carriers and other surface ships within range of precision-guided cruise missiles. The Chinese begin their ambush by attacking U.S. satellites, which confounds American targeting abilities and precludes any significant counter-offensive by the U.S. Navy. The Chinese also use space-based assets to enhance the effectiveness of their own forces. U.S. players in this war game were routed, their forces hit before they could throw up adequate defenses. ( More ... ) Lambakis, Steven. "Space Control in Desert Storm and Beyond." Orbis. Vol. 39, No. 3 (Summer 1995). [ 6 quotes ]
China possesses both the intent and a growing capability to threaten US space systems in the event of a future clash between the two countries. The PLA's development of ASAT weapons is primarily not a reaction to US space control initiatives. It is driven instead by very practical considerations of regional security and influence, and the desire to conduct asymmetric warfare against a superior foe if conflict arises. First, Beijing seeks to offset the dominance of US conventional forces by exploiting their dependence on spaceborne information assets. Second, China hopes to guarantee the viability of it's nuclear deterrent by holding the critical space-segment of American missile defense systems at risk. Both of these goals are deeply rooted in the issue of Taiwanese reunification and the potential for armed conflict over the status of the island. China's growing capability to attack American satellites could play an important role in a future military confrontation over Taiwan. ( More ... ) France, Martin E.B. and Richard J. Adams. "The Chinese Threat to US Superiority." High Frontier Journal. Vol. 1, No. 3 (Winter 2005): 17-22. [ 12 quotes ] [ page 21 ]
From a space launch perspective, China has a solid history of successes. Currently, only a handful of states or organizations (United States, Russia, China, European Space Agency (ESA), India, Israel, and Japan) possess space launch capacity. China’s inventory of space launch systems is substantial, and as of 2003, they had launched 73 satellites. China’s Long March series of rockets (12 different versions) possesses the capability to place satellites into low-earth orbit (LEO) and geostationary orbits (GEO). China is looking to increase its heavy lift capacity to a gaudy 25 tons for LEO and 14 tons for GEO. These numbers compare favorably to the European Space Agency (ESA) and the US space lift fleet. ( More ... ) Meteyer, David O. The Art of Peace: Dissuading China from Developing Counter-Space Weapons. USAF Academy, CO: USAF Institute for National Security Studies, August 2005. [ 20 quotes ] [ page 58 ]
China is in a certain sense already conducting space war. Regardless of the commercial or civil aspects of their satellites, all of them can be, and most certainly are, being used for military purposes. China is also aware of the information gathering capability of U.S. satellites and is conducting passive measures to deny information gathering. While these measures are certainly valuable, the bulk of Chinese writings on space address the issue of the need to conduct offensive space warfare missions. Despite an exhaustive review of Chinese writings on space, no articles were discovered rebutting the view that China needs to develop counter space technology and its use as inevitable. It is true that articles against the weaponization of space have been written, but these are mainly in the context of railing against U.S. efforts to weaponize space. Thus, these writings do not represent a debate within the PLA about whether to develop space weapons, rather, they are a concerted effort to convince the PLA to develop space weapons and prepare for their use. Pollpeter, Kevin L. "The Chinese Vision of Space Military Operations." China's Revolution in Doctrinal Affairs: Emerging Trends in the Operational Art of the Chinese People's Liberation Army. Ed. David M. Finkelstein. Alexandria, VA: CNA Corporation, December 2005. [ 9 quotes ] [ page 368 ]
The fixed and mobile ground tracking stations in China can only communicate with spacecraft visible from the Chinese landmass. China achieves worldwide command and control capabilities using three methods: ships, Chinese facilities built in foreign countries and access to foreign tracking networks. China operates a fleet of four tracking ships, the Yuanwang 1, 2, 3 and 4 (“long view”). These ocean-going ships provide full TT&C capabilities, including the ability to detect and correct spacecraft problems; however, they are expensive and affected by poor weather and sea conditions. To counter these limitations, China has built three TT&C facilities in foreign countries: Namibia (near the city of Swakopmund), Kenya (near Malindi) and in Pakistan (near Karachi). Finally, China has signed agreements with the privately owned Swedish Space Corporation to have access to their TT&C facilities around the globe in such areas as Alaska, Hawaii, Sweden, Norway and Australia. Smith, Steven A. Chinese Space Superiority? China's Military Space Capabilities and the Impact of their use in a Taiwan Conflict. Maxwell AFB, AL: USAF Air University, February 17, 2006. [ 1 reference ]
The fixed and mobile ground tracking stations in China can only communicate with spacecraft visible from the Chinese landmass. China achieves worldwide command and control capabilities using three methods: ships, Chinese facilities built in foreign countries and access to foreign tracking networks. China operates a fleet of four tracking ships, the Yuanwang 1, 2, 3 and 4 (“long view”). These ocean-going ships provide full TT&C capabilities, including the ability to detect and correct spacecraft problems; however, they are expensive and affected by poor weather and sea conditions. To counter these limitations, China has built three TT&C facilities in foreign countries: Namibia (near the city of Swakopmund), Kenya (near Malindi) and in Pakistan (near Karachi). Finally, China has signed agreements with the privately owned Swedish Space Corporation to have access to their TT&C facilities around the globe in such areas as Alaska, Hawaii, Sweden, Norway and Australia.
The Chinese military has "undertaken what we would call a very disciplined and comprehensive continuum of capability against ... our space capabilities," Marine Corps Gen. James Cartwright yesterday told the Senate Armed Services strategic forces subcommittee. Their capabilities go "all the way from temporary and reversible effects -- [Global Positioning System] jamming, things like that, [communications] jamming, all the way through direct ascent ASAT," he said, referring to anti-satellite weapons. "Eventually, they'll probably be looking at co-orbital" weapons -- missiles that orbit near a satellite and then explode. "Then, the one that you really worry about is introducing weapons of mass destruction into space on a missile," he said. The testimony provided the first details from the Bush administration about China's space-weapons program. Subcommittee Chairman Bill Nelson, Florida Democrat, said that China is expected to have enough ASAT weapons by 2010 to "basically knock out most of our satellites in low-earth orbit." "China has Gained and Tested Array of Space Weapons." Washington Times. March 30, 2007.
Contrary to some analysts' assertions, China would then likely have an ASAT system capable of threatening all U.S. space assets, not just those in low-Earth orbit. China has already mastered the techniques of placing satellites in medium and higher orbits: first placing the satellite and its booster's third stage into low-Earth orbit, then using the third stage to boost the satellite into a highly elliptical transfer orbit, and finally using the satellite's onboard engine to place it in a higher-altitude circular orbit. An ASAT attack against a navigational satellite or higher communications satellites would almost certainly involve the first two steps. At higher altitudes, moreover, the final attack is easier because at these altitudes satellites need to move less quickly to stay in orbit because of the Earth's weakening gravitational field. Likewise, an ASAT weapon does not need to approach its target satellite with as great a closing speed (information graphic available in the print edition). Thus, an attack on a geostationary satellite would be considerably less stressing for an ASAT weapon's tracking, guidance, and control systems than the scenario already successfully tested by China's ASAT system. Forden, Geoffrey. "After China's Test: Time For a Limited Ban on Anti-Satellite Weapons." Arms Control Today. Vol. 37, No. 3 (April 2007). [ 7 quotes ]
Regardless of the actual reason for the pursuit of an ASAT, China's research into the system outpaced almost all estimates. In early 2003, the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency testified that ASAT systems would not be available for ten years. In 2004, political scientist Michael E. O'Hanlon underestimated the Chinese ASAT program when he posited that "China might also have means to attack U.S. space assets, particularly lower-flying reconnaissance satellites, by 2010 or 2015." The rapid rate of Chinese research, underestimated by the American intelligence community, should serve as a warning to American policy-makers: China has set its sights on asymmetrical systems that can target vulnerabilities in the American military. Walsh, Frank M. "Forging a Diplomatic Shield for American Satellites: The Case For Reevaluating The 2006 National Space Policy in Light of a Chinese Anti-Satellite System." Journal of Air Law and Commerce. Vol. 72 (Fall 2007): 759. [ 28 quotes ] [ page 769-770 ]