Many countries (or groups of countries) are currently pursuing spacepower capabilities that could be a threat to the United States. As another example, the European Union has its own space center (European Space Agency) and one of the world's largest economies. They are currently conducting independent research to determine what their military role should be in outer space. While it is unlikely that the EU and the U.S. would ever clash in space, the proliferation of spacepower capabilities complicates U.S. efforts to control space.
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Many nations, including China and perhaps Iraq are currently developing laser anti-satellite systems. According to a National Security Council arms control specialist, "between twenty and thirty nations have ground-based lasers capable of putting directed energy into space." ( More ... ) Schlie, Kimberly M. "Developing and Deploying Laser Weaponry in Space: Is it Legal?." DePaul International Law Journal. Vol. 4 (Winter 2000). [ 1 reference ]
All four nations discussed above -- North Korea, India, Iran, and the PRC -- have the potential space boosters and have demonstrated the ability and willingness to develop nuclear devices. They realistically could, in the next few years, field a low-cost ASAT weapon system powerful enough to severely damage or destroy a target satellite. ( More ... ) Chun, Clayton K. S. Shooting Down a Star: Program 437, the U.S. Nuclear ASAT System and Present Day Copycat Killers. Maxwell AFB, AL: USAF Air University, April 2000. [ 11 quotes ] [ page 60-1 ]
Those nations capable of producing an ASAT system at least equivalent to Program 437 and its Thor-class booster [HAND] include Russia, North Korea (the Democratic People's Republic of Korea or DPRK), Iran, India, the People's Republic of China (PRC), and Libya. ( More ... ) Chun, Clayton K. S. Shooting Down a Star: Program 437, the U.S. Nuclear ASAT System and Present Day Copycat Killers. Maxwell AFB, AL: USAF Air University, April 2000. [ 11 quotes ] [ page 36 ]
The ability to restrict or deny freedom of access to and operations in space is no longer limited to global military powers. The reality is that there are many extant capabilities to deny, disrupt or physically destroy space systems and the ground facilities that command and control them. Knowledge of U.S. space systems functions, locations and physical characteristics, as well as the means to conduct counterspace operations, is increasingly available on the international market. Nations or groups hostile to the U.S. possess or can acquire the means to disrupt or destroy U.S. space systems by attacking the satellites in space, their communications nodes on the ground and in space, or ground nodes that command the satellites. ( More ... ) Wilson, Tom. Threats to United States Space Capabilities. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Space Commission, 2001. [ 8 quotes ]
Foreign knowledge of U.S. space operations is a necessary precursor to the successful conduct of counterspace operations or camouflage, concealment, and deception (CC&D) activities. Potential adversaries and competitors can learn about U.S. space systems and operations using standard HUMINT, SIGINT or IMINT intelligence collection techniques, as well as through dedicated space object surveillance and identification (SOSI) systems. More recently, with the advent of amateur satellite observers posting data on the Internet, the availability of intelligence regarding U.S. space system capabilities and orbital locations is increasing available to U.S. adversaries. Satellite situational awareness databases are maintained by organized clubs and organizations, which readily publish their information on Internet web pages such as those of the Federation of American Scientists and several Universities. ( More ... ) Wilson, Tom. Threats to United States Space Capabilities. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Space Commission, 2001. [ 8 quotes ]
The ASAT potential of high-energy lasers has been extensively explored by the US and to a lesser degree by the USSR. As many as 30 states may already have the capability to use low-power lasers to degrade unhardened sensors on satellites. In 1997, the US Mid-Infrared Advanced Chemical Laser (MIRACL) was test-fired against a satellite in a 420-kilometer orbit, damaging the satellite's sensors. Reportedly, it was not the mega-watt MIRACL laser, but a 30-watt laser used for alignment that actually damaged the target satellite's sensors. This suggests that even a commercially available low-watt laser could be used to 'dazzle,' or temporarily disrupt, a satellite functioning from the ground. ( More ... ) Cowan-Sharp, Jessy, Robert Lawson et al. Space Security Index 2004. Waterloo, Ontario: Space Security Index, June 2005. [ 13 quotes ] [ page 128 ]
Fueled by the revolution in military affairs, the military doctrine of a growing number of states, led by China, Russia, the US, and key EU members, is increasingly emphasizing the use of military space systems to support terrestrial military operations. Dependence on space systems has led several of these states to view space assets as national security critical infrastructure. US military space doctrine has also begun to focus on the need to ensure US freedom of action in space, while preventing adversaries from accessing and using space when necessary. Several states continued to place a greater emphasis on military space applications in 2004. The EU, France, Japan, and Russia articulated new policies designed to increase the uses of space for national security purposes. The US Air Force (USAF) released a doctrine document that outlined in greater detail the practice of 'counterspace operations.' To the extent that the USAF vision of counterspace doctrine is accepted by the US Government, this represents a significant departure from the broadly accepted international legal norm that space should be preserved as an environment that is open to all and belonging to none. ( More ... ) Cowan-Sharp, Jessy, Robert Lawson et al. Space Security Index 2004. Waterloo, Ontario: Space Security Index, June 2005. [ 13 quotes ] [ page X ]
By 2003, there were 10 actors with an independent orbital launch capacity, with an average of one new actor developing such a capability every eight years. A total of 44 states have accessed space through an independent launch capability or the launch capabilities of others. In the 1990s, the rate of increase in this capability doubled from just less than one to just less than two per year, mostly for civil space programs. ( More ... ) Cowan-Sharp, Jessy, Robert Lawson et al. Space Security Index 2004. Waterloo, Ontario: Space Security Index, June 2005. [ 13 quotes ] [ page XI ]
A growing number of actors are developing Space-Based Strike Weapons (SBSW) precursor technologies outside of SBSW programs. A majority of SBSW prerequisite technologies are dual-use. They are not related to dedicated SBSW programs, but are developed through other civil, commercial, or military space programs. While there is no evidence to suggest that states pursuing these enabling technologies intend to use them for SBSW systems, their development does bring these actors technologically closer to such a capability. Both the number of such technologies being pursued in non-SBSW programs and the number of actors doing so are increasing. ( More ... ) Cowan-Sharp, Jessy, Robert Lawson et al. Space Security Index 2004. Waterloo, Ontario: Space Security Index, June 2005. [ 13 quotes ] [ page XXII ]