As the above analysis shows, many nations have access to technology and systems that are much improved over what the United States used in the late 1950s and early 1960s. If these nations configured their ASAT weapons properly, they could pose a threat to US satellites. ( More ... )

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Chun, Clayton K. S. Shooting Down a Star: Program 437, the U.S. Nuclear ASAT System and Present Day Copycat Killers. Maxwell AFB, AL: USAF Air University, April 2000. [ 11 quotes ] [ page 63 ]

 

Concern for the vulnerability of U.S. space-based assets was expressed with even greater urgency in the Space Commission�s finding of a �virtual certainty� that a material threat to vital U.S. space equities will eventually arise. That finding led the commissioners to warn that the United States �is an attractive candidate for a �space Pearl Harbor�� and must accordingly begin hedging now against hostile acts in and from space by developing and deploying what they called �superior space capabilities.� ( More ... )

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Lambeth, Benjamin S. Mastering the Ultimate High Ground: Next Steps in the Military Uses of Space. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2003. [ 5 quotes ] [ page 101 ]

 

On the other hand, many presently robust industrial nations have space-launch facilities with a base of manufacturing and a technical personnel pool. Those nations are capable of placing dangerous payloads in space to menace United States space-traveling assets, but only a few might be expected to do so. Hard-to-detect techniques such as placing of space-mines, use of electromagnetic-pulse devices, killer-laser or particle-beam weapons and others, are among the weapons that such hostile industrial nations could bring to bear. Many nations can be brought to mind that harbor malice for the United States and this animosity could be expressed by disruptive actions against our space assets. ( More ... )

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Earl, Richard Hansen. "Can the United States Afford to Surrender in the Next Conflict to Another Nation's Dominance in Space?." Air & Space Power Journal. Vol. 12 (Fall 1998): 108-110. [ 1 reference ]

 

Adversaries can conduct attacks against our space capabilities using various methods both symmetric and asymmetric. Adversaries may have the capacity to develop counterspace capabilities but, in many cases, may simply acquire them from a third party. Near and far-term threats may include the following:

• Ground system attack and sabotage using conventional and unconventional means against terrestrial nodes and supporting infrastructure.


• Radio frequency (RF) jamming equipment capable of interfering with space system links.


• Laser systems capable of temporarily or permanently degrading or destroying satellite subsystems, thus interfering with satellite mission performance.


• Electromagnetic pulse (EMP) weapons capable of degrading or destroying satellite and/or ground system electronics.


• Kinetic antisatellite (ASAT) weapons capable of destroying spacecraft or degrading their ability to perform their missions.


• IO capabilities capable of corrupting space-based and terrestrial based computer systems utilized to control satellite functions and to collect, process, and disseminate
  mission data.

( More ... )

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Reiss, Jr., Robert J. "The Reality of Space Warfare: Space and Counter-space." High Frontier Journal. Vol. 2, No. 1 (September 2005): 46-50. [ 1 reference ] [ page 47 ]

 

The increasing militarization of space is not exclusively a superpower story, however. The United States certainly dominates military space spending—accounting for more than 90 percent of the total, by some measures. The country's military space budget totals exceed $15 billion a year. But other countries besides the United States and Russia have also increasingly sought military satellites, largely for reconnaissance and communications purposes so far, and will surely continue to pursue space capabilities of many types in the future. ( More ... )

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O'Hanlon, Michael E. "The State of Space: From Strategic Reconnaissance to Tactical Warfighting to Possible Weaponization." Testimony before the Subcommittee on Strategic Forces of the House Armed Services Committee. Ed. . Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, June 21, 2006. [ 4 quotes ] [ page 7 ]

 

Regardless of progress on the rapid relaunch front, the United States is probably entering an era when it should no longer count on its satellites remaining safe and secure. No foe is likely close to an ability to "clean up the heavens," systematically eliminating the dozens of GPS and communications satellites on hand for U.S. military use when needed. But satellites deployed now only in small numbers, such as imaging and signals intelligence satellites, may be more plausibly attacked. Over time, minisatellites or directed-energy weapons may even put the large constellations at risk. Although such a period of time is probably quite distant, the United States should avoid blind optimism in the availability of all satellite capabilities. The United States needs backups to satellites. Even if they prove less capable or efficient than the satellites they would replace, they are important, because the United States cannot afford to develop "single-point failures" that would bring down whole warfighting systems after the loss of a single type of asset. Catastrophic degradation of U.S. military capabilities from a single type of action or attack must be prevented. ( More ... )

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O'Hanlon, Michael E. "The State of Space: From Strategic Reconnaissance to Tactical Warfighting to Possible Weaponization." Testimony before the Subcommittee on Strategic Forces of the House Armed Services Committee. Ed. . Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, June 21, 2006. [ 4 quotes ] [ page 21 ]

 

The [U.S. Space] Commission went on to state: "The nation's leaders must assure that the vulnerability of the United States is reduced and that the consequences of a surprise attack on U.S. space assets are limited in their effects." This was not idle speculation about future challenges to space assets. GPS jamming has occurred as has jamming of commercial telecommunications satellites. Disruptions of U.S. space capability have the potential to impact all areas of national power – military, civil and commercial. Open source reporting has cited examples of incidents, both intentional and unintentional, that have impacted space capabilities and caused a ripple effect in the commercial world. ( More ... )

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Kehler, C. Robert. "Statement of General C. Robert Kehler." Testimony before the Subcommittee on Strategic Forces of the House Armed Services Committee. Ed. . Washington, D.C.: , June 21, 2006. [ 1 reference ] [ page 10 ]

 

The number of states emphasizing the security uses of space in national policies continued to increase in 2005. In January, the Japanese government introduced a plan to deploy a new generation of spy satellites. Japan also continued talks with the US throughout 2005 on furthering missile defense cooperation. The Israeli Air Force unveiled plans in June to launch additional surveillance satellites to boost intelligence capabilities and to manufacture micro-satellites that could provide information on combat zones (see Space Support for Military Operations). In addition, Yuval Steinitz, chairman of Israel's Defense and Foreign Affairs Committee, stated that defense and industry officials should consider future developments of "anti-satellite missiles" and "satellite-attacking lasers." India also continued to pay greater attention to the military uses of space. The Indian Air Force urged the government to set up a Strategic Aerospace Command to purportedly facilitate the development of capabilities to degrade space weapons in preparation for "future star wars." While some reports contend that the government has rejected the proposals, Indian Air Force Chief S. P. Tyagi insists that the recommendations are still under consideration, particularly in light of the Parliamentary Standing Committee's declarations that India needs the ability to counter any threat from space. Media reports throughout 2005 revealed significant speculation about China's space capabilities and military-related space intentions, although Chinese officials maintain that the country's space program is solely for peaceful purposes.

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Collard-Wexler, Simon, Thomas Graham et al. Space Security 2006. Waterloo, Ontario: Space Security Index, July 2006. [ 26 quotes ] [ page 60 ]

 

But even if a military and economic rivalry develops, would that necessarily lead to one of the many Pearl Harbor scenarios spun out by space warriors? The answer is almost surely no. Any substantive antisatellite threat to U.S. space assets would have to be preceded by extensive testing, including tests in space. The United States would quickly detect any such tests. The kindest thing that can be said about space Pearl Harbor scenarios is that they are classic scare tactics, the latest installment in a string of scenarios trotted out by hardliners throughout the Cold War. ( More ... )

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Moore, Mike. "A New Cold War?." SAIS Review. XXVI, No. 1 (Winter-Spring 2006): 175-188. [ 7 quotes ] [ page 183 ]

 

The second major aspect in which the space environment has evolved since the creation of the legal regime is the reality of space weapons technology. The debate over space weaponization is far from the theoretical discussion debated by the founders of the current legal regime. One particular display of how far the debate has progressed is the billions of dollars the United States continues to invest into the research and development of advanced space weapons like the Space Based Laser (SBL). In fact, recent leaps in space technologies have put the development of space weapons within the realm of possibility for several different countries. As New World Vistas: Air And Space Power For The 2lst Century, a U.S. Air Force board report, states, “In the next two decades, new technologies will allow the fielding of space-based weapons of devastating effectiveness to be used to deliver energy and mass as force projection in tactical and strategic conflict. These advances will enable lasers with reasonable mass and cost to affect very many kills.”

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Park, Andrew T. "Incremental Steps for Achieving Space Security: The Need for a New Way of Thinking to Enhance the Legal Regime for Space." Houston Journal of International Law. Vol. 28, No. 3 (2006): 871-911. [ 11 quotes ] [ page 881 ]

 

For many nations, the opportunity to acquire space weapons is growing as technologies become available on a global basis. Several countries already have ongoing space programs designed to provide a high-leverage response to U.S. military power. Their incentives to deploy space weapons are extensive; such capabilities could threaten present and future U.S. dominance, both in space and in the terrestrial arena. Space-based weapons in the hands of hostile states constitute an asymmetric capability designed to undermine U.S. strengths, including not only American maritime power projection assets, but also vital space-based sensors and communications satellites. Unless the United States chooses to abandon its superpower status, continued access to space as well as a growing U.S. presence in space, based on advancing technologies, will remain indispensable to national security.

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Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis. Independent Working Group on Missile Defense, the Space Relationship, and the Twenty-First Century, 2007 Report. Washington, D.C.: Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, August 28, 2006. [ 13 quotes ] [ page 34 ]

 

The preservation of this right will be the space policy issue for the US in the coming years. The medium of outer space is becoming a significantly more complicated operating environment. There is a clear trend toward challenges to the freedom of space. This trend is evidenced by the increasing prevalence of foreign efforts to interfere with satellite operations. For example, Iraq jammed US satellite positioning, navigation, and timing signals in 2002, Libya and Iran interfered with international communications satellite transmissions in 2005, and China apparently lased a US imaging reconnaissance satellite in 2006. After China’s successful test of a direct ascent anti-satellite (ASAT) weapon in January 2007, there should be no failure of imagination in foreseeing threats to US interests in space.

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Berkowitz, Marc J. "Protecting America's Freedom of Action in Space." High Frontier Journal. Vol. 3, No. 2 (March 2007): 13-18. [ 11 quotes ] [ page 13 ]

 

Operation Iraqi Freedom should be a wake up call for the US national security community. In contrast to the 1991 Gulf War, enemy forces attempted to challenge our use of space to enhance the combat effectiveness of coalition military operations. Although Iraqi efforts to jam global positioning satellites’ (GPS’) signals employed by our weapons platforms and munitions for the delivery of precision strikes did not succeed, it would be imprudent to conclude future enemies will not attempt to neutralize our space capabilities. History shows that no other medium has ever remained a sanctuary from armed conflict once it was exploited for national security purposes. During crisis or conflict, adversaries may target America’s space assets as an asymmetric means of countering US military operational effectiveness, intelligence capabilities, economic vitality, or political will. They may attack our space systems as symbols of our military and economic prowess to reduce our international status as a global superpower. We should expect that America’s freedom of action in space will be forcibly challenged. One of the most important policy choices facing American decision-makers is whether or not the US will have the capabilities to defend effectively its national interests in space.

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Berkowitz, Marc J. "Protecting America's Freedom of Action in Space." High Frontier Journal. Vol. 3, No. 2 (March 2007): 13-18. [ 11 quotes ] [ page 14 ]

 

Beyond the near- and mid-term ramifications of the debris threat, the Chinese ASAT test raises long-term cause for concern about the safety of EO satellites: the possible introduction of destructive ASATs into future arsenals. The Chinese test was the first dedicated ASAT-weapons test in more than 20 years, highlighting the growing tensions in space caused largely by the increased reliance on space assets by the world's militaries, especially that of the United States. In addition, some developing nations have begun to question the legitimacy of satellites for Earth observation and “spying” that were established by the former Soviet Union and the United States during the Cold War as a means of reducing nuclear tensions. Indian leaders, for example, have complained that Google Earth is enabling a potential threat from terrorism or arch-rival Pakistan.

While the Chinese are the first to break the unspoken taboo against ASATs that has existed for the past two decades, other nations—including the United States, India and Israel—are known to be considering satellite attack methods as part of their military strategies for the future. And although the U.S. military continues to shy away from destructive ASAT weapons in favor of what the Air Force terms “temporary and reversible means” such as jamming, it is highly unclear (as witnessed by the Chinese test) that others would follow that high-technology route in the event of an ASAT competition.

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Hitchens, Theresa. "Code Red? Chinese ASAT Test Raises Debris Threat to Earth Observation Satellites." Issues in Science and Technology. June 5, 2007.

 

A number of states are developing a variety of capabilities that will intentionally or unintentionally place at risk the space systems operated and used by the United States, its allies, and coalition partners. Although these actors are states, they are likely to include actors other than states in the relatively near future as technologies for space operations become more widely accessible. The Chinese ASAT direct ascent test should be a wake up call for the United States. Such high-leverage, asymmetric threats could have a highly disproportionate impact on U.S. military capability and security. Many of our space-based assets serve both civilian and military users. Their destruction, or even the threat of their destruction, would have devastating economic and military implications. Threats, disruption, or damage to commercial satellite systems would wreak havoc on the U.S. and global economy.

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U.S. State Department. Study on Space Policy: Report of the International Security Advisory Board. Washington, D.C.: U.S. State Department, April 27, 2007. [ 9 quotes ] [ page 4 ]

 

Today, the repercussions of an attack that existed in the Cold War seem to have diminished. In fact, ASAT incidents and tests are occurring, and we have seen few consequences for the culprits. In the past few years, we have seen a handful of GPS and increasing numbers of satellite communications (SATCOM) jamming incidents. In the early stages of OIF, US forces encountered a GPS jamming situation. In this case, precision munitions were used to hit these jamming sources, which allowed our forces to quickly resume operations. We have seen several SATCOM jamming incidents, including Iranian jamming of a US satellite from Cuba in July 2003; ongoing jamming by Iran against Panamsat, AsiaSat, ArabSat, and EutelSat from June 1997 to July 2005; and Libyan jamming of two international SATCOM systems in December 2005. Last fall it was reported that a Chinese ground-based laser illuminated a National Reconnaissance Office intelligence-gathering satellite.9 What is most troubling is that these attacks are coming during a period of widespread use of GPS, satellite communications, and space-based imagery. ( More ... )

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Everett, Terry. "Arguing for a Comprehensive Space Protection Strategy." Strategic Studies Quarterly. Vol. 1, No. 1 (Fall 2007): 20-35. [ 6 quotes ] [ page 23 ]