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All Arguments

Arguments are the core of the system and are organized into positions with relevant evidence. Each argument is editable, as are its related counterarguments and subarguments. [ More on Arguments ].

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z 0-9     [ There are 166 arguments ]

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A

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• A Code of Conduct between Spacefaring Nations would help Reduce Tensions in Outer Space [2697]
• A High Altitude Nuclear Detonation (HAND) Could Disable Space Assets [1309]
• Active Defenses are Not Viable meants to Protect Satellites from Attack [3537]
• Active Defenses could Defend Satellites Against Attack [3536]
• Advanced Space Weapons are not Technologically Feasible [1328]
• Adversaries will Challenge U.S. Space Dominance Assymetrically [2906]
• Almost any Space System could be used as an Anti-Satellite Weapon [1468]
• Anti-Satellite Space Weapons are not Technologically Feasible [1569]
• Anti-Satellite Space Weapons are Technologically Feasible [1329]
• Anti-Satellite Space Weapons Increase Space Debris [1160]
• Anti-Satellite Weapons Would Harm Commercial Space Sector [1162]

C

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• China Committed to Space Arms Control [2744]
• China has no Genuine Interest in Space Arms Control [2745]
• China has no Motivation to Pursue Spacepower Dominance [2740]
• China is a Space Power Threat [1141]
• China is Concerned about U.S. Space Power [1883]
• China is Developing Anti-Satellite Weapons [1343]
• China is not Developing Anti-Satellite Space Weapons [1327]
• China's ASAT Program is not a Threat to the United States [1157]
• China's Military Space Program is not a Threat to U.S. Conventional Strength [2579]
• China's Military Space Program Motivated by Desire to Protect Economic Investment [2743]
• China's Military Space Program Motivated by Strategic Goals [2742]
• China/Taiwan Conflict is a Likely Scenario for Space Warfare [1342]
• Chinese Spacepower is a threat to U.S. Conventional Strength [2580]
• Code of Conduct would not Help Reduce Tensions [3326]
• Conventionally Armed ICBMs are not Viable for Long-Range Strike Mission [2713]
• Conventionally-Armed Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles could Accomplish Long-Range Strike Mission [1572]
• Cost of Space Weapon Programs not worth Improvements in Security [3349]
• Countermeasures can Easily Defeat Missile Defenses [3538]

D

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• Demonstration Effect is Insignificant Factor in Determining Weapon Acquisition Decisions [1852]
• Deployment of Space Weapons Could Cause a Space Arms Race [1368]
• Deployment of Space Weapons could Ignite Arms Race by Demonstrating Technological Possibility [1370]
• Deployment of Space Weapons will Encourage other States to Pursue or Increase Reliance on WMD [1158]
• Deployment of Space Weapons Won't Cause Arms Races [1153]
• Directed Energy Weapons Could be used to Disable Satellites [1330]

E

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• Economic Value of Space Does not mean Space Weaponization is Inevitable [1295]
• European Union Pursuing Independent Spacepower Capabilities [3325]
• Every New Environment is Inevitably Weaponized [1144]

F

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• Force Projection Space Weapons are not Technologically Feasible [1365]
• Force Projection Space Weapons are Technologically Feasible in the Near-Term [1337]
• Foreign ISR Satellites Threaten US Security [1149]
• Foreign Space Assets do not Threaten U.S. [1261]
• Foreign Space Assets Threaten U.S. [1148]
• Foreign Space Weapon Programs are a Threat to U.S. Space Assets [1138]

G

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• Global Economy Dependent on Space Services [1691]
• Globalization of Space Services Market makes Unilateral Space Dominance Unlikely [3343]

H

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• History of Naval Forces Evolution is not Analogous to Outer Space [1593]

I

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• Imaging Satellites could be Blinded by Lasers [1332]
• India is an Emerging Space Power [1357]
• India is not a Space Power Threat [1358]
• India/Pakistan Conflict is a Likely Scenario for Space Warfare [1362]
• International Community should Agree to Prohibit ASAT Tests [2903]
• International Community Would Backlash Against U.S. Deployment of Space Weapons [1165]
• International Law can't Keep Pace with Advances in Space Technology [1469]
• Iran is a Space Power Threat [1361]
• Iran is not a Space Power Threat [1918]
• Israel is an Emerging Space Power [2401]

J

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• Japan is an Emerging Space Power [2262]

M

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• Microsatellites Could Make Highly Effective Anti-Satellite Weapons [1310]
• Missile Defense is not a National Security Priority for the U.S. [3535]
• Missile Defense Systems are not Latent Anti-Satellite Weapons [2877]

N

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• New National Space Policy Allows for Weaponization of Space [2404]
• New National Space Policy does not Open Door to Space Weaponization [2405]
• No Significant Threat of a High-Altitude Nuclear Detonation (HAND) Attack [1363]
• Non-State Actors Could Threaten U.S. Space Assets [1376]
• North Korea is a Space Power Threat [1360]
• North Korea is not a Space Power Threat [1326]
• Nuclear States would Place Nuclear Forces on High-Alert if Space Weapons are Deployed [1359]

P

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• Passive Defenses can Protect Satellites from Anti-Satellite Weapons [1381]
• Passive Defenses Insufficient to Protect Against Anti-Satellite Space Weapons [1382]

R

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• Radiation Hardening Could Defend Satellites against HAND Attacks [1340]
• Russia is a Space Power Threat [1139]
• Russia is not a Space Power Threat [1325]

S

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• Satellite Export Controls Hamper U.S. Economic Competitiveness [2714]
• Satellites can Easily Defend Against Jamming and Electronic Warfare Attacks [1431]
• Satellites could be Disabled Through Information Warfare Attacks [1341]
• Self-Interest will Compel States to Compete in a Space Arms Race [1369]
• Shutter Control Agreements can Constrain Commercial High Resolution Satellite Imagery [1364]
• Shutter Control of Commercial High-Resolution Imagery Satellites Won't Work [1152]
• Space Arms Control is not Worth Pursuing [1269]
• Space Assets could be Disabled by Jamming or Electronic Warfare [1331]
• Space debris is a significant threat to space exploration and development [2213]
• Space Debris is not a Reason to Reject Anti-Satellite Weapons [2597]
• Space Power Capabilities Useful for Defending Against Extraterrestrial Threats [1702]
• Space Warfare has Already Occurred [1799]
• Space Warfare Inevitable for Economic Reasons [1145]
• Space Warfare Inevitable for Strategic Reasons [1146]
• Space Weaponization has Already Occurred [1143]
• Space Weaponization has not Already Occurred [1259]
• Space Weaponization is Inevitable [1140]
• Space Weaponization is not Inevitable [1271]
• Space Weaponization Requires Stationing Weapons in Space [2246]
• Space Weapons are Destabilizing [1164]
• Space Weapons are Destabilizing because they Encourage First-Strikes [1366]
• Space Weapons are Destabilizing because They Threaten Early Warning Assets [1177]
• Space Weapons are Destablizing because they Escalate Conflicts [1776]
• Space Weapons are Not Destabilizing [1155]
• Space Weapons are not Escalatory [1851]
• Space Weapons are Technologically Feasible [1137]
• Space Weapons Could Cause Miscalculation and Accidental War [1161]
• Space Weapons do not Increase Risks of Miscalculation and Accidental War [1427]
• Space Weapons do not Violate International Law [1154]
• Space Weapons Technology will Proliferate through Technology Transfer [1777]
• Space Weapons Tradeoff with Military Modernization Efforts [1163]
• Space Weapons Violate International Law [1159]
• Space Weapons will be Defeated by Countermeasures [1804]
• Space-Based Space Weapons Lack Survivability [1367]
• Strategic Considerations will Outweigh Arms Control Committments [1470]
• Strategic Value of Space Does not mean Space Weaponization is Inevitable [1297]
• Structural Barriers Impede China's Military Space Program [2728]
• Structural Barriers Impede U.S. Military Space Program [2729]

T

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• There is an Inherent Norm against the Use of Space Weapons [3350]
• Threat Against U.S. Space Assets is Insignificant [1156]
• Threat from Foreign Space Weapons is Underestimated [1716]

U

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• U.S. Adversaries won't be able to Effectively Exploit ISR Satellites [1299]
• U.S. can Protect Satellites through Redundancy and Rapid Reconstitution [3143]
• U.S. can Target Ground-Based Components of Space Assets Instead of Developing Space Weapons [1796]
• U.S. can't Maintain Dominance of Outer Space [1467]
• U.S. Cannot Rely on Attacking Ground-Based Components of Space Assets [1795]
• U.S. Countermeasures can Defeat Foreign Space Assets [1298]
• U.S. Deployment of Space Weapons will Dissuade Other States from Deploying [1262]
• U.S. Deployment of Space Weapons will not Dissuade Other Nations from Deploying [1371]
• U.S. Deployment of Space Weapons Won't Cause Political Backlash [1151]
• U.S. Destruction of USA 193 Spy Satellite was Justified [3347]
• U.S. Destruction of USA 193 Spy Satellite was not Justified [3348]
• U.S. does not Need Force Projection Space Weapons [1801]
• U.S. Dominance of Outer Space will Dissuade Competitors [2132]
• U.S. Dominance of Outer Space will not be Stabilizing [1379]
• U.S. Dominance of Outer Space Would be Stabilizing [1466]
• U.S. Economy Depends on Existing Space Assets [1134]
• U.S. Hegemony is Dependent on Dominance of Outer Space [1378]
• U.S. Hegemony is not Dependent on Dominance of Outer Space [1380]
• U.S. is Developing Missile Defense Systems that have Latent Anti-Satellite Capability [1690]
• U.S. is not Planning to Develop or Deploy Anti-Satellite Space Weapons [1375]
• U.S. is not Planning to Develop or Deploy Force Projection Space Weapons [1374]
• U.S. is not Planning to Develop or Deploy Space Weapons [1377]
• U.S. is not Planning to Develop or Deploy Space-Based Missile Defense [1373]
• U.S. is Planning to Develop and Deploy Anti-Satellite Space Weapons [1334]
• U.S. is Planning to Develop and Deploy Force Projection Space Weapons [1335]
• U.S. is Planning to Develop and Deploy Space Weapons [1333]
• U.S. is Planning to Develop and Deploy Space-Based Missile Defense [1372]
• U.S. Military Power Depends on Existing Space Assets [1133]
• U.S. Military Should Protect Satellites in the same way the Navy Protects Ships at Sea [1592]
• U.S. needs Force Projection Space Weapons [1802]
• U.S. Security does not Depend on Deployment of Anti-Satellite Weapons [2730]
• U.S. Security Requirements include Anti-Satellite Space Weapons [1803]
• U.S. Security Requires Development of Long-Range Strike Weapons [1571]
• U.S. Security Requires Development of Space-Based Missile Defense [2904]
• U.S. Should be Concerned about Chinese ASAT Test [2581]
• U.S. Should not be Concerned about Chinese ASAT Test [2582]
• U.S. Should Pursue Responsive Space Strategy [3144]
• U.S. Should Pursue Space Arms Control [1270]
• U.S. Should Share its Space Surveillance Data [3539]
• U.S. Space Assets are a Vulnerable Center of Gravity [1136]
• U.S. Space Assets are not a Vulnerable Center of Gravity [1296]
• U.S. Space Assets are not Vital [1284]
• U.S. Space Assets are Threatened [1135]
• U.S. Space Assets Vital [1132]
• U.S. Space Assets Vulnerable to Ground-Based Strikes [2741]
• U.S. Weaponization of Space would be Advantageous [1267]
• U.S. Weaponization of Space would be Disadvantageous [1285]
• U.S. Weaponization of Space would not be Advantageous [1286]
• U.S. Weaponization of Space would not be Disadvantageous [1266]

V

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• Verification of a Space Weapons Arms Control Agreement is Possible [1264]
• Verification of Space Weapons Arms Control is not Possible [1324]

W

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• Weaponization of other Environments not Analogous to Outer Space [1355]

 

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